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Abstract
TIME AND POLARITY
THE DIMENSIONAL THINKING OF KARL HEIM
by Atso Eerikäinen
Astonishing discoveries in the natural sciences are opening new paths
of conversation among scientists, philosophers, and theologians. It has been
recognized that each of their disciplines share a common basis: a desire to
make sense of the unknown and the unknowable. Opposition and “creative
dissonance” are changing into dialogue and consonance. On this common
basis, it is possible to improve our understanding of reality, even though we
can never fully resolve the whole mystery of reality in our quest.
Karl Heim (1874-1958) was one of the first theologians who deeply
understood the necessity of a fundamental discussion among practitioners of
science, philosophy, and theology. Heim argued that, first, we must
construct an intelligible ontological, rather than epistemological, theory,
although such a theory will have epistemological  consequences. Heim’s
dimensional doctrine was a coherent ontological theory of reality, a
“theology of nature.”
The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to analyze Karl Heim’s
dimensional thinking in the context of philosophy, science, and theology.
The main question is, is the “theology of nature”: a synthesis between the
worldpicture of current natural sciences and the religious world-view
possible on the ontological basis of Heim’s dimensional thinking? Two
auxiliary questions are posed: What is the intension of Heim’s dimensional
thinking? And what is the extension of this thinking? The most important
source of this dissertation is Heim’s six-volume work, Der evangelische
Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart . Grundzüge einer christlichen
Lebens-anschauung, which was originally published between 1931-1952.
The research method practiced here is a critical systematic analysis. Thus,
my study is not comparative, even though I occasionally compare Heim’s
thinking to other scholars’ arguments.
In order to provide a clear and systematic picture of Heim’s
dimensional thinking, this study will proceed as follows: Chapter I presents a
historical description of the evolution and philosophical battleground of his
dimensional thinking. Chapter II provides an analysis of the basic concepts
of his dimensional thinking. Chapter III analyzes and formalizes the
intension of the dimensional thinking. The goal will be to answer the first
question posed above. Chapter IV answers the second question. It is an
analysis of the main contributions of Heim’s dimensional thinking to
philosophy, science, and theology. The basic concepts of space, boundary,
and polarity, with two-dimensional time as a general denominator of Heim’s
dimensional thinking, have opened new perspectives for resolving such
ultimate metaphysical questions as the controversy of idealism and realism,
the problem of mind and body, the measurement problem of Quantum
mechanics (QM), the problems of time, cosmology, and eschatology. This
dissertation concludes with an estimation of the usefulness of Heim’s
dimensional thinking for the discussion concerning ultimate questions related
to a “Theory of Everything” (T.O.E).
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1INTRODUCTION
1. Research Problem
“If faith does not think, it is nothing.”
“If nobody asks me, I know what time is,
but if I am asked then I am at a loss
what to say.”
St. Augustine
Throughout the history of science, the “worldpicture”1 of physics has become
more generalized.2 Nowadays, physicists are seeking the ultimate answer to the mystery
of reality: a Theory of Everything (T.O.E.). If this “cosmic code” is discovered, it could
reveal a strange realm of interdimensional wormholes and time warps. Such a theory
would give us the ability to “read the mind of God,” as Cambridge cosmologist Stephen
1 The concept “worldpicture” is strictly defined as the picture of reality in physics. The concept “world-
view” is more comprehensive. Lars Haikola gave a useful definition of “world-view” in his essay, “Our
need of a World-View. The Answer of Religion and Science,” in Philosophical Studies in Religion,
Metaphysics, and Ethics. Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen, ed. Timo Koistinen and Tommi
Lehtonen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1997), pp. 60-76: “The world-view has one descriptive and
one perspective aspect. It gives a description of reality in a general way. It gives a fundamental view of
what is to be counted as real... It also includes fundamental moral convictions and other political and
esthetical values and norms. The world-view is a pattern, a structure, of reality and life… It is not only a
pattern for interpretation, but also a pattern for action.”
2 The first worldpictures were the cosmological theories of the ancient Greeks: Aristotle’s geocentric theory
of spheres, Pythagoras’s heliocentric theory, and Ptolemy’s geocentric epicyclical model. Copernicus’s
heliocentric model was a variation of these theories. These theories supposed that the stars and planets
orbit in uniform circles. The next worldpictures were the cosmological theories of classical physics in the
modern period: the cosmological theories of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. According to these theories, the
orbits of stars, planets, moons and comets are ellipses, parables or hyperbolas, and the law of universal
gravitation prevails among them. Newton’s theory describes gravity in terms of force acting at a distance.
It works well to explain our solar system, but it breaks down in strong gravitational fields. The next
generation of worldpictures was the relativity theories of Einstein. According to his Special (SR) and
General (GR) theories of relativity, the orbits of stars are open curves or orbiting ellipses. GR does not
describe gravity as a mysterious mechanical force operating across distances but as a warping of space-time
by mass and energy within it, as acceleration that depends on the curvature of space-time. Mass tells
space-time how to curve, and space-time tells mass how to move. Objects try to move on straight lines, but
their paths appear bent because space-time is curved. The next step was Quantum mechanics (QM), which
is a worldpicture still under research. It describes phenomena at the atomic level and below, but not the
substantial universe in any sense. Although contemporary physicists use “particle” language to describe
the entities that they investigate, these entities themselves seem far fro m what is ordinarily called “bits” or
“stuff.” At its most fundamental level, reality does not seem to be composed of stuff or things at all, but
instead of dynamic relations. See, for example, Stephen Hawking, The Illustrated A Brief History of Time
(New York: Bantam Books, 1996).
2Hawking believes.3 There may be a fifty-fifty chance that someone will discover the
“Holy Grail” of physics within the next twenty years. Then we could “play God”: master
space and time, and create our future without limits.4
On one side of the puzzle is Albert Einstein’s theory of GR. Einstein saw the
large-scale universe as a smooth, curved surface in four dimensions, the three dimensions
of space plus the dimension of time. The gravitational force that binds us to the earth
arises from the very structure of that space-time continuum. 5 On the other side of the
puzzle is the theory of QM. Beginning in the 1920s, a generation of scientists defined the
small-scale universe as a collection of fuzzy phantoms. These subatomic particles could
not be precisely located in space-time, but their interaction could be described in
statistical terms.6
Both theories are proven successes in their fields, but taken together they are out
of joint. The equations that explain gravitational fields are completely different from
those used for electromagnetism and subatomic interactions. Moreover, each theory is
incomplete by itself. GR cannot tell us how the Big Bang gave rise to the universe, as we
know it, or what lies within black holes created by the collapse of massive stars. QM,
meanwhile, only describes an assortment of particles, mathematical constants, and
equations without divining the sense and symmetry underlying them all. For decades,
theorists have tried various strategies to combine gravitational models and quantum
models into one set of equations. All attempts have failed, even the most advanced form
of QM, the so-called “Standard Model.” Whenever scientists tried to calculate the
equations of these theories, they arrived at meaningless infinities.7
The most promising candidates for a T.O.E. are the theories of Quantum gravity,
which describe the real world in a philosophical sense: as the foundation of the modal
3 Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p. 223, concludes: “ …if we do discover a complete theory, it should in
time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all…be able
to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that the universe and we exist. If we find the
answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason- for then we would know the mind of
God.”
4 Michio Kaku, Visions. How Science will Revolutionize the 21st Century (New York: Anchor Books 1998),
pp. 345-346.
5 Richard P. Feynman, Six not-so-easy Pieces. Einstein’s Relativity, Symmetry, and Space-Time (Reading,
MA: Perseus Books, 1997), pp. 49-71, 93-109.
6 Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, The Nature of Space and Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996), pp. 61-73.
7 Hawking, A Brief History of Time, pp. 82-103.
3world that we are able to perceive. Theoreticians have reproduced the ancient quest for
finding the answer to a very old question that is intrinsic somehow in the very structure of
consciousness. They ask: “What is the difference between a picture (or model, or
metaphor) of the world and the world as object of which this picture is made by the
process of mapping?” There are two competing theories of Quantum gravity: the theory
of superstrings and loop quantum gravity.8
Since the early 1980s, Superstring Theory has gained popularity. Brian Greene
and Michio Kaku have attempted to make it more understandable in several books.9
There is a growing acknowledgment among physicists worldwide that the universe may
actually exist in a higher-dimensional space than is commonly recognized. Superstring
theoreticians imagine the core components of the universe as strings or membranes
vibrating in at least ten-dimensions. Different “eigenmodes” of the vibrations correspond
to different types of particles. Thus, electrons, neutrinos, and other elementary particles
fit on a grand cosmic scale. Superstring theoreticians say it should come as no surprise
that the universe makes more sense in higher dimensions, because, for example, Einstein
made the universe seem more sensible by including time as the fourth dimension.
However, if the universe we only dimly understand as having four dimensions really has
ten, where are the other six dimensions? The answer may be that when the Big Bang
inflated our four dimensions into the universe as we know it the other six dimensions
collapsed into loops smaller than the smallest observed subatomic particle.10
There are millions of possible solutions for superstring equations, and figuring out
the right solution for our universe would be like picking a needle out of a galaxy-sized
haystack. Even if the theory turns out to be right, probing such shrunken dimensions
would require energies approaching the scale of the Big Bang. However, outer space
8 See, for example, Rainer E. Zimmermann, “Spinoza in Context: A Holistic Approach in Modern Terms,”
in Infinity, Causality, and Determinism. Cosmological Enterprises and Their Preconditions, ed. by Eeva
Martikainen (Forthcoming in Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2001), 24 pp. Abbreviated next:
ICD.
9See, for example, Brian R. Greene, The Elegant Universe. Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the
Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), Michio Kaku and Jennifer
Thompson, Beyond Einstein. The Cosmic Quest for the Theory of the Universe (New York: Anchor Books,
1995), and Michio Kaku, Hyperspace. A Scientific Odyssey through Parallel Universes, Time Warps, and
the Tenth Dimension (New York: Anchor Books, 1995)
10 Kaku, Hyperspace, pp.151-177 and Green, The Elegant Universe, pp. 135-227.
4could open a window to the hidden dimensions and provide at least some confirmation of
the superstring theory. By observing patterns of particles and antiparticles flying through
space, researchers just might find indirect evidence to back up this particular T.O.E.
Superstring theoreticians claim that the importance of the Superstring Theory lies in its
power to unify all known physical phenomena: gravity, electromagnetism, and strong and
weak nuclear forces.11
The second, quite similar, approach to find a T.O.E. is the so-called “Loop
quantum gravity.” Loop theoreticians try to find a background free quantum theory with
local degrees of freedom propagating causally. In the 1960s, John Wheeler argued that if
it is not possible to unify GR and QM within the world, it might be possible to unify them
outside the world. His basic idea was to introduce an abstract mathematical structure
from which space and time (and matter) as fundamental categories of the world could be
eventually derived. Thus, everything outside the world from which we might be able to
derive these fundamental categories is the foundation of the world and as such it is a non -
being. The idea is to visualize the world as a parallel variety that has become out of a
primordial unity. Loop theoreticians argue that, in fact, GR and QM are not so different
at all. The concepts of space and state turn out to be two aspects of a unified whole,
likewise space-time and process or emergence.12
Even if a T.O.E. is found, one always can and will ask how we might know that
quarks or even superstrings are not composed of still smaller entities ad infinitum. How
do we know that the visible universe is not just one of an infinite number of universes?
Why such a world and not something else? No matter how far empirical science goes,
our imagination can always go further. We are curious, and this trait has driven us
continuously to seek and organize our understanding about reality. We have the inner
need to find “the answer”: a comprehensive picture of this world, and our own place in
it.13
11 Green, The Elegant Universe, pp.178-190. Alan Boyle, “Big Mystery: A Theory of Everything” in
MSNBC: Mysteries of the Universe (http://www.msnbc.com/news, 1998).
12 Zimmermann, “Spinoza in Context,” in ICD, pp. 12-13.
13For example, Stanley L. Jaki, in his essays, The Limits of a Limitless Science and Other Essays
(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2000), argued that it is, in principle, impossible to find a T.O.E. as long as
Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theories are valid.
5A senior writer at Scientific American, John Horgan, argued in his provocative
study The End of Science that science has given rise to a marvelous paradox. The same
extraordinary progress that has led to predictions that we may soon know everything that
can be known has also nurtured doubts that we cannot know anything. When one theory
so rapidly succeeds another, how can we ever be sure that any theory is true? It seems
that Charles Sanders Peirce, a founder of pragmatism, was right when he offered the
definition of absolute truth: “It is whatever scientists say it is when they come to the end
of their labors.”14
However, can scientists really prove a theory through inductive reasoning,
repeated empirical tests, or observations? Karl Popper asserted that observations can
never prove a theory, but they can only disprove or falsify it. He denied that science
could ever be reduced to a formal, logical system in which raw data is methodologically
converted into truth. A scientific theory can be true, but we cannot know absolutely that
it is true. There are questions beyond our cognitive abilities. Science could never answer
questions about the meaning and purpose of the universe, for example, because its
answers are only quantitative. Similarly, the lesson of QM is that nothing is completely
determined, nothing is certain, and nothing is predictable. There are only propensities for
things to occur. Science ultimately depends upon the illogical creative exercise of human
imagination for its development of explanatory theories.15
Thomas Kuhn, in his book on the philosophy of science, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, argued, against Popper, that falsification is no more possible than
verification. A priori paradigms (which are collections of procedures or ideas, what to
believe and how to work) guide scientists. If a paradigm does not work, its anomalies
may trigger a revolution, and the old paradigm is abandoned for a new one. Therefore,
science is neither a continual building process, nor constantly approaching the truth. It
does not evolve toward anything, but only away from something. In addition, says Kuhn,
some day science could end. All scientific theories are, in the end, equally untrue,
14 John Horgan, The End of Science. Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age
(New York: Broadway Books, 1997), pp. 31-32. See also Stanley L. Jaki, Means to Message: A Treatise
on Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), pp.43-61, and Ted Peters,
“Science and Theology: Toward Consonance,” in Science &Theology. The New Consonance, ed. Ted
Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 11-39. Next abbreviated: ST.
15 Horgan, The End of Science, pp. 33-41, an interview with Karl Popper.
6because we cannot discover the truth, we cannot find any final answer. For as long as
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are valid, the mathematical structure of that theory
cannot contain within itself its own proof of consistency. We can never be sure that the
assumptions with which we started are self-consistent or true. There will be things that
we assume to be true but they cannot be proved.16
Such metaphysical questions as “Why is there a universe?” “Why is there
something, rather than nothing?” or “Why such and not something else?” are as real, but
as unresolved, today as they ever were. It is a task of philosophers and theologians to
answer those ultimate metaphysical and cosmological questions, but they have left this
task to the physicists, even if the metaphysical problems have no much or nothing to do
with physics, as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, among others, have proved.17
In recent years, a desire to make sense out of the unknown and the unknowable has
brought philosophers, scientists, and theologians closer to each other. Astonishing
discoveries in the natural sciences, such as mentioned above, are cultivating fruitful soil
for dialogue. It seems likely that the scientific community is moving to an era of
radically new possibilities of dialogue and consonance. 18 To assist such a task, a
functional metaphysics, especially one focused on ontology, could help us toward a
coherent vision of reality, as Ian G. Barbour has emphasized.19 The purpose of this
dialogue cannot be an integration of science, philosophy, and theology. It is impossible
because scientists can only measure physical aspect of reality and present generalized sets
16 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1962), and Horgan, The End of Science, pp. 41-48. Physicist Charles H. Townes believed in his “Logic and
Uncertainties in Science and Religion,” in ST, pp.45-46, that “science must operate with the faith of reason
that human logic can, in the long run, understand nature’s laws, and that these laws are consistent.” See
also Paul Davies, “Is the Universe Absurd?” in ST, pp. 65-76.
17 See Peter van Inwangen and Dean W. Zimmermann, “Introduction,” in Metaphysics:The Big Question,
ed. by Peter van Inwangen and Dean W. Zimmermann (New York: Blackwell, 1998), pp.1-13, Michael J.
Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-17, Stanley L. Jaki,
Is There a Universe? (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, and Olli Koistinen, “On the
Relationship between Metaphysics and Physics,” in ICD, pp. 1-10.
18 Robert John Russell, “Bridging Science and Religion: Why It Must be Done” (http://www.ctns.org,
1999), and “Theology and Science: Current Issues and Future Directions” (http://www.meta-
library.net/rjr/index-body.html, 2000).
19 Ian G. Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A
Common Quest for Understanding, ed. Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J. and George V.
Coyne, S.J. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1997), pp. 21-45. Abbreviated next: PPT. See also
John Polkinghorne, Science & Theology. An Introduction (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 4-
24.
7of quantitative correlations about it, and what remains, that is, non-quantitative aspect of
reality, is the field of philosophers and theologians.20 Freeman Dyson explained clearly
this truth by arguing, “Science and religion are two windows that people look through,
trying to understand the big universe outside, trying to understand why we are here. The
two windows give different views, but they look out the same universe. Both views are
one-sided, neither is complete. Both leave out essential features of the real world, and
both are worthy of respect.”21 On this common basis, it may be possible to improve our
understanding of reality, even if we cannot ever solve the whole mystery of the world, of
our minds, and of God.
Karl Heim (1874-1958) 22 realized that theologians have to look at reality also
through the “window” of science. He saw that it was necessary to start a constructive
dialogue and interaction among philosophers, scientists, and theologians. In order to
relate theology with science and philosophy, Heim understood the necessity of a
consistent and coherent, adequate and applicable epistemology, language, and
methodology with which to relate such ultimate mysteries as the world, the mind, and
God. To assist such a task, he constructed his ontological theory of reality: “theology of
nature.”23
20 Jaki, The Limits, pp. 1-23.
21 Freeman Dyson, “New Mercies: The Price and Promise of Human Progress,” in Science & Spirit, 3
(2000), p. 37.
22 Karl Heim’s last book was his autobiography: Ich gedenke der vorigen Zeiten. Erinnerungen aus acht
Jahrzenten (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1957, reprinted 1980). There are four biographies of Heim:
Friedrich Hauss, Karl Heim. Der Denker des Glaubens (Giessen, 1960); Gert Schörle, Du Herr bist Kraft
und Leben. Karl Heim: sein Leben und Werk (Stuttgart, 1961); Adolf Köberle, Karl Heim. Denker und
Verkündiger aus evangelischen Glauben (Hamburg: Furche Verlag, 1973), and Karl Heim. Leben und
Denken. (Stuttgart: J.F. Steinkopf Verlag, 1979). See also Hans-Georg Erdmannsdörfer, “Karl Heims
Beitrag zur Auseinanderstzung zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Theologie,” in Glaube und Denken.
Jahrbuch der Karl-Heim-Gesellschaft. 9. Jahrgang 1996, ed. by Hans Schwarz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter
Lang, 1996), pp. 11-46. Abbreviated next: GDJ.
23 Manfred Büttner, “Das physikotheologische System Karl Heims und seine Einordnung in die Geschichte
der Beziehungen zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaften,” Kerygma und Dogma 4 (1973), pp. 267-
268, argued that Heim’s thinking was “physico-theological.” So-called “physico-theology” began in the
seventeenth century in the work of Voetius. It means there is some kind of synthesis between theology and
science, whose aim is to ask about the possibility of God’s existence in the gaps of science. I argue that the
term of “theology of nature” explains Heim’s purpose better than the term of “physico-theology” because
Heim was neither a theologian interested in such “gaps” in science nor a natural theologian, but a
theologian who wanted to show what is important for the relationship between science, philosophy, and
theology in God’s reality. For example, Barbour in “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” in PPT, pp.
41-45, and Ernan McMullin in “Natural Science and Belief in a Creator: Historical Notes,” in PPT, pp. 63-
8Karl Heim was one of the first theologians in the twentieth century who tried to
make the worldpicture of natural science consonant with a biblical christocentric-
eschatological world-view. Such consonance was possible, he argued, by thinking
“dimensionally.” Heim’s dimensional thinking was based on the concept of two-
dimensional time, which was a theory he developed from 1902. According to Heim, time
has not only a physical dimension but also an eternal dimension. From this revolutionary
concept of two-dimensional time, with the subsequent additions of the “dimensional
boundary” and “polarity” versus “supra-polarity,” came a remarkable solution to the
ultimate questions about reality, as we shall see.
Heim described his life and thinking in his autobiography and some other
memoirs.24 He believed that the living heritage of Schwabian pietism in his home most
heavily influenced his thinking.25 When Heim was studying at the University of
Tübingen (1892-96), Albert Ritschl’s theology dominated there, as in most European
universities. According to Ritschl, whose theology was influenced by Immanuel Kant
and Friedrich Schleiermacher, there are two kinds of sentences: statements of facts and
judgments of value. Statements of facts present scientific facts, whereas judgments of
value describe other things, such as theological matters. René Descartes had already
divided reality into the realms of matter and of mind, and Kant had divided it into the
realms of pure and practical reason, of knowledge and faith, of facts and values, of
68, argued quite similarly with Heim. Wolfhard Pannenberg also used the term “theology of nature” to
define his endeavor in Toward a Theology of Nature. Essays on Science and Faith, ed. by Ted Peters
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993).
24 See Karl Heim, “Zur Einführung,” in Glaube und Leben. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Vorträge (Berlin:
Furche-Verlag, 1928), pp. 11-36 (abbreviated next: GL), and “Einführung,” in Leben aus dem Glauben
(Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1932), pp. 7-16. There is also a chapter about Heim’s early years’ works in his
autobiography, Ich gedenke der vorigen Zeiten, pp. 67-79.
25 Mystic, spiritual, and pansophic Schwabian Pietism arose in the seventeenth century from the thinking of
Johann Valentin Andreäs, and its adherents included Johan Albrecth Bengel, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger,
Michael Hahn, Johann Tobias Beck, Ludwig Hofacker, Johann Christoph and Christoph Blumhard. The
synthesis of Christology, cosmology, and eschatology in their thinking was the key to interpretation of
revelation in the cosmic process of the universal history. The famous representatives of German
speculative idealism, Schelling and Hegel, were also heirs of Schwabian Pietism. See Adolf Köberle, “Das
schwäbisch-spekulative Erbe in der Theologie Karl Heims,” in Theologische Beiträge 5 (1974), pp. 14-24.
9science and religion. Ritschl’s Kantian assumptions continued to separate science and
theology completely for another century.26
As traveling secretary of the German Christian Student Federation, Heim
participated in the international conference of Christian students held in Paris in 1900.
The theme of his lecture was “Belief and Thinking” (Glaube und Denken), which later
became the title of his opus magnum.27 Heim metaphorically compared the process of his
thinking with a “river” that must break a “channel” through a “mountain,” that is, through
God’s revelation and action in the world. The curves of the river can be understood only
if we can know the form of the mountain. He argued that the “direction” of his thinking
was determined by a passion to understand the mysterious existence into which we are
thrown. This endeavor was neither some exercise in Christian apologetic nor missionary
work to fill the “gaps“ of science, as some critics of Heim have asserted. Heim thought,
as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had thought about philosophy, that theology must elevate
itself to the level of “science on everything” (Wissenschaft vom Ganzen). Heim’s aim
was to resolve the problem of how we could reduce the chaotic plenitude of phenomena
to the fewest, simplest, and most reliable singularities (Urgegebenheit), and describe
reality in consonance with scientific facts based on those singularities. This kind of
“theory of everything” was such an important goal to Heim that he did not fear the
criticism to be expected from theologians who strictly separated science and theology, as
Ritschl and Karl Barth did. A “worldpicture of the future,” a “theology of nature,” where
the conscious minds “I” and “Thou” and the objective world “It” are in a coherent and
inseparable relationship with “God,” was the purpose of Heim’s work.28
26 Heim’s studies under such Ritschlian theologian as Theodor Haering played a secondary role in his
development. Of much greater influence was the revolutionary religious awakening that took place in
1893. According to Heim’s Ich gedenke, pp. 31-36, “Es geschah gleich im Anfang meiner Studienzeit
etwas, das von entscheidender Bedeutung für meine ganze Zukunft werden sollte, ein Ereignis, das stärker
auf mich einwirkte als die glänzenden Vorlesungen unseres Philosophen Sigwart über Logik und
Anthropologie… Dieses Ereignis bestand darin, daß zum erstenmal ein wirklich grosser und
geistesmächtiger Evangelist, nämlich Elias Schrenk, in meinen Gesichtskreis trat… Es gab ein kurzes, aber
befreiendes und erquickendes Gespräch, bei dem es zur bedingungslosen Kapitulation kam und damit zu
dem radikalem Neuanfang… Das war der schöpferische Neubeginn meines inneren Lebens.”
27 Ibid., p. 56.
28 GL, pp. 11-26.
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Karl Heim was both an intellectual and a “therapeutic” thinker in his journey to
build interaction between science and theology. 29 Among theologians of the twentieth
century, he was years ahead his time. In the opinion of Hans-Rudolf Müller-Schwefe,
Heim was a genius of the caliber of Max Planck and Albert Einstein.30 Quantum
physicist Pascual Jordan honored Heim by arguing that Heim proved how it is possible to
understand God’s existence, revelation, and action in our world within a scientific
context.31
2. Previous Research on Heim’s Work
Heim’s distinctive method, which he termed “thinking in spaces” (Denken in
Räume), to build an intelligible and reliable ontology of reality consonant with theology,
philosophy, and the natural sciences has been without equal among theologians on the
first half of the twentieth century, but it has largely been abandoned after the rise of Karl
Barth’s dialectical method of theology.32 Heim’s thinking has been subject of quite a few
29 Friso Melzer, “Nachwort. Karl Heims Bedeutung für meinen Lebensweg,” in Karl Heim, Die Gemeinde
des Auferstandenen. Tübinger Vorlesungen über den Ersten Korintherbrief, ed. by Friso Melzer (Gießen:
Brunnen Verlag, 1987), pp. 253-271. Helmut Thielicke, “Zu Gast auf einem schönen Stern,” in
Erinnerungen (Hamburg, 1984) pp. 216-219, states “Ich gewann den Eindruck, daß Karl Heims Person
selbst kaum von Relativismus angefochten wurde, daß er vielmehr im Frieden einer Glaubensgewißheit
ruhte, die durch keine ernsthafte Erschütterung bedroht war. Er war, wenn ich es so a usdrücken darf, eher
ein ‘diakonischer Denker,’ der die Nöte anderer auf sich nahm und sich zu eigen machte, um gleichsam
stellvertretend – da ihm das entsprechende Ingenium verliehen war! – einen Ausweg aus der geistigen
Umzingelung zu suchen.”
30 Hans Rudolf Müller-Schwefe, “Einführung,” in Dimensionen der Wirklichkeit. Die Bedeutung Karl
Heims für die Theologie unserer Zeit 1 (1974), pp. 1-2.
31 Pascual Jordan, “Unbekannter Karl Heim,” in Begegnungen (Oldenburg und Hamburg, 1971), pp. 107-
113. Heim had his detractors, of course. Charles A. Coulson, for example, bluntly rejected Heim’s
endeavor saying, “[this type of metaphysical dogmatism] cuts no ice with the professional scientist who
feels hamstrung right away when told to accommodate his science to some reality beyond his reach,” in
Erwin N. Hiebert, “Modern Physics and Christian Faith,” in God and Nature. Historical Essays on the
Encounter between Christianity and Science, ed. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 441-442.
32 Müller-Schwefe, “Einführung,” p. 1, said: “Es ist ein sehr merkwürdiges Phänomen, daß dieser Mann
so gut wie vergessen ist.” Walter Künneth said in his autobiography, Lebensführungen (Wuppertal:
Aussaat Verlag, 1979), p. 54: “Es eine irreführende Analyse der Theologiegeschichte sei, nur an Karl Barth
zu erinnern und Karl Heim zu verschweigen.” See also Zdeňek Kučera’s entry, “Heim, Karl,” in
Theologische Realenzyklopädie. Band XIV (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), pp. 774-777, “Heims
Fundamentaltheologie hat in den Jahren nach dem 2. Weltkrieg in Deutschland nur wenig Resonanz
gefunden; anders dagegen in der Tschechoslowakei. Doch in unserer gegenwärtigen Situation zeigt sich,
daß vor allem Heims theologischem Personalismus noch immer eine Dynamik innewohnt, die das
theologische Gespräch heute erneut befruchten könnte.”
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books or essays. Strictly speaking, Heim’s main contribution to the discussion
concerning the ultimate questions of reality, dimensional thinking, has not been critically
researched at all. 33
There were only five dissertations on Heim’s work written before his death in
1958. These dissertations focused on the concept of the certainty of faith in Heim’s
thinking. When these were written Heim’s dimensional thinking had not taken the final
form it would have since 1934, when the revised Glaube und Denken was published at
first time. Heim continuously reconstructed his thinking vis-à-vis the scientific
discoveries of his time.
In his dissertation, Hans Joachim Iwand critically analyzed Heim’s concept of the
certainty of faith.34 According to Iwand, Heim tried to prove with the help of Kant’s
antinomies that faith is the fundamental motif or cause of all human experiences. Iwand
argued that it is impossible to combine Kant’s antinomies with any theological system,
and that Heim’s logical and epistemological argument was a circulus vitiosus.35
Wilhelm Heyderich compared the theological basis of Heim and F.H.R. Frank in
his dissertation.36 According to Heyderich, the certainty of faith is the most important
theological basis for Heim and Frank, but their models of certainty and the positions of
these models in theology differ radically. Frank’s certainty of faith is psychological,
33 There are monographs and essays on various aspects of Heim’s theology, such as: Walter Ruttenberg ,
Die apologetisch-theologische Methode Karl Heims (Leipzig-Erlangen: A. Deither’sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1925), Heinz Erich Eisenhuth, Die Entwicklung des Problems der
Glaubensgewißheit bei Karl Heim (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1928), Erdmann Schott, Das
Problem der Glaubensgewißheit. In Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Heim erörtert (Greifswald: Verlag
Ratsbuchhandlung, 1931), Edgar Leonhard Allen, A Guide to the Thoughts of Karl Heim. Jesus Our Leader
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), Heinrich Schulte, Vom Weltbilde Karl Heims. Zu seinem
Gesamtwerk “Der evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart” (Stuttgart: Druckerei Körner,
1963), and Horst W. Beck, Götzendämmerung in der Wissenschaften. Karl Heim-Profet und Pionier
(Wuppertal: Verlag Rolf Brockhaus, 1974). The Karl-Heim-Archive is located at the Albrecht Bengel
House in Tübingen. It holds the largest bibliographical collection of Heim and on Heim. Unfortunately,
the manuscripts and correspondence of Karl Heim are missing. Of course, these are still not all the
materials on Heim from universities around the world.
34 H.J. Iwand, Über die methodische Verwendung von Antinomien in der Religionsphilosophie. Dargestellt
an Karl Heims “Glaubensgewißheit” (Königsberg, 1924). A copy of the unpublished dissertation is
located at the Karl-Heim-Archive in Tübingen.
35 See also “Über die methodische Verwendung,” in H.J. Iwand, Nachgelassene Werke, Band VI, ed. H.
Gollwitzer, W. Kreck, K.G. Steck, and E. Wolf (München, 1974), pp. 327-329.
36 W. Heyderich, Die Bedeutung einer christlichen Gewißheitslehre für die systematische Theologie in
Auseinandersetzung mit den von F.H.R. Frank und K. Heim vertretenen theologischen Grundpositionen
(Göttingen: Leopold Klotz Verlag, 1934).
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whereas Heim’s idea is ontological. When Heyderich wrote his dissertation, the first part
of Heim’s main work had just been published in 1931. It included Heim’s early ideas
about dimensional doctrine, but Heyderich did not analyze them.
The next dissertations on Heim, after a twenty years’ silence, argued over the
contribution of Heim’s method to the apologetic discussion in the secular culture of the
twentieth century. Carl Michalson, Francis Burger, and John Pemberton analyzed
Heim’s thinking only from this point of view. Their descriptions of Heim’s dimensional
thinking are correct, but they did not systematically analyze it. 37
Hans Schwarz compared the understanding of miracles in the theologies of Heim
and Rudolf Bultmann.38 According to Schwarz, both Heim’s and Bultmann’s intention
was to help skeptical and disbelieving people to believe in God without any sacrifice of
the intellect. To both men the ontology o f Heidegger was important for analyzing human
existence. For both of them, Christology was the center of dogmatic study. However,
there was a fundamental difference in their thinking. Bultmann demythologized the
biblical world-view, whereas Heim demythologized the “modern” world-views. As the
three dissertations discussed above, Schwarz’s analysis of Heim’s dimensional thinking
was incomplete.
James Cecil Logan examined the work of three twentieth century theologians:
Karl Heim, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Friedrich Gogarten. Their major efforts were
directed towards explaining the relationship of Christian theology with the secular stance
of modern man. 39 Logan’s examination is an analysis within the history of ideas, that of
“salvation history.” The crisis of secularism for Heim was the crisis of transcendence,
and his dimensional thinking became the foundation on which a new expression of
transcendence could be predicated. In his response to Heim’s thinking, Logan argued
that Heim’s world-view rests upon a type of inward and primal cognition of values and
37 Carl Michalson, “The Task of Apologetics in the Future. Karl Heim’s Theology after Fifty Years,” in
Scottish Journal of Theology 6 (1953), pp. 362-378, Francis Burger, Karl Heim as Apologeet (Amsterdam:
T. Wever-Franeker, 1954), and John Pemberton III, Karl Heim’s Conception of the Apologetic Task of
Christian Theology (University of Duke, 1958). A copy of Pemberton’s unpublished dissertation is located
at the Karl-Heim-Archive in Tübingen.
38 Hans Schwarz, Das Verständnis des Wunders bei Heim und Bultmann (Stuttgart: Calver Verlag,1966).
39 James Cecil Logan, The Secular as a Theological Problem. A Study in the Theologies of Karl Heim,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Friedrich Gogarten (Boston University, 1966). A copy of this unpublished
dissertation is located at the Karl-Heim-Archive in Tübingen.
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not upon scientifically verifiable facts. According to Logan, Heim’s confusion
concerning his metaphysical basis is furthered by his failure to distinguish between the
metaphysical and the epistemological intentions of statements. Logan’ s analysis of
Heim’s dimensional thinking is, however, extremely cursory, and thus his conclusion is a
jump into a swamp.
Hermann Timm focused on the interaction between faith  and the natural sciences
in Heim’s theology.40 He thoroughly analyzed Heim’s thoughts concerning the crisis in
the natural sciences, the concepts of time and space, and the problem of transcendence in
secular culture. His description of Heim’s dimensional thinking was, alas, not at all
systematic. There are also shortcomings concerning the origins of Heim’s thinking.
Timm forgot the impact of at least Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Heinrich Rickert, Paul Natorp,
and Edmund Husserl on Heim.
Timm concluded his work by claiming that Heim’s thoughts provide a possibility
for Christians to understand and speak about faith and science without linguistic troubles.
According to Timm, Heim’s dimensional thinking, where theology and science are
complementary, has resolved the problems of time and transcendence. However, he did
not realize that Heim’s concept of time is two-dimensional.
Dwight Calvert Steward compared the concept of space in the philosophies of
Heim and Alfred North Whitehead.41 The focus of Steward’s dissertation was the
philosophy of Whitehead. His analysis of Heim’s philosophy was only a point of
reference. However, Heim’s system, according to Steward, corresponds better to science
as currently practiced, because its concept of space is n-dimensional, whereas
Whitehead’s metaphysical system was based on the Newtonian three-dimensional world.
Steward traced some interesting similarities and differences between Heim and
Whitehead. A doctrine of panpsychism found in both men’s work constituted a rejection
of materialism and positivism. The concepts of consciousness-spaces (Heim) and actual
occasions (Whitehead) are quite similar. Both men spoke of the “in-flux” character of
40 Hermann Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft in der Theologie Karl Heims (Witten/Berlin: Eckart-
Verlag, 1968).
41 Dwight Calvert Steward, A Study of the Philosophies of Karl Heim and Alfred Whitehead With Special
Attention to Their Concepts of Space and Bearing of These on Certain Religious-Philosophical Ideas
(Northwestern University of Evanston, 1973). A copy of this unpublished dissertation is located at Karl-
Heim-Archive in Tübingen.
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the present as contrasted with the settled character of the past. Heim’s portrayal of the
process of becoming was similar to Whitehead’s doctrine of “perishing.” Finally, both
men rejected solipsism, Heim as a realist and Whitehead as a critical idealist.
According to Steward, the most important difference between Heim and
Whitehead is their concept of the transcendence of God. According to Heim, it is “supra-
polar,” which means that the personal God is unchanged and independent from the world.
According to Whitehead, God’s transcendence is “bi-polar,” which means that the
apersonal God is continuously changing and that God requires the world. Moreover, man
is a co-creator of the universe with God. Whitehead’s metaphysical system is
teleological but not eschatological. According to Steward, the main reason for
differences between Heim and Whitehead was their basic philosophy: Whitehead, a
mathematician, was a Platonist, whereas Heim rejected Platonism in favor of realism.
Altogether, Steward’s analysis of Heim’s dimensional thinking was incomplete.
Therefore, he did not realize that Heim’s aim was to unify idealism and realism.
Ingemar Holmstrand analyzed critically the concept of the transcendence of God
in Heim’s thinking.42 He constructed some analytical concepts, such as “total view of
reality” and “basic assumption,” and four criteria, those of “universality,” “philosophy,”
“science,” and “existential criterion,” to judge the problem of transcendence in Heim’s
thinking. Unfortunately, Holmstrand’s analysis concerning Heim’s dimensional thinking
was misleading. Selecting only a few texts from Heim’s oeuvre for his analysis did not
do justice to Heim. Holmstrand’s arguments raised more questions than they gave
answers.
The most interesting point in Holmstrand’s dissertation was his comparison of
Heim with Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, as applied to religion, and with Thomas
F. Torrance’s theory of multileveled knowledge. Holmstrand argued that Heim’s
philosophy of spaces could be seen as a theory of paradigms in the same way as Kuhn
used the idea. Heim’s “supra-polar space” is an effort to construct an ultimate paradigm
that unifies everything and eliminates every anomaly. Holmstrand also argued that
42 Ingemar Holmstrand, Karl Heim on Philosophy, Science and the Transcendence of God (Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980).
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Torrance’s notion of “levels of inquiry” is similar to Heim’s notion of space. Both are
conceptual frameworks for ordering continuous reality.
Rolf Hille analyzed Heim’s apologetic and philosophical arguments toward
idealistic philosophies and pantheistic religions.43 He produced a handbook on and about
Heim, without which it would be much more difficult to research Heim. Roughly, the
half of Hille’s book consists of an introduction and bibliographies, and only the
remaining half contains any analysis. Although Hille agreed with Heim’s critics that the
notion of dimensional thinking is an empty one, his work, nevertheless, discussed an
important function of the dimensional doctrine in Heim’s thinking, namely, that it is a
new method in the mission against all forms of absolutist world-views.
According to Hille, Heim argued that Christian theology is dualistic, yet its
ontology is monistic, whereas both in pantheism and in idealism, theology is monistic
and ontology is dualistic. However, Hille is incorrect with his assessment. Heim’s
theology was also monistic, because between polar and supra-polar reality is continuity,
not discontinuity, as we will see later. Hille has not noticed the continuity, because he
did not analyze Heim’s dimensional thinking.
Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt studied the certainty of faith in Heim’s epistemology, in
the context of the philosophical influence of EdmundHusserl.44 According to her,
Heim’s main concern was the unity of thinking and believing. The means to explore the
unity demanded an exploration into philosophy, especially epistemology. In order to
avoid conflict between thinking and believing, Heim argued against Kant’s idea of pure
forms of intuition. Heim used the phenomenology of Husserl, but he misunderstood it in
some crucial points. In the opinion of Gräb-Schmidt, Heim never was successful in his
arguments against Kant. Instead, Heim developed his unique method, his “epistemology
of faith,” on the ground of the concept of “non-objectifiable,” which is an absurd concept
according to Husserl. Heim’s aim, according to Gräb-Schmidt, was to build an
epistemological foundation of faith. His intellectual conscience could not rest before a
43 Rolf Hille, Das Ringen um den säkularen Menschen. Karl Heims Auseinandersetzung mit der
idealistischen Philosophie und den panteistischen Religionen (Gießen: Brunnen Verlag, 1990).
44 Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt, Erkenntnistheorie und Glaube. Karl Heims Theorie der Glaubensgewissheit
vor dem Hintergrund seiner Auseinandersetzung mit dem philosophischen Ansatz Edmund Husserls.
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).
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solution was found to this problem. Either the epistemological conditions of reality were
false or the Christian faith was an illusion. For Heim, knowledge is based on revelation,
which means that faith and thinking belong together but faith goes before thinking.
Therefore, Heim not only tried to justify faith with epistemology but also epistemology
must be proven by faith, because believing and thinking (Glaube und Denken) belong
inseparably together and are complement each other. Gräb-Schmidt asked: “Does Heim
really want to think, or does he from the beginning want to prove possibility of faith?” 45
Her dissertation is the critical analysis of Heim’s epistemology, and her criticism about
Heim’s earlier works is as sharp as that found in Iwand’s thesis of 1924, but she was
unaware what Iwand had said.
Toward the end of her analysis, Gräb-Schmidt made a brief reference to Heim’s
dimensional thinking, but her question whether Heim’s dimensional thinking was
epistemological (Erkennen) or only an emotional experience (Erlebnis) was not
answered, because she did not analyze ontology of Heim’s dimensional thinking. She did
not realize that Heim’s earlier thinking was also an endeavor, with the help of Husserl’s
work, to construct an “ontological epistemology,” not just a “theological epistemology.”
Verena Grüter analyzed comparatively Heim’s Christology and eschatology in a
theological and historical context.46 The development of Heim’s Christology and
eschatology, and their position in the theological discussion are analyzed critically.
However, Grüter did not analyze the role of dimensional thinking in Heim’s Christology
or his eschatology. Therefore, she did not realize that Heim sought to provide clarity in
theology with his dimensional perspective for those wrestling with theological questions,
not to write an ecclesiastical dogmatics for theologians, as Karl Barth did.
Helmut Krause has written the most recent study on Heim. Krause studied the
interdependence of theology, physics, and philosophy in Heim’s thinking.47 According to
Krause, Heim battled with “twilight of the gods” of absolute space, time, object, and
causal determinism in favor of faith in God. Heim proved how relative reality was
45
“Will Heim wirklich denken oder will er von Anfang an den Glauben als denkmöglich beweisen?” Ibid.,
p. 18.
46 Verena Grüter, Begegnung mit dem göttlichen Du –Karl Heims Christologie im theologiegeschichtlichen
Kontext (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 1992).
47 Helmut Krause, Theologie, Physik und Philosophie im Weltbild Karl Heims. Das Absolute in Physik und
Philosophie in theologischer Interpretation (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994).
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constituted. He found a solution to the issues of subject-object, of monism-dualism, and
of immanence-transcendence.
In the opinion of Krause, and many others, Heim’s concept of “supra-polar space”
was a mistake because it meant that faith and thinking were no longer complementary but
in conflict. Krause did not realize that in Heim’s dimensional thinking there is no
discontinuity between polar and supra-polar reality. Regrettably, no scholar of Heim’s
work has correctly understood his dimensional thinking, and especially his ingenious
concepts of “two-dimensional time-space” and “supra-polar space.” The purpose of this
dissertation is to fill this gap.
3. Research Method, Sources, and Liter ature
The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to analyze Karl Heim’s dimensional
thinking in the context of philosophy, science, and theology. The main question is, is the
“theology of nature,” a synthesis of the current worldpicture of the natural sciences and a
religious worldview, possible on the ontological basis of Heim’s dimensional thinking?
Two auxiliary questions are posed: What is the intension of Heim’s dimensional
thinking? And what is the extension of his dimensional thinking? The “intension” of a
concept refers to the combination of qualities that is necessary for the application of that
concept. The “extension” is the class of the objects to which the concept can be
applicable. The meaning of “intension” in this dissertation is the structure of Heim’s
dimensional thinking, which forms the ontological basis and language for the discussion
among philosophers, scientists, and theologians. The meaning of “extension” in this
dissertation is the contributions of Heim’s dimensional thinking to philosophy, to science,
and to theology.48
48 According to Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 30-33, “intension” (connotation) and “extension”
(denotation) are inseparable. There are three possibilities concerning “intension”: subjective, conventional,
and objective. The subjective intension of term means the sum total of attributes that are present to the
mind of any person employing the term. The conventional intension of term connotates the set of attributes
those are essential to it. The objective intension or “comprehension” may signify all the attributes, which
the objects in the denotation of a term have in common, whether these attributes are known, or not. See
also Raili Kauppi, Einführung in die Theorie der Begriffssysteme. Acta Universitatis Tamperensis. Ser.
A.Vol 15 (Tampere, 1967), pp. 12-18.
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I have pursued a critical systematic analysis of Heim’s dimensional thinking by
using the logical empirism practiced by the Vienna Circle as a point of reference (even if
its arguments are commonly rejected nowadays), because it was a major current within
philosophy in Heim’s lifetime, and because Heim’s attitude toward it was negative.49
The second, subsidiary, purpose of my dissertation is to present Heim’s dimensional
thinking as a formalized appearance.
The most important source for this dissertation is Heim’s opus magnum, Der
evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart. Grundzüge einer christlichen
Lebensanschauung, which originally was published in six volumes between 1931 and
1952. To present a clear and systematic picture of Karl Heim’s dimensional thinking
requires an outline of the evolution of his dimensional thinking,50 and a description of his
philosophical battleground (Chapter I), a systematic analysis of the basic concepts of his
dimensional thinking (Chapter II), and a systematic analysis of the intension of his
dimensional thinking (Chapter III). One can then suggest an answer to the question
concerning the intension of Heim’s dimensional thinking posed above. Finally, the
answer to the question concerning the extension of Heim’s dimensional thinking requires
an analysis of its contributions to philosophy, to science, and to theology. Although the
intension of the dimensional thinking is concerning with ontology, its extension is
focused on epistemology (Chapter IV). I conclude my study by estimating the
usefulness of Heim’s dimensional thinking for the discussion about the ultimate questions
related to a T.O.E.
While the focus of this dissertation is on the six volumes of Heim’s main work, an
insufficient analysis of his dimensional thinking would result, if one did not consider all
of Heim’s oeuvre. Moreover, although my study is not comparative, it is impossible to
avoid a critical comparison among Heim, his critics, and other scholars.
49GN, 230. Heim accepted only Hans Reichenbach’s philosophy of space-time. About logical empirism
and its adherents, see J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna
Station, ed. by Linda Wessels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 171-374.
50 The analysis of roots of Heim’s thinking is only indirect, because Heim’s whole library was sold and
dispensed, soon after his death. In addition, Heim’s correspondence with such thinkers as Einstein is
missing, and Heim seldom used bibliographical footnotes in his work. However, for example, the name
index of his main work includes 367 names. Heim referred mostly to Fichte, Einstein, Hegel, Heidegger,
Heisenberg, Jordan, Kant, Luther, Newton, Planck, Reichenbach, and Schelling.
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Chapter I
AN OUTLINE OF HEIM’S DIMENSIONAL THINKING
1. Evolution of Heim’s Dimensional Thinking
There seem to have been four periods in Heim’s thinking. The first one ended
around 1906, the second one in 1920, the third one in 1928, and fourth one lasted until his
death in 1958. During each period, Heim’s thinking changed as he confronted with
scientific discoveries and philosophical ideas of the day. He was not interested in
traditional theology, but he wanted to construct a modern “theology of nature” in which
believing and thinking worked in consonance with philosophy and science.1
A. The first period (1899-1906): Heim’s Decision-category
Heim started his academic career by studying the epistemology and logic of
Thomas Hobbes, who was perhaps the most well known materialist and nominalist of the
seventeenth century. 2 Hobbes rejected free will in favor of determinism, and he rejected
both Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy in favor of the philosophy of Galileo, which
largely treated the cosmos as matter in motion. The motion of bodies was the basis of
Hobbes’ metaphysics. For example, there are two kinds of bodies ruled by the
fundamental principle of motion: natural bodies of the physical world and artificial
bodies, or social groups, culminating in “the state.” Man moves in both of them. The
mind is a link between natural and artificial bodies. Hobbes abandoned the obscurantism
and dualism of Descartes and other rationalists, and he applied the new mathematical and
mechanical principles of Galileo to the mind as well as matter. He thus established a
mechanical empiricism in which thinking becomes arithmetic. Hobbes also imposed
severe limitations on philosophical knowledge. He argued that we would never be able
1 It is impossible to say exactly when one period ends and another one begins. I have supposed that
changes in Heim’s thinking became visible in the fully revised editions of his works, and the publishing
years serve as rough boundaries.
2 Unfortunately Heim’s unpublished dissertation, Die Grundzüge der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik von
Hobbes (University of Tübingen, 1899), is lost. Heim subsequently referred to it only in passing.
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to know completely the external world. It may be real, but if so, we cannot detect or
prove its reality. What we know about the world is the result of stimuli coming from the
motions of the external world and acting upon the substance of our brains. The resulting
sense perceptions are all that we can be conscious of, and they reveal only our reactions
to external stimuli, not the external world as it really is. 3
Like Hobbes, Heim held a negative position toward Cartesian dualism. Descartes
had argued that the human body was a machine, and subject to the same mechanical laws
of nature as amachine. The mind, however, as an essence of the human being, was a
non-material entity. Therefore, causal laws did not govern it. Because human beings
were thought to be essentially non-material and spiritual beings, they could not be
subjects of inquiry for a philosopher of nature. Hobbes had rejected this conception, but
Heim argued that there is an inseparable relationship between mind and body.
Epistemologically, knowledge depended on the relation between mind and body. Like
Hobbes, Heim was interested in the physiology of the knowledge process. His aim, like
that of Hobbes, was not to discover a soul or spirit in the brain, and thus renounce all
speculations of faith, but to seek every possible connection between mind and body for
the certainty of faith.4
In his first, and I think most suggestive publication, Psychologismus oder
Antipsychologismus. Entwurf einer erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentierung der
modernen Energetik (PA), 5 Heim tried to construct a new world-view from Kant’s
epistemology6 using Husserl’s phenomenology, 7 and both Wilhelm Ostwald’s and John
Bernard Stallo’s “modern energetics.”8 The basic idea of Heim’s book was that Kant’s
argument concerning “true knowledge” is possible only intuitively. Kant believed that
the elevation of metaphysics to the status of a science requires that metaphysics must be
3 On Hobbes (1588-1679) see, for example, Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume 3:
The Phenomenology of Knowledge, trans. Ralf Manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1985), pp. 30, 177-178, 205-206.
4 Krause, Theologie, Physik und Philosophie, pp. 11-14.
5 Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1902.
6 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Kritik der reinen Vernunft, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure
Reason (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965).
7 Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) had written his books Logische Untersuchungen I-II (1900-01), in English:
Logical Investigations (1970), in Halle where Heim also then lived.
8 Physicist and philosopher Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) was monist, anti-materialist, and anti-atomist.
John Bernard Stallo (1823-1900) was a Hegelian idealist.
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founded upon a priori knowledge. All attempts to establish an a priori base for the
knowledge of things fail so long as we assume that our knowledge must conform to
things. What we can know about objects a priori is limited to that which “we ourselves
put into those objects.”9 Husserl argued that phenomenology must begin with the study
of human consciousness, with ego cogito rather than nature, and take up the standpoint of
“transcendental subjectivity.” It was an attempt to define the “structures” that are
essential to any and every possible experience. Thus, Husserl’s phenomenology was
ultimately a search for “foundations.”10
Like Husserl, Heim attacked psychologism and naturalism, because necessary
truths are neither psychological nor empirical truths. Husserl also had rejected Gottlob
Frege’s argument that necessary truths are conventional truths. What makes necessary
truths true, according to Husserl, is the very structure of human consciousness and a
peculiar class of objects called “essences,” which are not to be discovered
psychologically, syntactically, or semantically, but phenomenologically. Because
Husserl’s phenomenology denies the existence of any external reality, it is solipsistic.
Heim rejected solipsism. Nevertheless, he did embrace Husserl’s phenomenological
method, which was important for his later dimensional thinking.11
From the beginning of his work, Heim believed that space and time belonged
inseparably together. This unity played an important role for outlining a new world-view
that was no longer dependent on Newtonian concepts of absolute space and absolute
time.12 In place of it, he tried to construct a new, physically energetic and philosophically
phenomenological world-view based on the relativity of space-time. He argued that his
philosophy is a philosophy of relations. Therefore, the principle of relativity was the
basis of his world-view even before Albert Einstein’s formulation of SR.13 He justified it
with a relational epistemology: knowledge was the understanding of relations. Heim
9 Kant, B xvi-xvii.
10 About Husserl’s phenomenology, see Robert C. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 158-183.
11 Heim, “Selbstanzeige zu: Psychologismus oder Antipsychologismus?” in Kantstudien 8 (1903), pp.123-
125.
12 PA, pp. 77-100.
13 Einstein spoke “space-time” in 1905. Heim had used the term of “time-space” since 1902.
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argued that perception is impossible without a relationship of physical and phenomenal
time.14
“Time” in his space-time relationship is more important than “space.” Therefore,
he preferred to explain the relationship of space and time as “time-space.” Time and its
contents form a relational unity. 15 Time-space was not only an a priori form of intuition,
as Kant had thought it is. Time-space is perspectival, relative, and an infinite reality. 16
Like Leibniz, Heim argued that there is no fixed and motionless point in infinite space,
but space is always in relative motion. From the perspective of possibility, the continuum
of time-space is volitional, and from the perspective of actuality, it is energetic.
Therefore, the continuum of time-space is, from the viewpoint of epistemology,
decisional. According to Heim’s “decision-category,” the number or sum of real
decisions is constantly one, while the number or sum of possible decisions is constantly
infinite because energy is constant.17
Heim had realized that an irrationality was within physical time, because at the
“now” point, the past and the future, cause and effect, seemed to be simultaneous
possibilities. As a solution to this antinomy, Heim argued that time must be two-
dimensional, and reality is then a five-dimensional world of consciousness or experience
(Bewusstsein oder Erlebnis).18 Heim’s concept concerning time was breaking a new path,
which, almost a century later, is now playing a crucial role in the Superstring Theory.
Regrettably, Heim did not explain clearly his revolutionary idea and its consequences in
PA. He subsequently changed his ideas to agree with Kant, that time is somehow “supra
14 PA, pp. 69-71. “Ein Erkennen von Relationen ist. Es müssen also die Sätze gelten: Jeder Inhalt ist eine
Relation relativ zu den Inhalten betrachtet, deren Beziehung auf einander er in sich darstellt. Und jede
Relation ist ein Inhalt relativ zu den nächst höheren Relationen, in denen sie selbst wieder zu anderen
Inhalten bzw. Relationen steht.”
15 PA, pp.72-77. “Der Jetztpunkt ist nicht anders als die Unterscheidung von Inhalten, die in derselben als
vergangene und zukünftige Inhalte auseinandertreten.” Heim argued that within consciousness logical
principles are without time limits, thus supra-temporal. Heim, “Selbstanzeige,” pp.124-125.
16 PA, p. 113. Heim had not recognized that the laws of thermodynamics deny infinite time and space.
17 PA, pp. 122-134.
18 PA, pp. 142. David Hume in his book A Treatise of Human Nature (Book I, Part III, Sections ii and xiv,
1739), rejected the proposition that cause and effect could be simultaneous: “For if one cause were co-
temporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, ‘tis plain there wou’d be no such thing as
succession, and all objects must be co-existent.” Therefore, physical time can be only one-dimensional.
Heim made the right conclusion about the irrationality of time, but he did not yet realize that cause always
happens at the eternal now-point, and effect appears always in the past. In other words, cause belongs to
the dimension of eternal time, and effect to the dimension of physical time.
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empirical,” and as such, a mathematical, logical, and an a priori form of intuition.19
Later his concept of two-dimensional time became the foundation of his dimensional
doctrine and his main contribution to philosophy, science, and theology, as we will see.
On the other hand, Heim’s concept of space was consistently empirical, for
geometry was an empirical science, not only rational, as Kant had thought. Heim also
argued that the logical principles within consciousness are without time limits, thus supra
temporal. Like Leibniz, Heim believed that it would be theoretically possible to calculate
all possible experiences. According to Heim, this calculation is possible in a five-
dimensional continuum of time-space.20
Heim’s first attempt to construct the outline of a modern world-view did not
receive much attention. However, from PA began a line of thought that continued
through the rest of Heim’s work, and it is important for understanding his later,
dimensional, thinking. More comprehensive was the next book, Das Weltbild der
Zukunft. Eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen Philosophie, Naturwissenschaft und
Theologie (WZ),21 in which Heim reconsidered certain old and unsolved metaphysical
questions. He hoped that this book would help him receive a university appointment, but
such was not the case. Students liked it, but the scientific community rejected it with
shrugs.22
The point of departure in Heim’s endeavor wa    s an attempt to clarify Kant’s
epistemology by using the work of such Neo-Kantians as Riehl and Natorp.23 The
possibility of knowledge is not only dependent on what we put into objects, but also what
objects are put into our minds. Kant had decided that neither the forms of space and time
(his sensible concepts) nor the categories of causality and substance (his intellectual
19 Heim, “Selbstanzeige,” pp. 124-125. “Da nun nach unserer Raum- und Zeittheorie die zweidimensionale
Zeit und der dreidimensionale Raum nur empirisch vorgefundene Beschränkungen der an sich unendlichen
Dimensionsmöglichkeit des Bewusstseins sind, so darf der logische Dingbegriff nicht mit der empirischen
Zeit- oder Raumanschauung verquickt werden, sondern muss an einem überempirischen Zeitbegriff
orientiert sein… (italics mine).”
20 PA, p. 100.
21 First published in Berlin 1904 and reprinted: Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag, 1980.
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“Wenn ich überhaupt vorwärtskommen wolle, so hätte ich das nicht dümmer anfangen können…Viel
besser wäre es gewesen, zunächst einmal durch eine kleine historische Untersuchung zu beweisen, daß ich
überhaupt imstande sei, exakte historische Quellenarbeit zu treiben.” Heim, Ich gedenke, p. 76.
23 Heim often referred to Riehl’s Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart and Natorp’s Platos
Ideenlehre. About interpretations of ideas in these books, see Cassirer, Phenomenology of Knowledge, pp.
51-57, 203.
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concepts) applied to objective reality, that is, to the things-in-themselves. For Heim the
concept of relation was so essential to consciousness that all genuine consciousness is
relational. He argued that the contradiction between mind and reality, perception and
existence, could be eliminated, but the elimination of those contradictions demanded a
radical crossing of Kant’s “transcendental horizon,” that is, the limits of human
knowledge to know anything about so-called noumena. The solution was in the either-or
relations of consciousness (Bewusstseinswirklichkeit). Heim agreed with Leibniz that it
is impossible simultaneously to determine the opposite directions of over or under, right
or left, forward or backward, motion or rest. If there were only one being in space, we
could not know whether it is moving or resting, because there is no absolute rest point.
Therefore, space-time must be relative and proportional.
According to Heim, there are three different epistemological relations: a basic
relation (Grundverhältnis) between unity and proportion, a relation between proportions
(Proportionsverhältnis), and an alternative or exchange relation (Umtauschverhältnis).
There are also higher and lower unities and proportions, which are arithmetical relations
within the epistemological relations. Between relations, there are boundaries that
separate, for example, form and its contents. The relation of proportions is “hard,” and
both basic and alternative relations are “living” or “soft” relations. The relation of
proportions explains the causal-mechanic reality, and the other relations, the organic
reality.24
John Bernard Stallo, a Hegelian idealist, had claimed that Giordano Bruno’s idea
of an infinite reality “is the background of all material actions and forms; no system of
elements or forces can exist without it, or is cognizable without reference to it; and in this
sense, and in this sense only, the universe is necessarily infinite in mass as well as in
space and time.” Heim agreed with Stallo that reality is infinite rather than finite.25
24 WZ, pp. 34-36. “Haben aber hiernach alle unsere räumlichen und zeitlichen Maße den Charakter von
Verhältnissen oder Proportionen, die sich gleichbleiben, wenn man ihre Glieder mit denselben Zahlen
multipliziet oder dividiert, so wird damit unsere ganze Naturwissenschaft zu einer Wissenschaft von
Verhältnissen.” In GL, p. 26, Heim’s arguments about relations were based on the psychophysical law of
Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878) and Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-87): dγ = k dβ / β, where γ is a
quantity of emotion, β a quantity of stimulus, and k is constant. Heim said that Fechner also influenced his
arguments in other books.
25 See J.B. Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881), ed. P.W. Bridgman (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 285.
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Heim’s continuum of time was a dynamic and infinite relation with double alternatives,
where the present is the eternally permanent and constant duration (or point) between
past and future. Both future and past are transformed into a unity in the present. Time
has also a certain simultaneous content and form: the basic relation of unity and
proportion. The continuum of space is an alternative relation. If in one point of time,
there is always only one relation but many proportional contents simultaneously real,
then it is possible to experience these contents separately.26
By studying colored surfaces and optical phenomena, Heim argued that the pure
time duration is originated by the “first grade” of the alternative relation, and the spatial
surface by the “second grade” of the alternative relation. Space itself is second grade
time, which means, two time-lines becomes one space-line.When the space-lines are
restored to the pure time-line, we can experience the depth-dimension. Heim thought that
the full explanation of the space of colors needs at least a four-dimensional perspective. 27
George Berkeley, an empiricist, had summoned inner experience to battle against
outward experience, psychology against physics, especially against the foundations of
Newton’s mathematics and his theory of motion. Nevertheless, nineteenth-century
physics underwent a strange shift in the field of epistemology. Ernst Mach used
Berkeley’s theory of knowledge in his physics and psychology. In his analysis of
sensation, Mach expressly stated that the central methodological purpose of his theory
was to eliminate the arbitrary distinctions between inner and outward experience, that is,
between psychology and physics. Heim’s purpose was similar, but he rejected Mach’s
positivism.
The most important problem for Heim was, what is the relation between
consciousness and reality, are they identical or separated? If they are identical, solipsism
cannot be avoided. Heim had already battled against solipsism in PA, concluding that
reality and consciousness cannot be identical. The only possibility was that these must be
26 WZ, pp. 47-58. Heim argued in “Leidet die Verhältnisphilosophie an einer Inkonsequenz?” in Hefte zur
Verständigung über Grundfragen des Denkens 3 (1906), pp. 49-55: “Es ist Einheit einer Zweiheit,
Gleichzeitigkeit einer Ungleichzeitigkeit.”
27 WZ, pp. 59-89. Heim’s thought that space is the “second grade time,” is, in fact, similar with Einstein’s
space-time concept. According to Einstein, it is incorrect to speak about time and space. We must speak
only about space-time. Heim’s conception was time-space, which means, that time is more important than
space in this relation.
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in a relationship. Reality is both “become” (Geworden) and “becoming” (Werden) by
decisions of energetic wills, “Thou” or “I,” between which is the alternative relation.28
Both “Thou” and “I” are the centers of the perspectival world. From that situation
follows the decision of will: either-or. The continuum of time-space is the battleground
of wills.29 The purpose in the battle of wills is the will from disunity to unity, where
“soul is the universe,” as WZ argued. However, it is necessary that there is also chaos
because the cosmos originated from chaos. If reality could be explained wholly, it would
be absolute nothingness, as is thought in Japanese Buddhism.30 The same move from
disunity to unity is also evident in the battles between determinism and indeterminism,
and between matter and energy. The last unity is possible only in the transcendent
Oneness, which is divine reality (Raum) and the origin of all.31
In his earliest period of thought, Heim tried to construct a world-view that was
based on epistemology. He started with the materialistic epistemology of Hobbes,
continued through the phenomenological epistemology of Husserl to the transcendental
epistemology of Neo-Kantianism, the positivistic or physiological epistemology of
Mach’s and Avenarius’ empirism, and through the energetic epistemology of Stallo’s and
Ostwald‘s Hegelian idealism. Heim’s purpose was to clear Kant’s transcendental
epistemology of its fatal flaws. The fundamental category in the structure of his world-
view was the epistemological “decision,” which means that the energetic and volitional
aspect of the mind has the priority within the human actions. During his second period,
Heim focused on ontology rather than epistemology, which meant that he had to cross
Kant’s transcendental horizon. Heim’s world-view was then monistic, psychophysical,
28 Heim quoted books of Richard Avenarius, Kritik der reinen Erfahrung and Der menschliche Weltbegriff,
and Ernst Mach, Analyse der Empfindungen, and he argued that these books eliminated the “I-myth” of
German absolute idealism and made possible the modern research methods of science.
29 Arthur Schopenhauer had thought that a universal will is the primary reality, and the individual’s will
forms part of it. In his view, the will dominates every aspect of an individual’s personality, knowledge,
feelings, and directions in life. Heim’s thought was similar, but he did notmention Schopenhauer in his
book.
30 Japanese Buddhism influenced Heim’s thinking, as could be seen in many pages in WZ and, for example,
in his essay, “Der Zen-Buddhismus in Japan,” in GL, pp.144-159.
31 WZ, p. 211. Heim could eliminate dualism because soul and body, spirit and nature are in a polar
relation. See also J. Schniewind, “Die Hauptstücke des Heim’schen Weltbildes” and F. Siegmund-
Schultze, “Die Überwindung des Solipsismus bei Heim,” in Hefte zur Verständigung über Grundfragen des
Denkens 3 (1906), pp. 43-49,56-65.
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indetermininistic, energetic, and religious. Heim believed that his new vision of the
cosmos harmonized such opposites as: dualism and monism, science and religion.32
B. The second period (1906-1920): Heim’s Destiny-category
After this exceptional start of his academic career as a theologian, Heim followed
the advice of his advisors, such as Friedrich Loofs, and turned to traditional historical
studies. Loofs advised him to study pre-Thomist scholasticism. Heim analyzed the
concept of grace and its relation to the natural functions of human beings by Alexander
Halesius. This was a preliminary exercise for his historical analysis of the concept of the
certainty of faith used in systematic theology until Schleiermacher.33 The problem of the
certainty of faith became the main theme of Heim’s thinking in his second and third
periods. Methodologically these studies were important for Heim’s later development as
a philosopher. Heim said in his autobiography that the scholastic method of Halesius was
a good foundation for his later thinking.34
Even though he did not hold a position at a theological school, Heim was allowed
to assume duties as a private docent in the department of systematic theology at the
University of Halle in 1907,35 and in 1914, Heim was invited to be professor (Ordinarius)
of systematic theology at the University of Münster. Because of World War I, Heim did
not start teaching until 1918. During the war, he was developing his world-view, which
sought to justify the certainty of faith. Heim considered his book,Glaubensgewißheit.
Eine Untersuchung über die Lebensfrage der Religion (GG), the main work of his second
period.36 The world-view of the certainty of faith followed the arguments of his earlier
thinking: relational reality had a decision-making characteristic. However, because the
32 See GL, pp. 26-27, and Heim, Ich gedenke, pp. 72-77.
33 Karl Heim, Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den natürlichen Funktionen des Menschen bei
Alexander Halesius. Die Lehre von der gratia gratis data nach Alexander Halesius (Leipzig,1907), and
Das Gewißheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher (Leipzig, 1911).
34 Heim, Ich gedenke, pp. 78-79.
35 According to Martin Thust, “Christliche Revolution in derWissenschaft, Karl Heim 75 Jahre alt,” in
Zeitwende 20 (1948-49), p. 523, there were in Halle in 1910s, “Drei ein wenig verrückte Akademiker, über
die man den Kopf schüttelte”: the mathematician Moritz Cantor, the philosopher Edmund Husserl and Karl
Heim.
36First published in Leipzig, 1916, revised edition 1920. See Heim, Ich gedenke, pp. 102-104.
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“decision”-category was too narrow and insufficient to justify the certainty of faith, Heim
borrowed the “destiny”-category (Schicksal) from Oswald Spengler.37 This category
allowed for greater emphasis on God’s continuing activity in the world than had the
category of “decision.” Spengler had formulated a speculative philosophy of history that
explained the whole history of human culture. He attempted to suggest that each
individual culture possesses a unique soul or style of art and thought, and that all cultures
pass through an irreversible life cycle of growth and decay that is comparable to the
biological cycle of living organisms. According to Heim, Spengler tried to release the
science of history from the random ways of human decisions. Spengler’s world -view of
destiny unfolded a new organic, supra-personal, absolute, and immortal interior of reality,
which was the opposite of the relative, causal-mechanic, and physicalistic world-view of
physics. Heim rejected Spengler’s ideas as inadequate. The destiny-category meant to
Heim that ego as a perspectival center of reality could consider its own personal destiny
in the flux of space-time as either external chance or internal necessity. My personal
destiny is the irreversibility of time and the non-exchangeability of it. Thus, a new
question was asked: how it is possible to decide the issue of external contingency or
internal determinism? According to Heim, neither human experience and scientific
measurement nor pure intuitive thinking was capable of resolving it. Therefore, it was
necessary to find another solution for this problem that was both epistemological and
ontological. Hans Vaihinger’s fictionalism (Philosophie des Als-Ob) seemed to be a
possibility, but Heim rejected it as too easy a solution.38 According to Vaihinger, there
are only fictions and illusions: space and time as infinities, necessity and possibility as
abstractions, and subject and object as primordial illusions. Fictionalism, in which even
the concept of fiction was untrue, could not be the necessity of reason in a Kantian sense
or the real structure of reality. It could not be any solution for the dilemma of our destiny
and of faith’s certainty.
Inspired by Einstein’s SR, Heim analyzed how the absolutes of space and time
have changed from Copernicus and Kepler to Einstein. On the one hand, Copernicus’s
37 See Heim, “Die religiöse Bedeutung des Schicksalsgedankens bei Oswald Spengler,” (1921), in GL, pp.
374-405.
38 See Heim, “Zur Philosophie des Als-Ob,” (1912) in GL, pp. 69-78.
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heliocentric system had made relative Ptolemy’s geocentric worldpicture with the center
position of human soul in space, Darwinian evolution took away the center position of
human soul in time, and physiology undermined the meaning of human soul in nature.
Thinking and willing consciousness had changed to a pure chemical process. Heim asked,
did such an understanding not mean the end of religion? However, there were opposite
speculations such as the theosophical system of Paracelsus who had speculated that
nature was the incarnation of God, and God itself was soul in this body of nature. Kepler
believed in animate stars, and Jacob Böhme dreamed in his natural philosophy that there
are no transcendent heaven and hell but rather they are supra-spatial spaces of the soul.39
Schelling thought that reality was theosophical and polar, and Gustaf Theodor Fechner
argued in favor of space of consciousness in which the whole nature from the inorganic
atoms was constructed from animate circles. The physical cosmos was changed to the
religious and mythological world. Heim rejected all these speculations and argued that
speculative natural philosophy was not an adequate conception of reality. Heim’s vision
was a ”theology of nature,” that was a synthesis of the worldpicture of modern science
and world-views of philosophy and theology. Heim argued that the theologians must
follow the developments of science and of philosophy.40
Although Heim shifted his interest from epistemology to ontology in his second
period, his concept of time-space developed not only ontologically, but also
epistemologically. An interesting endeavor was Heim’s analysis of Neo-Platonic and
Aristotelian dualisms. According to Heim, neo-Platonic dualism was one-dimensional:
subject and object belong together, and Aristotelian dualism was two-dimensional:
subject and object are opposite. Heim argued that reality was a monistic relation, in
which transcendence and immanence are inverted. Heim argued based on Kant’s space-
time antinomies that the past, future, and present within the continuum of time are a unity
39 Heim was influenced by Jakob Böhme’s conception of ultimate reality as a coincidence of opposites, as
also was Paul Tillich, who developed from it the notion of the multi-dimensional unity of all things. The
first dimension was the primal, non-rational dimension, which was both a creative and demonic reality at
the same time. The second dimension was ontological and a dialectical kind of rational reality. The third
dimension was ontic and a scientific kind of rational reality. About Böhme and Tillich, see Roy D.
Morrison, II, Science, Theology and the Transcendental Horizon. Einstein, Kant and Tillich (Atlanta, GA:
Scholars Press, 1994), pp. 141-142.
40 Heim, “Der Gegenwärtige Stand der Debatte zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft“ (1908) in GL,
pp. 39-68.
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in the eternal consciousness, solinuncism. On the other hand, perception of space is
paradoxal: either-or and both-and are simultaneous.41
For Heim, time-space was relative, as Einstein had proved. The continuum of
time was irreversible, and the destiny of the “I”-space was not an alternative. The
disjunction dominates in logic, and the conjunction in reality. They both are unified
irrationally in a double way. Heim believed that this thought could resolve all paradoxes
of space and time.
C. The third period (1920-1928): Heim’s Non-objectifiable- and Perspective-
categories
In 1920, Heim was invited to be the professor of systematic theology at the
University of Tübingen, as a successor to his own teacher, Theodor Haering. In 1922, he
traveled to China for an international conference of Christian students, and from there, he
traveled through Japan and the United States back to Germany. The journey apparently
had a great influence on him. Although Heim rejected the pantheism of eastern
philosophies, its influence could be seen in his thought. One of the basic concepts in his
dimensional thinking would be the “Yin-Yang” of Taoism, namely, “polarity.”42
After Einstein had formulated his GR, Heim considered it in his essay Gedanken
eines Theologen zu Einsteins Relativitätstheorie (1921).43 Heim’s question was: Are the
theories of relativity only applicable in the territory of physics, but not those of
philosophy or of theology? What is the essence or purpose of thesetheories? Heim
argued that Einstein’s theories have changed the assumptions of all sciences, including
philosophy and theology. It is impossible to study theology without knowing the
consequences of Einstein’s theories of relativity. Heim argued that the epistemological
subject as a perspectival center has become more important in Einstein’s space-time than
41 See Ruttenbeck, Die apologetisch-theologische Methode Karl Heims, pp. 47-54.
42 See Heim, Ich gedenke, pp. 104-162, and “Der Zen-Buddhismus in Japan,” (1923) in GL, pp. 144 -159.
“Polarity” was one of the central concepts in the transcendental idealism of Schelling, whose influence on
Heim was notable, for he referred to it as early as 1908. See F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental
Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath with an Introduction by Michael Vater (Charlottesville, VA: University
Press of Virginia, 1997).
43 GL, pp. 125-143.
31
it had been in Newton’s absolute space and absolute time. The “knowing I” is in an
inseparable relation with reality. In addition, if it is so that the “knowing I” is in a
relation with reality, then so too are the “willing I” and the “evaluating I.” Because SR
displaced the notion of an absolute objectivity, reality must be not only physical but also
psychic or spiritual. However, there is no neutral and absolute perspective in our relative
reality. The only possible absolute center must be a theocentric space beyond relative
and polar reality.
The main result in the third period of Heim’s intellectual history was the fully
revised third edition of GG.44 In this book, Heim’s time-space concept crystallized.
There are two opposite worldpictures of physics: a causal-mechanic worldpicture, where
time is without a now-point and space without a here-point, and a dynamic and
phenomenological worldpicture, where time has a now-point and space has a here-point
in the perspectival center of non-objectifiable “I.” Heim borrowed the concept of “non-
objectifiable” (nichtgegenständlich) from Heinrich Rickert, who was a Neo-Kantian
philosopher.45 This concept became fundamental to Heim’s dimensional thinking. It
opened a new “dimension,” the unseen reality beyond the objectifiable world. However,
Heim’s world-view did not change to one of Cartesian dualism. It remained monistic,
because he argued that there could not be two layers in reality: material and spiritual.
Reality is one relational unit, as Einstein had argued in his theories of relativity. Heim
outlined a scheme in which the world of objects is formed perspectivally around the non -
objectifiable center. Non-objectifiable reality is neither spatial nor temporal. It is
theologically the most real, always present, eternal, and transperspectival space of God,
44 Leipzig, 1923.
45 Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) completed his habilitation work in 1891, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis,
which was a general introduction to the problems of epistemology from a Neo-Kantian perspective.
According to Rickert, there are three kinds of subjects: psycho-physic, psychic, and epistemological. See
Guy Oakes, “Introduction: Rickert’s Theory of Historical Knowledge,” in H. Rickert, The Limits of
Concept Formation in Natural Science. A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences, ed. and trans.
Guy Oakes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. vii. In this period of Heim’s thinking, “non -
objectifiable” is the same as the epistemological subject, but it is also the space of God. It is impossible to
define the concept of “non-objectifiable.” It is also impossible to prove non-objectifiable from the
antinomies of experience. As a via negationis, it is a non-temporal, non-spatial or non-causal concept, and
as such, irrational. Logical negation cannot implicate anything, but according to Heim, reality is more
important than logic. Non-objectifiable reality is not real deductively or inductively, because it is
scientifically unexplored. However, it is intuitively the most real reality, where the now-point and non-
spatial here-point are eternal.
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which opens upon us by God’s grace. Without it, we cannot know and experience
anything, but with it, the knowledge and belief are complementary. In the opinion of
Heim, the concept of non-objectifiable reality has resolved the controversies between
realism and idealism, and between subject and object. Non-objectifiable reality is “we-
space” that is the volitional, ethical, and indeterministic reality. According to Heim’s
doctrine of perspectivity, for example, the risen Christ is now the eternal non-
objectifiable center of all possible temporal human destinies. However, this formulation
was not sufficient, because in it, the dependence on Christ was parallel with other
contingent dependencies, which could not be exchanged with others. I cannot change my
self or my homeland. It is not possible that I could have been born in some other place or
time. On the other hand, it is possible to look at the world from some other centers than
from Christ, for example, from only my own center. 46
Heim’s concept of time had an important eschatological viewpoint as well.47 He
asked, what is the relationship between time and eternity? The answer depended on both
the concept of time and the experience of time. If we could know what time is, we could
resolve all metaphysical questions. If time is “straight,” where it is running? From inside
time, belief in the future can be pessimistic or optimistic, as in the antroposophical
thinking about the evolution of the soul. From outside time, belief in the future can be
only optimistic, as in the philosophy of Plato or in German idealism from Leibniz to Kant,
Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher. Einstein’s concept of space-time had changed
Kant’s formal and illusory conception of time and space. However, if time is relative, is
it a bridge to somewhere that is already existing but not yet visible?48 Henry Bergson had
argued that because time is immeasurable, we could only experience it. Heim argued that
time itself is the existence-form of “I,” and we can experience time only non-objectifiably.
The last question Heim asked in his GG is, is there only this temporal form of
existence (Dasein), or is there also another form of existence? There must be an end of
46 Heim, “Geleitwort,” in GG (1923). See also Ruttenbeck, Die apologetisch-theologische Methode Karl
Heims, pp. 64-82.
47 Heim analyzed the eschatologies of Paul Althaus, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, and Martin Dibelius
among others in his essays “Zeit und Ewigkeit, die Hauptfrage der heutigen Eschatologie” (1926) in GL,
pp. 539-568, or in Zeit und Ewigkeit. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Vorträge, ed. Adolf Köberle (Brendow
Verlag, 1987), pp. 9-35.
48 GL, pp. 539-545.
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this form of time, in the biblical sense, telos. The answer of existential theology was that
in every point of time, eternity is present, and time is always immediately consummatio
mundi. The end, which is already here, is becoming. Heim rejected this answer, because
it is not a solution to Kant’s antinomies of time. According to Heim, God will create
some new form of time in the end of time. For now, any given moment is, on the one
hand the last point of time, and on the other hand, eternity in which the creative, invisible,
and healing will of God’s possibilities is acting. Thus, Heim’s conception of time was
two-dimensional in which one dimension is physical, and the other is eternal. 49
The final solution of Heim’s third period was a negation: all perspectives have
lost their meaning in the non -objectifiable God. God is beyond the world, and He is both
metaphysically and scientifically unexplorable. God’s revelation in Christ was a
“transperspective event.” Its consequence was a new transcendent perspective whose
center was Christ. The origin and meaning of all intra-mundane propositions was in this
supra-mundane world. Thus, Heim rejected Karl Barth’s dialectical theology as
inadequate. According to Heim, such ideas of Barth as: God and world were
diametrically opposite, and God’s revelation was “straight from above,” were
misconceptions. From the dialectical contradictions between Creator and created, life
and death, judgment and grace, follows the conclusion that the intersection of vertical and
horizontal lines must be in every point of relative time. Heim agreed with Paul Tillich,
“Here and only here, namely, in the incarnate Christ, is that genuine place where the
vertical line from the top down crosses the horizontal line of events.”50
D. The fourth period (1928-1958): Heim’s Dimension-category
The thinking of Karl Heim continuously sharpened: from the epistemological
“decision”-category through the ontological “destiny”-category to the “perspective”-
49 GL, pp. 545-568.
50 GL, pp. 32-34. Heim, however, rejected Tillich’s purpose to de-literalize, de-onticize, and de-theify
Christian theology. Instead, Heim agreed with Tillich’s similar conception with Heide gger about the unity
of being and time. About Tillich’s world-view, see Morrison, Einstein, Kant, and Tillich, pp. 113-192.
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category. This was not the endpoint in the dynamics of his thinking, but only the first
round in the battle to understand the relation between God and reality.
Toward the beginning of the fourth period of his thinking, Heim argued that the
age to construct new world-views might be over. Belief in a specific world-view has
become impossible. However, we must battle with ultimate questions to find a useful
solution for them and a way for the steadfast “view of life.”51 Heim believed that if we
could find the answer to the problem of time, it would be possible to answer the other
ultimate questions of life. Present and past are not parts of the same continuous interval
of time in which consciousness could be experienced, as had been thought from
Descartes to Husserl. A new ontology, in which consciousness and physical time belong
together, but in different dimensions, must replace this old one. We can measure time,
but we cannot know or define it. We can only experience it. Reality is not a thought
reality, as the idealists believed, but the experienced reality of a non-objectifiable “I,” as
the existentialists argued. The time-space continuum is the basic form of experience, and
its zero-point is the perspectival center, the non-objectifiable and eternal presence.52
The core of Heim’s thinking was moved toward the “dimensional” thinking.
According to Heim, time is a two-dimensional and infinite “space.” Physical time that is
one of dimensions of time is formed from time-points, and there are no empty spaces
between them. These points flow in the same direction one after another, so that one
time-point is always present. In the perception of time, there are disjunctive and
conjunctive relationships between time-points simultaneously, which is logically
contradictory within physical time. The solution to this antinomy can only be that the
ontological concept of the non-objectifiable center point in consciousness of reality is the
second dimension of time: nunc aeternum.
Three-dimensional and infinite space is formed from space-lines, which are bi-
directional. Space-surfaces are formed from these bi-directional lines. In the perception
of space, there are disjunctive and conjunctive relationships. According to Heim, the
space-relation is the second level of the time-relation. The three-dimensional experience
51 See the first edition of Glaube und Denken (1931), pp. 1-22.
52 Ibid., pp. 23-38.
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of space is possible only through the synthesis of those contradictory disjunctive and
conjunctive relations.
In Heim’s continuum of five-dimensional time-space, time is more important than
space. The perspectival center of time is not a mathematical point but many
simultaneously seeing, knowing, and willing points, which are non-objectifiable, infinite,
and conscious spaces. The non-objectifiable and trans-perspectival center of the whole
reality is God’s space.
After 1928, Heim began to write his magnum opus of six volumes: Der
evangelische Glaube und Denken der Gegenwart. Grundzüge einer christlichen
Lebensanschauung. It was the crystallization of over twenty years of work on a Christian
world-view in which the conscious “I” and “Thou,” the world, and God are in a
meaningful relationship. Its first three volumes form a philosophical and theological
trilogy, and its last three volumes are a scientific and theological trilogy.
The first volume, Glaube und Denken. Philosophische Grundlegung einer
christlichen Lebensanschauung (GD) was an endeavor to give an intelligible, ontological
foundation and structure to reality and to God’s revelation and action in it. 53 Heim
constructed a dynamic and dimensional world-view, and put it up against the static,
mechanic, and materialistic world-view that was the predominate conception of reality in
his lifetime.
The second volume, Jesus der Herr. Die Herrschervollmacht Jesu und die
Gottesoffenbarung in Christus (JH), was an endeavor to explain how the supra-polar
space of God opened upon us in the incarnation and resurrection of Christ.54 This and the
next volume, mentioned below, were endeavors to explain important the ological
propositions by using his new language of dimensions.
The third volume, Jesus der Weltvollender. Der Glaube an die Versöhnung und
Weltverwandlung (JW), was an endeavor to solve dimensionally the theological questions
53 First published in Berlin, 1931, and reprinted in München, 1931. The revised edition was published in
Berlin, 1934 and reprinted, 1937, in Hamburg, 1957, in Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag, 1975, and 1985, trans.
Edgar Primrose Dickie with introduction by Edwyn Robert Bevan, God Transcendent. Foundation for a
Christian Metaphysics (London: Nisbet and Co., 1935).
54 First published in Berlin, 1935 and reprinted, 1939, in Hamburg, 1955, and in Wuppertal: Aussaat
Verlag, 1977, trans. H. van Daalen, Jesus the Lord. The Sovereign Authority of Jesus and God’s Revelation
in Christ (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961).
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of guilt and power.55 The question of guilt is solved first, and the question of power will
be solved in the second coming of Christ, when all kind of relativism and contingency
will end.56
The fourth volume, Der christliche Gottesglaube und die Naturwissenschaft.
Grundlegung des Gesprächs zwischen Christentum und Naturwissenschaft (GN), 57 the
fifth volume, Die Wandlung im naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild. Die moderne
Naturwissenschaft vor der Gottesfrage (WnW),58 and the sixth volume, Weltschöpfung
und Weltende. Das Ende des jetzigen Weltzeitalters und die Weltzukunft im Lichte des
biblischen Osterglaubens (WW)59 were the trilogy of Heim’s “theology of nature,” his
comprehensive and coherent vision of reality.
55 First published in Berlin, 1937, and reprinted 1939, in Hamburg, 1952, in Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag,
1974, 1975, and 1985, trans. D. H. van Daalen, Jesus the World’s Perfector: The Atonement and The
Renewal of the World (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), Jeesus ja maailmanhistoria, trans. Osmo Tiililä
(Helsinki: WSOY, 1962).
56 WW, p. 191.
57 First published in Tübingen, 1949, and reprinted in Hamburg, 1953, and in Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag,
1976, trans. N. Horton Smith, Christian Faith and Natural Science (New York: Harper, 1953).
58 First published in Hamburg, 1951, and reprinted 1951, 1954, and in Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag, 1975,
trans. N. Horton Smith, The Transformation of Scientific World View (New York: Harper, 1953).
59 First published in Hamburg, 1952, and reprinted 1952, in Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag, 1974 and 1976,
trans. Robert Smith, The World: Its Creation and Consummation; the End of the Present Age and the
Future of the World in the Light of Resurrection. (Edinburgh, London, and Philadelphia: Oliver and Boyd,
1962).
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2. The Philosophical Battleground of Heim’s Dimensional
Thinking
Throughout his career, Heim’s main battle was with the ideas of Immanuel Kant.
Kant’s critical idealism and epistemology were Heim’s point of departure. Heim tried to
clarify Kant‘s work on the base of the absolute idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the Neo-
Kantian idealism of Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert, the phenomenology of Edmund
Husserl, the existentialism of Martin Heidegger, the theories of relativity and critical
realism of Albert Einstein, and the quantum idealism of Werner Heisenberg. As was
discussed in Chapter I.1, since the second period of his thinking, Heim shifted his focus
from epistemology to ontology, which became the new foundation of his dimensional
thinking, although the conclusions of his ontological thinking were epistemological. In
order to understand Heim’s dimensional thinking, we must first outline Kant’s critical
idealism and the most important post-Kantian philosophies with which Heim was
debating.
A. Kant’s Critical Idealism
First, it is necessary to understand Kant’s position,60 the philosophical background
to which he was reacting, and the basis of his central thesis. Secondly, it is necessary to
understand Kant’s concepts that Heim developed in his dimensional thinking, namely,
concepts of space, time, and the self.
Over the centuries, the epistemological questions “What can we know?” and
“How can we know?” had been asked mainly in terms of how the mind as an immaterial
entity could comprehend to material objects in the world. There were two intellectual
60 There are many controversial interpretations about Kant’s transcendental idealism and its position in
philosophy. Although many arguments against Kant’s idealism claim that it is an incoherent blend of
phenomenalism and skepticism, these arguments also have their own inadequacies. Henry E. Allison,
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1983), provides a defending interpretation on Kant. Nevertheless, it is not the purpose of this
dissertation to resolve such controversies, but only try to explain those ideas in Kant’s thesis, that are
important for understanding Heim’s dimensional thinking.
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movements in the early modern period of philosophy that had a significant impact on
Kant: empiricism and rationalism. Kant argued that both the method and the content of
those ideas contained serious flaws. The empiricists sought an answer to these
epistemological questions through the senses and a posteriori reasoning, which depends
upon experience or contingent events in the world to provide us with information. The
rationalists attempted to use a priori reasoning, which depended, not upon experience,
but on reason itself to inform it.
Empiricists such as John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume argued that
human knowledge originates in our sensations. 61 Locke, for instance, argued that all
knowledge of things was derived from sensations that were imprinted on the tabula rasa
of the mind. His concept of knowledge was that of a classical realism. Experience
teaches us everything, including concepts of relationship, identity, and causation. Kant
countered that the “blank slate” of the mind is insufficient to explain the beliefs that we
have about objects, because some components of our beliefs must be brought by the mind
to experience. He had to respond to Locke’s logical “guillotine,” according to which,
from what we know, we could not conclude how things really are. Locke’s empiricism
was challenged by the material idealism or phenomenalism of Berkeley, who argued that
only sensations or ideas were known in human experience. Berkeley explained this in his
well-known dictum, “esse est percipi.” For him, material objects were impossible and
unknowable outside the mind. In sense-experience, we only have access to ourmental
representations, not to the objects themselves. Kant rejected this by arguing that
Berkeley’s material idealism was actually indefensible in that we are capable of making
judgments about our experience. Hume asserted that the only responsible attitude one
could take to the question about knowledge was skepticism. In Hume’s opinion, we
cannot know the world as such at all, but only our own ideas about it, and these are
commonly mistakes. Kant was not satisfied with those incompatible answers of
61 About Kant vs. Hume, see Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”
(New York: Humanity Books, 1999), pp. xxv-xxx, 61-64, 593-600, and about Kant vs. Locke and
Berkeley, pp.155-159.
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empirism about knowledge. He asked not how the mind conformed itself to the world,
but how the world conformed itself to the mind.62
Rationalists like René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
approached the problems of human knowledge from yet another angle.63 They believed
that it was possible to construct knowledge of the external world out of the simplest,
indubitable, ideas possessed innately by the mind. Leibniz, in particular, thought that the
world was knowable a priori, through logical analysis and derivations of ideas. For
Leibniz, supersensible knowledge could be achieved by means of reason. Truths of
reason are explicit statements of identity, or reducible to explicit identities by a
substitution of the definitions of their terms. Since a finite analysis always reveals the
structure of the identity of such truths, they cannot be denied without contradiction and
are perfectly necessary. Truths of fact, on the other hand, are implicit statements of
identity. These truths are merely contingent and may be subject to dispute, since only an
infinite analysis could show them to be identities.
Descartes, armed with the knowledge of his own existence, hoped to build a
foundation for all knowledge. Kant argued that knowledge of external objects could not
be inferential. The rationalists presupposed that the existence of objects in space and
time was outside the mind. Kant’s answer was that our knowledge is constrained to
mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world. Therefore, it is impossible
to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason
that knowledge has these constraints is that the mind plays an active role in constituting
the features of experience and limiting the mind’s access to the empirical realm of space
and time. Kant’s antinomies proved that the rationalists’ position revealed fundamental
methodological and metaphysical mistakes. The contradictory claims of rationalism
could both be proven, because they both shared the mistaken assumption that it is
possible to have knowledge of things, as they are in themselves. These antinomies could
be resolved, if we could understand the proper function and domain of the various
62 See James B. Miller, “Of Artichokes and Onions: Philosophy, Faith, and Science,” part II: “The Division
of the World,” in Science & Spirit, 3 (1999), pp. 34-36,and Matt McCormick, “Immanuel Kant:
Metaphysics,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.utm.edu, 1999), pp. 1-24.
63 About Kant vs. Leibniz, see Smith, Commentary, pp. xxx-xxxiii, 601-606, and about Descartes and
Spinoza, pp. 583-592. See also Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, “Leibniz’s Philosophy of Mind,” in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu, 1997), pp. 1-12.
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faculties that contribute to produce knowledge. It is necessary to recognize that it is
impossible to know things as they are in themselves and that knowledge is subject to
conditions of experience. Kant’s critical philosophy was an endeavor to redefine the
foundations and limits of metaphysics by a novel synthesis of rationalism and
empirism.64
Kant’s first task, his “Copernican revolution” in philosophy,65 consisted of asking
and answering two kinds of questions: questions of fact (quid facti) and questions of
legality (quid iuris). In theoretical, practical, aesthetic, or teleological thought, we make
factual claims, accept certain judgments, or employ certain concepts, which must be
justified. Kant’s critical or transcendental method was the answer to these questions.66
Kant claimed that the old division between a priori truths and a posteriori truths
employed by rationalists and empiricists was insufficient to describe the sort of
metaphysical claims that were under dispute. An analysis of knowledge required a
distinction between “synthetic” and “analytic” truths. Therefore, according to Kant, if we
are to solve the problems generated by empiricism and rationalism, the central question
of metaphysics should be reduced to “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?”67
If we could answer that question, then it would be possible to determine the possibility,
legitimacy, and range of all metaphysical claims. A judgment is synthetic if and only if,
its negation is not self-contradictory, and a priori if, and only if, it is logically
independent of any judgments describing a sense experience. Kant made three claims
about synthetic judgments a priori of pure reason: that there are synthetic judgments a
priori; that there is only one internally consistent set of synthetic judgments a priori; and
that this set has been completely exhibited in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of
Pure Reason). The set of such synthetic judgments a priori comprises all axioms and
theorems of Euclidean geometry, all true arithmetical propositions, and certain
64 McCormick, ”Kant,” pp. 1-4, and Jussi Kotkavirta, ”The Concept of Infinity in Kant and Hegel,” in ICD,
pp. 11-23.
65 Copernicus recognized that the movement of stars could not be explained by making them revolve
around the observer; it is the observer who must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must
reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. See Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought,
trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 148-149.
66 See Stephan Körner’s “Introduction,” in Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. vii-xxi, and Morrison,
Einstein, Kant and Tillich, p. 52.
67 Smith, Commentary, pp. 43-44.
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assumptions of Newtonian physics, such as the principles of causality, of the
conservation of substance, and of continuity. Kant’s revolutionary notion of synthesis a
priori was the idea that objects are not simply given in experience but rather constituted
as a necessary condition for experience by pure concepts of understanding. The
justification of those three claims of the existence, uniqueness, and completeness of the
synthetic a priori judgments was based on some important presuppositions of a
transcendental argument. Kant supposed that we have experience of objects, and that it is
possible to distinguish what is “given” to the senses as a posteriori content from what is
yet ascribed by us to the objects as a priori forms. The a priori features of the given
experience are the necessary conditions of its objective character, which means that an
objective experience is not possible without some a priori forms. Kant’s touchstone was
“what we can know a priori about objects is limited to that which we ourselves put into
those objects.”68
Synthetic a priori claims are true because of the structure of the mind that knows
them. For example, “Every event must have a cause” cannot be proven by experience,
because the causal connection is not given in exper ience, as Hume had argued.
Nevertheless, experience itself is impossible without a cause, because it describes the
way the mind must necessarily order its representations. The experience is explained by
the understanding of the mind, which is a necessary condition of every experience.
Empiricists and rationalists think that the mind is passive, either because it finds itself
possessing innate, well-formed ideas ready for analysis, or because it receives ideas of
objects onto a blank slate. Kant claimed that the experience of the world is possible only
actively, because the mind builds a systematic structure of its representations. Therefore,
philosophical investigation into the nature of the external world must be as much an
inquiry into the features and activity of the mind that knows the external world. It is the
mind itself that gives objects at least some of their characteristics, because they must
conform to its structure and conceptual capacities, not the reverse.69
Kant’s second, subsidiary, task was the justification of his system of categories,
which he also regarded as unique and complete. There are four classes of categories:
68 Kant, B xviii, (III 19). See also Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. 157-158.
69 Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. 18-19, and McCormick, “Kant,” p. 5.
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quantity, quality, relation, and modality, with triadic subcategories. Categories are
concepts that occur in non-mathematical and synthetic a priori judgments, are a priori in
the sense of being applicable to, not abstracted from, sense experience, and are applied to
what is given to the senses that confer objectivity upon it. The justification of the
categories was “transcendental deduction,” which means that what has been established,
as being de facto is also appropriate de jure. Thus, Kant combined the empiricist
principle that knowledge has its source in experience with the rationalist belief that
knowledge is obtained by deduction. The conditions on which experience as a function
rests are at the same time the conditions of everything it yields us. Every determin ation
of an object rests on the interpenetration of the pure forms of intuition and the pure
concepts of understanding, through which the manifold of mere sensations is first woven
into a system of rules, and thereby constituted as an object.70
A logical consequence of Kant’s first and second task was that Kant must divide
the realm of knowledge into two separate domains: phenomena and noumena.71 This
division led to a new skepticism, which, in fact, Kant tried to avoid. Phenomena were the
domain of empirical knowledge that was formed of two elements: experience of the
world through the senses and the a priori structure of the mind. Knowledge was not a
mirror of the world but rather a product of the interaction of senses and the ordering
structure of the mind. Therefore, one could not properly speak of knowing things-in-
themselves, which belong to the realm of noumena in which there are no categories. He
argued that there are two functions of the thing-in-itself: metaphysical (ideal) and
epistemological (real). The metaphysical function maintains that there is an external
referent beyond our private experiences. In fact, Kant believed that he had given a solid
proof of objective reality. “Otherwise we would have tomake the absurd conclusion that
there can be appearances without anything that appears.”72
The epistemological function of the noumenal thing-in-itself sets a boundary to
sensibility, and hence to the kinds of objects that we can claim to know. In addition, in
the domain of noumena belong those things of which no sensory experience is possible,
even in principle: the universe as a causal whole, the human self as a free and immortal
70 Körner, “Introduction,” pp. viii-ix, and Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. 171-172.
71 Smith, Commentary, pp. 404-417, and Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 235-257.
72 Kant, B xxvi.
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agent, and God. There could be no proper knowledge of such noumenal entities. Only
phenomena could be known by pure reason. Kant’s claim, however, does not mean that
he was a Berkeleyan idealist or Cartesian skeptic. He did not claim that we know only
the contents or ideas of our own minds. Kant was an empirical realist rather than an
empirical idealist.73
Kant claimed that if metaphysics were a science at all, it would be necessary to
think that the world, in a “regulative” or “ideal” sense, was a causal whole. In order for
moral action to take place, it is necessary to assume the idea of the freely acting and
immortal ego, but we cannot know anything about this ego. In order for the world to be
more than a mere aggregate of disparate objects and causal chains, it is necessary to think
of a perfect unifying principle for all reality, namely, the idea of God. Kant argued that,
since Aristotle, philosophers have concluded that if there is no entity that is purely “in
itself” and “through itself,” then there is no secondary and dependent thing thinkable.
Thus, all actuality as a whole dissolves into insubstantial illusion.74
Kant criticized all arguments for God’s existence because we can only think that
God exists. His criticism concerning the ontological argument for God’s existence was,
however, logically inadequate. The ontological argument for God’s existence as a
necessary being:
(1) N (∃x) ((y)(y exists⊃ x exists)),
where “N” is the necessity operator, is logically true. It says that, in each world, there is
something such that if anything at all exists in that world, it does. Thus, it seems that this
sentence expresses precisely the necessary existence of an existentially perfect being.
Kant argued that “from any given existence we can correctly infer the existence of an
unconditionally necessary being,” that is, a God.75 However, in different worlds such
Gods can be entirely different from each other. Therefore, the defenders of the
ontological argument have argued that the sentence:
73 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 3-13.
74 About Kant’s postulates concerning the cosmos, the soul, and God, see Cassirer, Kant’s Life and
Thought, pp. 199-217, and about a demonstration of the existence of God, Immanuel Kant, Der einzig
mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1762). The One Possible Basis for a
Demonstration of the Existence of God, trans. Gordon Treash (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press,
1994).
75 Kant, A 588 = B 616.
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(2) (∃x) N ((y)(y exists ⊃ x exists))
must be proved. We would be able to infer (2) from (1) only if we could assume that all
these individuals are identical with each other. The switch of the quantifier in the
sentence (2) is, however, an illegitimate step in logic. The ontological reasoning of
Descartes and Leibniz is impossible from a critical viewpoint, because it presupposes, not
demonstrates, that which must be proven. In addition, such presuppositions are only
contingent, even if they were formally or materially non-contradictory and possible. The
premise of all ontological arguments is the sentence
(3) (∃x) it is known that (God = x).
The “one possible basis for a demonstration of the existence of God” was,
according to Kant, a “genetic” foundation. That God is the a priori necessary being will
be shown by proving that there is a function that is essential and can be assumed only by
a being who cannot not be. Kant’s strategy was to show that God is necessary because
certain things are possible. Kant’s argument reversed the Cartesian one: it moves from
possibilities, as consequences, to the necessary being as their ground. Kant argued that
only those elements that correspond to the possibility of an experience in general, that is,
only those elements capable of being found in space and time, are possible objects of
experience. Thus, only potential objects of sensible experience are the material of
possibility.76
Kant did not speak just of “existence,” “being” (Sein), and “is,” but also of
“position” (setzen). He stated that “being” could never be a real predicate but only the
positioning of a thing, or of certain determinations as existing in-themselves.77 “God is
omnipotent” could be true even if there were no God. If God were possible, in the fullest
sense of the word, for Kant, as God was possible for Leibniz, that is, possible in
experience, God would presumably and eventually be actual, and hence always actual.
From mere conceptual possibilities, it is impossible to infer actual existence.78 Thus,
76 Jaakko Hintikka, “Kant on Existence and Predication, and the Ontological Argument,” in The Logic of
Being. Historical Studies, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dortrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1986), pp. 249-267. See also Gordon Treash, “Introduction,” in Kant, One Possible Basis, pp. 9-32, and
Smith, Commentary, pp. 525-537.
77 Kant, A 598 = B 626.
78 Kant, A 601-602 = B 629-630.
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Kant thought that we cannot prove the existence of God but only postulate a God
practically, which is necessary to complete the account of the ethical life.79 Although it
was impossible to know anything about noumenal entities, it was possible to think them
as useful ideas, and it was necessary to believe in their possibility for practical reasons.
For example, God is a mere idea, because He is an ens realissimum, the sum total of all
reality.80
Thus, from the division of reality into the realms of phenomena and noumena
followed the division of pure and practical reason, of knowledge and faith, of facts and
values, and, at last, of science and religion.81
The most crucial tenet of Kant’s transcendental idealism was the ideality of space
and time. Kant once agreed with Leibniz that space is relative. Space was a phenomenon
of relations among substances, which are unextended and dimensionless mathematical
points. According to Leibniz, the entire world of extended matter is constructed from
simple immaterial substances, monads, or entelechies. Spatial magnitude was the only
measure of the intensity of the forces exerted by any substance. In fact, Leibniz held that
neither space nor time is a fundamental feature of reality, because the individual
substances, which stand in spatial relation to each other, are reducible to the non-
relational “windowless” and timeless properties of individual monads. Space and time
are thus unreal. Nevertheless, references to spatial location and temporal duration
provide the possibility for keeping track of the relations among a consistent set of
monads, which make up the actual world. In a universe of mirrors, each reflects any
other, along with its reflections of every other, and so on ad infinitum. Leibnizian space
is the positional quality of material objects in the best possible world. Space without any
material object is inconceivable.82
Later, Kant abandoned the notion of relative space and embraced the Newtonian
concepts of absolute space and absolute time but as a metaphysical fashion. Newtonian
79 See Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary, pp. 527-542.
80 Miller, “Artichokes and Onions,” part II, pp. 35-36, and Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 51-111.
81 Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 7-21, and Solomon, From Hegel to
Existentialism, pp. 24-25.
82 Max Jammer, Concepts of Space. The History of Theories of Space in Physics (New York: Dover
Publications, 1993), pp. 131-139, and Garth Kemerling, “Leibniz: Logic and Harmony,” in Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://people.delphi.com, 1999), pp. 1-7.
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space is the container of all material objects, and a material object can only be conceived
as existing in space. Space appears as a reality, which, in a ce rtain sense, is prior to the
material world. In the opinion of Kant and his followers, Leibnizian space was
insufficient to serve as the foundation for Newton’s principle of inertia and the law of
motion.83
Kant thought that he had found an incontestable proof for the existence of
absolute space independent of the existence of matter. Kant based his proof on the
distinction between left and right. He argued that the intrinsic relations among the
individual parts of our left hands with regard to each other are the same as in our right
hands, but that a fundamental distinction makes it impossible to substitute one hand for
the other. He believed that this phenomenon could be explained only by absolute space.
It is only one’s immediate intuition that distinguishes between left and right, and it is
one’s immediate intuition that forms the general concepts of Euclidean geometry and
makes their statements evident. For Kant, the problem of space was no longer a problem
of physics but an integral part of transcendental idealism.84
Kant classified space and time as “forms” of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) in the
mind. These two forms do not relate to things-in-themselves, but only to the appearance
of reality. All experience shows its objects in space and in time. Thus, space and time
are neither objective nor real, but subjective and ideal fictions. Kant designated them as
“sensitive concepts,” whose applicability is restricted only to sense experience or to
phenomena. Neither these sensitive concepts nor such “intellectual concepts” as
causality and substance applied to objective reality. The forms and categories of the
mind are not intrinsically objective or real, because they are only subjectively located in
the mind, and their status in reality is ideal rather than physical. There is no object in the
external world called space. It is not an object of perception but a mode of perceiving
objects.85
83 Jammer, Concepts of Space, p. 132. Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 289-291. Albert Einstein,
“Foreword,” in Jammer, Concepts of Space, pp. xiii-xvii.
84 In fact, until 1956, when for the first time the conservation of parity was called into question, it was
generally believed that all laws of nature are invariant with respect to an interchange of right and left. See
Jammer, Concepts of Space, p. 134.
85 Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, p. 72, and Koistinen, “On the Relationship between Metaphysics
and Physics,” in ICD, pp. 6-7.
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Kant evaluated the validity and universality of space and time by the science of
Euclidean geometry, which has apodictic certainty, that is, a certainty that avoids
contingency and possesses both universality and necessity. The reason that synthetic a
priori judgments are possible in geometry is that space is an a priori form of sensibility.
Kant agreed with Hume that inductive perception could not yield principles that are
apodictic. By hypothetically granting the status of “pure intuition” to space and time,
Kant believed that he had incorporated them into the science of metaphysics. These two
forms of intuition belong to the “subjective constitution” of the mind, and in
epistemology, this location was a prerequisite for a priori certainty. Thus, the concepts
of space and time as subjective forms of intuition are mathematically and metaphysically
infinite. However, according to Kant, everything that we sense in space and time is
empirical and finite.86
Kant’s space is neither a purely empirical concept, nor a property or form of
things-in-themselves. Nothing perceived in space is a thing -in-itself. Instead, space is a
form or a pure intuition a priori, which is universal, necessary, certain, and objectively
valid, but not necessarily transcendental. Space is transcendental when applied to objects
in general, but it is empirical when restricted solely to objects of sense. External objects
are mere appearances or representations within our sensibility. The object, the thing-in-
itself, is not known and cannot be known. 87
Like space, Kant’s time is a pure form of sensible intuition a priori, not an
empirical concept derived from our experiences. There are three different basic
determinations, three modes that must be distinguished within the idea of time, and in
which the idea itself is fulfilled: duration, succession, and simultaneity. Different times
are always successive and irreversible formal orders. Successiveness is directly linked to
the notion of alteration and contradiction, that is, in a relation of either-or. Only in time
is it possible that two opposite predicates meet in the same object one after the other.
Thus, the a priori notion of time as a pure intuition is presupposed in Kant’s notion of the
principle of non-contradictory. There are three components in the principle of non-
86 Kant, A 30-32 and B 46-48. See also Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 52, 72-73, and
Kotkavirta, “The Concept of Infinity in Kant and Hegel,” in ICD, p. 12-15.
87 About Kant’s conflicting views of space, see Smith, Commentary, pp. 89-122.
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contradiction. The first is that a thing cannot be itself and the opposite of itself
simultaneously. The next can be called the principle of mutual exclusion, which means
that if one definition or state exists, the other cannot exist simultaneously. The final
component is the principle of the excluded middle, which asserts that some definitions or
states of reality are not only mutually exclusive, but also exhaustive possibilities. For
example, the states of death and life are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the possible
states: one cannot be both dead and alive, or neither dead nor alive.88
Like space, time is nothing but a subjective condition, and without this condition,
there is no intuition.89 Whereas space is the formal a priori condition of outer
experiences, time is the formal a priori condition of appearances. Knowledge is
ultimately subject to time, which provides causally ordered and successive relations for
representations. Like space, time has a dual status: empirical and transcendental. Time
has an empirical, objective validity in respect to objects given to the senses, and a
transcendental ideality, because it does not inhere in things-in-themselves, but only in the
mind. If this subjective condition of sensibility were removed, time would be nothing at
all. Thus, space and time are given to us a priori, whereas everything that is given in
them is a posteriori.90
Finally, Kant’s transcendental idealism was a critique of the epistemological
subject rather than a critique of the epistemological object. The statement “I think” was a
formal necessity, a unifying principle that constituted a necessary precondition for any
consciousness. It was not equivalent to a “person” but only to that non-material
conception of the “I” that thinks, a conception that is transcendentally necessary for there
to be conscious at all.  “I” was neither a “thing” nor substance, not a soul, nor the self-in-
itself. The determination of a pure form of knowledge must precede a determination of
any object of knowledge. The ego or “subject” was none other than reason itself, in both
88 Kant, B 47. See also Morrison, Einstein, Kant, and Tillich, pp.74-78, and Mike Sandbothe, “Die
Verzeitlichung der Zeit. Grundtendenzen der modernen Zeit-philosophie und die aktuelle
Wiederentdeckung der Zeit,” in GDJ, 1994, pp. 114-118.
89
“Die Zeit ist also lediglich eine subjective Bedingung unserer Ansc hauung und an sich, außer dem
Subjekte, nichts. Nichtsdestoweniger ist sie in Ansehung aller Erscheinungen, mithin auch aller Dinge, die
uns in der Erfahrung vorkommen können, notwendigerweise objektiv.” Kant, B 51-52.
90 About interpretations of Kant’s conception of time, see Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. 160-161,
183 and Smith, Commentary, pp. 123-134. See also Kotkavirta, “The Concept of Infinity in Kant and
Hegel,” in ICD, pp. 14-15.
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its universal and its particular functions. The ego that thinks and is necessary for
consciousness is only a subject of experience, not an object of experience. Only on moral
grounds, never through any purely theoretical analysis of cognitive experience, can it be
proved that the self is an abiding personality, and that the conscious, personal form of the
self belongs to the order of noumenal reality. Because the “I” cannot be an object of
experience, categories of understanding cannot be applied to it. This subject, the ego,
cannot be considered as either a unit or a plurality of substances, cannot be exhibited in
causal relationships, and cannot be known.
Kant’s critical transcendental idealism was an endeavor to avoid subjective or
psychological idealism, solipsism, positivism or dogmatic realism, relativism, or any
combination thereof. These positions can only be avoided by postulating and justifying
on a priori grounds some type of realism, objectivity, external order, and something that
is designated as absolute.91
Kant’s arguments were designed to show the limits of our knowledge. Against
the rationalists, who believed that we could possess metaphysical knowledge about God,
souls, and substance, and that such knowledge was transcendentally real, Kant argued
that it is not possible to gain knowledge beyond the empirical. Against Hume’s
empiricism, which concluded that reality is an aggregate of subjective, atomic sense
impressions without causal order and without external objects causing these impressions,
Kant’s transcendental method or deduction and the synthetic a priori unity hypothetically
postulated and constituted a unified technical apparatus as a necessary condition for
completely overcoming the otherwise inescapable consequences of Hume’s position. As
a transcendental idealist, Kant believed that the nature of objects, as they are in-
themselves, is unknowable, but knowledge of their appearances is still possible. Thus,
Kant was also an empirical realist about the world we experience as it appears to us by
means of space, time, and categories. His critical idealism was a combination of
rationalism and empirism.92
91 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 272-293.
92 Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. 193-195, and McCormick, “Kant,” pp. 6-10.
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B. Post-Kantian Philosophies
The vast amount of post-Kantian philosophical literature and their different
interpretations, criticisms, and modifications of Kant’s central thesis prove that Kant’s
transcendental idealism and its method was not the final “theory of everything” in
philosophy. One of the main concerns of post-Kantian philosophy has been that of
ontology. German absolute idealism, phenomenalism, and existentialism represented this
ontological concern. On the other hand, within the field of epistemology, one may
discern at least three major currents of thought: positivism, Kantianism, and the semantic
tradition. Their common issue has been what stance should be taken toward a priori
knowledge. Positivists denied it, Kantians explained it through Kant’s “Copernican
revolution,” and those of the semantic tradition believed in it but not in the constitutive
power of the mind. They argued that the root of all the confusion found in idealism is the
effect of misunderstanding its conceptual meanings.93
Heim’s own philosophical battle concerned the controversy between idealism and
realism. He sought to resolve the contradictory with his idea of dimensional thinking,
which was based on ontology, but which also provided answers for epistemological
questions. The most important post-Kantian philosophies for Heim’s dimensional
thinking were the ontology of the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the Neo-
Kantian idealism of Natorp and Rickert, the epistemological phenomenalism of Husserl,
the existentialism of Heidegger, the critical realism of Einstein, and quantum idealism of
Heisenberg.94
German absolute idealism was an ontological response to Kant’s epistemological
critical idealism.95 Its adherents were not so interested in what we put into objects or
what the objects put into our minds, but in providing a philosophical inspiration and
enthusiasm for action. German idealists believed that philosophy is not only a scientific
93 Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 1-4.
94 The subsequent analysis is based only on certain interpretations and commentaries about those
philosophers with whom Heim debated. I refer only occasionally to the original works of those
philosophers, because the purpose of this chapter is only to describe the philosophical battleground in
which Heim developed his notion of the dimensional thinking.
95 According to Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. 18-36, epistemology in German idealism was
an “ontology of knowledge.”
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exercise but also a vision, a statement of purpose, the development of a point of view.
The perspectival stand for something could be a stand for the importance of the arts or
politics, for sympathy or passion, for a way of thinking and living.96
Fichte developed the principle that the unity of subject and object, of presentation
and thing, can be found only in constitutive activity of self-consciousness. He called this
subjective consciousness the “transcendental ego” or the “self-positing I.” He noticed
that Kant’s account of experience created a vital tension between the roles of pure
intelligence and of objects as noumenal realities, and it was necessary to maintain a
balance between them. Fichte argued that it is necessary to choose one of two alternative
views: to emphasize the knower and ignore the known as a thing-in-itself, or to ignore the
knower in order to focus on the reality of the known. He chose the former, subjective
course, because he believed that it alone was capable of securing the freedom required for
an adequate account of morality. He argued that all philosophy and all reality begin with
the transcendental ego, the elusive but active noumenal self, which is identifiable only in
an indefinitely repeated reflection upon primary experience. This conscious self expands
itself infinitely to do everything and to comprehend everything. The freedom of the ego
must be the basis of all philosophy, both theoretical and practical. Thus, Kant’s
“autonomy” of the self is, according to Fichte, the foundation not only of practical or
moral philosophy but also of the theoretical philosophy of knowledge and being.97
Schelling argued that the most general proof of the overall ideality of knowledge
was carried out in Fichte’s “science of knowledge” (Wissenschaftslehre) by the
immediate inference from the proposition “I am.” What remained was to prove Fichte’s
theoretical position and to construct a reliable, monistic, and objective system of absolute
idealism that could verify Fichte’s subjective thought. Such a system would give
substance to a perceptual and cognitive idealism by demonstrating that the objective
world is in a process of emergence from the “self” and its activities. The world was
constructed from the self’s fundamental quality, namely, freedom. Schelling’s task was
96 Ibid., pp. vii-xii.
97Ibid., pp. xii-xiv, and Garth Kemerling, “The Development of Absolute Idealism,” in Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://people.delphi.com, 1999, pp. 1-7.
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to prove the identity of transcendental idealismand of realism, and thus to elevate
transcendental philosophy into an “ideal-realism.”98
Schelling argued that the self is primordially both active and limited, and it makes
itself to be both subject and object, finite and infinite. In his system the self returns from
limitation to its original freedom in a dialectic process, and for the first time becomes
conscious of itself in what it already was in itself, namely, pure freedom. Schelling’s
treatment of Kant’s philosophy emphasized the primacy of the practical. Time played the
central role in the synthesis of finite and infinite self-consciousness. Like Fichte, and
later Hegel, Schelling stated that cognition and action are fundamentally the same. It
means that one’s identity is a basis and motivation of reason both in cognition and in
action. Yet, reason as a free act of spirit or will also seeks to find and establish itself in
the other – the non-self. The practical was over the theoretical, and spirit over nature. In
Schelling’s philosophy of nature, nature itself is spiritualized. From the pragmatic or
spirit-centered standpoint, Schelling interpreted all being, in its objective aspects as well
as its subjective ones, through categories of willing. Freedom was not simply activity of
self. It must be more than a concept in the domain of the possible. It must be the
archetypal origin, the principle of existence and actuality. Freedom was the place in
which thinking, as an interplay of concepts, ceases, and reality begins. The actual takes
precedence over the possible, the practical over the theoretical.99
Schelling’s “ideal-realism” had two distinct systems at play. The first system was
a reflexive relation of the self, an immanent unification of human knowledge under a
dialectic process. The second system was a comprehensive science of reality. The latter,
as a philosophy of nature, included the former, and the two were joined through a
transcendental logic or a metaphysical theory of identity and difference. Schelling
attempted to preserve the distinction between knower and known, between subject and
object, between “ego” and “non-ego,” by describing their interdependence. He argued
that Kant’s accounts of causality and teleology were not sufficient to explain the
connection between the object and our knowledge of it. He believed that there is a
perfect parallel between the nature and the structure of our consciousness. The nature
98 Vater, “The Odyssey of Consciousness,” in F.W.J. Schelling, System, pp. xi-xii.
99 Ibid., pp. xvi-xx.
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reflects consciousness. This proposition was not true from the perspective of the
individual ego, because the world does not invariably conform to each individual’s
thoughts about it. Avoiding subjectivity, Schelling postulated an objective, and
transcendental consciousness, an absolute ego that simultaneously contained the thoughts
of every individual ego and provided the noumenal ground for every material object. By
shifting from the finite individual ego to the infinite reason of absolute ego, he employed
the notion of “monism” to express the fundamental identity of the real with the rational.
Schelling made realism and idealism parallel, and demonstrated their ideal principle, the
polarity between the conscious and empirical ego and the unconscious and absolute ego
within it. The reason of absolute ego is systematic: an ordering and pattering will to
know, a will to discover itself in the known. Everything is at once a priori and a
posteriori, and so all our knowledge is empirical.100
According to Schelling, there are two types or ways of knowing: objective and
non-objective. The self is pure inwardness, a state of being with an infinitely non-
objective intellectual intuition that is self-constituting. It exists by knowing itself in this
non-objective manner. The self’s objective knowing and activity is the becoming of a
world for it. Self-consciousness is thus a steady, enduring juxtaposition of conscious and
unconscious activities, and an ongoing translation of the self from the unconscious over
to conscious will. All predicates apply only to the will that is a primordial being. The
willing and acting self is an act of knowing. Knowing is directed only to the past, that is,
an objectivity of a thoroughly determined world.101
Hegel developed German absolute idealism as an objective and global perspective
of entire reality. He rejected Fichte’s enthusiastic individualism by arguing that the
individual is unimportant within the perspective of history as a whole. Spirit (Geist) is
the main conception of Hegel’s philosophy. Spirit refers to some kind of general and
abstract consciousness, a single mind common to everyone. In other words, spirit is the
absolute conception of humanity as one. There are no opposition between an individual
oneself, others, and God. Absolute consciousness is the explicit recognition of one’s
identity as universal Spirit that ignores individual differences but not deny them. Our
100 Ibid., pp. xx-xxx.
101 Kemerling, “Development of Absolute Idealism,” pp. 2-3.
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individual minds are not only one consciousness but also individual at the same time:
unity in difference. In Hegel’s absolute idealism, “I” am something other than a person,
namely, a part of the superpersonal and abstract Spirit. Hegel’s purpose was, on the one
hand, to resolve epistemological disharmonies between subject and object, and on the
other hand, disharmonies of Christianity by introducing an immanent God and World-
Spirit to Christian theology.
Like Kant’s ego, Hegel’s Geist was a treatise on self-knowledge. The nature of
the knowing subject was the key to all philosophical understanding. Hegel’s Geist
replaces Kant’s ego by removing certain philosophical perplexities, which that was
incapable of resolving. Hegel tried to avoid the methodological solipsism, to which “I
think” of Descartes and Kant’s transcendental ego as a starting point irrevocably lead.
For Descartes, “I” is neither person nor human body but the thinking substantial mind.
For Kant, “I think” is a formal necessity, a unifying principle that constitutes a necessary
vehicle of all concepts for any consciousness. The “I” that thinks and is necessary for
consciousness is only the subject of experience, not an object of experience. Hegel,
instead, argued that a self has knowledge purely of itself in the absolute antithesis of
itself. Geist is in every experience but it is not itself experienced in any of these. Hegel’s
Geist is Kant’s ego without the unwarranted claim there is one ego per person. Geist is a
transition from a personal subject to a universal subject.102
The “ontological epistemology” and “ideal-realism” of German idealism strongly
influenced Heim’s dimensional thinking, especially Fichte’s concept of non-objectifiable
“I,” Schelling’s concept of “polarity,” and Hegel’s concepts of “universal subject” and
“immanent God.” However, Heim’s dimensional thinking was closer to Schelling’s
“ideal-realism” than to Fichte’s “self-positing ego” and Hegel’s “Geist as the divine
subject.” Like Schelling, Heim stated that time played a central role in the synthesis of
idealism and realism. Both men interpreted reality as an objective and subjective being
through the categories of a knowing and a willing ego. Such distinctions in Heim’s
dimensional thinking, as “identity and difference,” “part-relation or inclusion,” and “two
kinds of a knowing way,” were similar to those of Schelling’s metaphysical theory. The
concept of “polarity” was one of the basic concepts in both their thinking. It explained
102 Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. ix, 3-17.
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the tension and interdependence between knower and known, subject and object, ego and
non-ego. Like Schelling, Heim thought that there was a parallelism between nature and
ego, that nature reflects consciousness. Thus, both of them were “panpsychists,” as we
shall subsequently see.
The next influential front of Heim’s philosophical battleground was Neo-
Kantianism. Heim tended to agree with Neo-Kantian pluralists in both the so-called
Marburg School (in which Paul Natorp, José Ortega y Gasset, and Ernst Cassirer were
prominent members) and with the so-called Freiburg School (in which W. Windelband
and Heinrich Rickert were members). The Marburg School was more philosophical than
scientific, and the Freiburg School was more concerned with an extension of Kant’s
thoughts relating to the cultural sciences.103 Themost important concepts for Heim’s
dimensional thinking were Natorp’s concepts of “poly-dimensionality” and “supra-
world,”104 and Rickert’s concept of “non-objectifiable.”
Paul Natorp tried to build a general psychology in accordance with Kant’s critical
method. For him consciousness is not a part of reality. Rather, it is a psychological
foundation and precondition for reality. Psychology cannot attempt to know
consciousness by describing it as some sort of analogue of objective reality. It must see
consciousness as something irreducible and ultimate, which can only be disclosed as
such, but which cannot be explained in accordance with the categorical forms of our
knowledge of things, and in particular not in accordance with the categories of substance
and causality. The intuitive or thinking ego is not something that exists in space and
time, but is solely the pure fact of appearance. According to Natorp, there are three
dimensions of reality: the theoretical and ethical dimensions of Kant, and the supra-world
of art and religion. The mind cannot be logically subordinated to these worlds or set
beside them or over them. The mind is not accessible either by direct observation or by
any instrument of empirical psychology, nor can it be simply postulated as a hypothetical
basis of explanation. The concept of “relation” was the very foundation and
103 Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, p. 57.
104 No one of Heim scholars has noticed the influence of Natorp’s “poly-dimensionality” and “supra-world”
on Heim’s dimensional thinking.
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presupposition for all critical psychology. Natorp argued that relation seems to be so
essential to consciousness that all genuine consciousness is relational. 105
Natorp’s relational phenomenology of consciousness was similar to Heim’s
dimensional thinking in which the epistemological subject is the non-objectifiable and
eternal center of reality. However, Heim rejected Natorp’s philosophy of immanence, the
doctrine that all objects of knowledge are non-existent and present only in the act of
knowledge. With classical idealists such, as positivists Richard Avenarius and Ernst
Mach, and the neutral monist Bertrand Russell, Natorp argued that we should accept the
existence only of what is at least in principle observable, and that knowledge is possible
only when concept and intuition join together to give us information about reality. The
existence of observable objects offers sensible, inductive grounds for discarding the
notion of things-in-themselves, and the joining of concept and intuition tells us why we
could know nothing about them. Realists believe that there are things-in-themselves, real
objects that are entirely independent of mind, and it assumes that we can see, touch, and
otherwise recognize the existence of these objects. Immanentists dismiss the claim of
realists and since they see no other reason for the belief in things-in-themselves, they
drop it too.106 Heim agreed with realists that there is an objective reality independent of
the mind, an “it”-world that is in a dimensional relation with the epistemological subject
“I.”
For Heinrich Rickert epistemological questions were concerned with the
formation of concepts. The conditions for the possibility of knowledge of an object were
conditions for forming concepts of that object. Valid formation of concepts, therefore,
constitutes knowledge.107 Rickert rejected epistemological realism, the correspondence
theory of truth, and epistemological naturalism, that is, psychologism and historicism,
which reduce philosophical questions to empirical problems. According to him, reality as
an object of experience is an infinite conglomerate of single events and processes that has
no identifiable temporal beginning or end and no discernible spatial limits. Moreover, it
appears in endless numbers of combinations. The fact that reality is “extensive” infinite
105 Cassirer, Phenomenology of Knowledge, pp. 51-57, 203.
106 Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 185-186.
107 Guy Oakes, “Rickert’s Theory of Historical Knowledge,” in Rickert, The Limits, pp. vii-xxviii.
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means that as a whole it cannot be exhaustively incorporated into experience and that it is
impossible to survey it in toto. In addition, each event and process within this infinite
conglomerate is also infinitely complex in numbers of parts and aspects. Rickert calls
this the “intensive” infinity of reality. Thus, reality is irrational both as an infinite whole
and as infinite parts and aspects. This concept of the irrationality of reality was not an
ontological doctrine but a phenomenological claim whose core was the concept of “non-
objectifiable.”108
Rickert separated epistemology from methodology. The systematization of
constitutive forms is the domain of epistemology or the theory of knowledge in general,
and the systematization of methodological forms is the domain of methodology or the
theory of scientific knowledge. Rickert proposed both a theory of the formation of
concepts that holds that knowledge cannot qualify as a reproduction of reality, and a
theory of truth that holds that the idea of a correspondence between any set of
propositions and reality is incoherent. Thus, a proposition is true not because it
corresponds with reality, but because what is asserted by the proposition is valid as a
representation for reality. Truth is a value, and the domain of values is an ideal, not a
real, domain. This means we cannot argue that what exists is true. It can only be said to
hold validly. Knowledge has essential aims or cognitive interests that, in the face of the
infinite complexity of reality, identifies specific aspects of reality. In light of the
essential values of truth, we expect knowledge to be build by certain methods.
Nevertheless, according to Rickert, given the irrationality of reality, knowledge is
possible only by means of “concepts. Therefore, Rickert’s theory of method is a theory
of concept formation.109
As was discussed in the previous Chapter I.1, Heim borrowed Rickert’s concept
of “non-objectifiable.” He agreedwith Rickert that the epist emological subject is “non-
objectifiable,” but rejected that it is some kind of “common consciousness” (Bewußtsein
überhaupt), and that the individual “real subjects” are only objects.110
108 Ibid., p. xvii.
109 Ibid., pp. xviii-xix.
110 GD, pp. 145-147.
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The next influential front of Heim’s philosophical battleground was
phenomenology and existentialism. These philosophies have long been associated.
Phenomenology is often characterized as an attempt to demonstrate the “objective
validity” of the fundamental principles of mathematics, natural science, epistemology,
and ontology from the standpoint of “transcendental subjectivity.” Edmund Husserl
initiated it in his austere and hard to understand lecture notes and manuscripts, most of
which are not published. Descartes and Kant were his most important philosophical
predecessors. Husserl’s phenomenology has the Cartesian emphasis on the primacy of
the experience of the ego and the Kantian search for basic a priori principles. It started
with the study of human consciousness, attempted to define the structures that are
essential to all possible experiences, and searched for foundations. Husserl tried to find
the a priori principles of all human cognition.
Existentialism also begins from the Cartesian standpoint of the ego, but it moves
from a focus on knowledge to a focus on human action. Martin Heidegger interpreted
consciousness not as knowing but as acting, willing, and deciding. Kant’s practical
reason and its freedom posed a fundamental problem to Husserl and to Heidegger. For
Husserl the study of consciousness was essentially an epistemological study. For
Heidegger it was a means to understand what it is to be a person, and what the universal,
a priori, essential, existential, and ontological presuppositions of human action are.111
Husserl, whose phenomenology Heim used as a method of his dimensional
thinking, argued that his phenomenology was a “presuppositionless” method without any
theoretical bias, and that its results were unconditionally true. He insisted that
phenomenology consists solely of d escriptions, and it neither presupposes nor advances
any philosophical theories, because there are no possible philosophical theories. Theories
always assert something more than their data, and this “something more” has no place in
philosophy. Every philosophical proposition must be constantly open to questions.
Therefore, a presuppositionless philosophy will admit only those propositions that will be
true and acceptable in any intellectual environment, and phenomenology must limit itself
111 See Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp.158-183.
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to reconfirmable descriptions of experience and the role of ego in the “intuition of
essences.”112
Like Kant’s critical idealism, the phenomenology of Husserl was a combination
of rationalism and radical empiricism. With the rationalists, he maintained that we can
and do have knowledge that is not empirical. With the empiricists, he said that all
knowledge comes from intuition. Husserl rejected the Cartesian distinction between
experiences and the objects themselves. His concept of “phenomenon” represents
something that is both an experience and something that is the object itself. The
phenomenon is a directly evident object as it is consciously experienced.
The phenomenological standpoint for Husserl is the ego, which “inhabits”
consciousness and is in some sense responsible for one’s consciousness of the world, as
Kant had argued. However there are important differences between Kant and Husserl.
For example, Kant distinguished between phenomena, which are given in intuition, and
noumena, which lie behind the transcendental horizon of intuition. Yet, Husserl rejected
this distinction and insisted that phenomena are the things-themselves. He held Kant’s
distinction between sensibility and understanding, and that a priori principles of
understanding are given in intuition, but argued that his own concept of intuition includes
parts of what Kant had divided into sense and understanding.
There are at least two possible directions to explain the notion of “phenomena”:
reduce them to the notion of “experience,” or interpret them as if they were not to be
distinguished from things-in-themselves. For the analysis of “consciousness” there are
also two explanations: consciousness is either a mysterious and autonomous realm or
substance, as Descartes had thought, or it is nothing at all, as Spinoza and Wittgenstein
had thought. Descartes distinguished between mental and physical substances, and his
followers spoke of a distinction between “in the minds” and “in the world.” Husserl
argued that such theories of mind are simply products of a careless phenomenological
description, and they do not explain what consciousness really is like. From Franz
Brentano he borrowed his central thesis that consciousness is intentional. Intentionality
112
“Essence” is concept or proposition, but not in a psychological fashion. Concepts are different from
people’s having concepts, as propositions are different from people’s believing propositions. Essence is
what gives meaning to experience, what make it possible for us to see objects. When I see a dog, I see that
it is dog. See Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. 175-176.
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means that consciousness always takes an object, and its act is always directed towards
something. Knowing is always to comprehend something. The intentional object is a
material object, but it may also be something unreal, propositional, or ideal object. There
is a correlation between act and object: every act has at least one object, and every object
has at least one possible act. The intentional act constitutes the object. Without act, there
would be no object. A phenomenon is an object as intuited, that is, phenomena and
things-in-themselves are identical as intentionally experienced. The analysis of meaning
of object and the analysis of what it is for there to be an object are identical. In
phenomenological or transcendental reductions, the description of phenomena is reduced
to a description of essences, to focus attention on the meaning of phenomena rather than
on peculiarities of any particular experience. In addition, in such reductions, the problem
of existence is bracketed out in an “epoche.” The epoche means that when we describe
the essence of something, its existence is irrelevant. For instance, for Husserl, the
existence of the ego, the world, or God, was as such irrelevant. He did not doubt, or did
not seek a proof, as Descartes did, but only sought to describe what it was to believe in
one’s own existence, in the existence of the world, and in God.113
The point of departure in the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger was
not epistemology but ontology, as was the case for Heim. The primary task of
philosophy is to understand being itself, not merely our knowledge of it. Traditional
metaphysics focuses on what is, but Heidegger argued that it might be far more
illuminating to examine the boundaries of ordinary knowledge by trying to study what is
not. The basic question of Heidegger’s existentialism was “what is it to be or not to be a
person?” that is, what is the “existential foundation,” or the a priori principles, regarding
what it is to be human? The ability to think and to know is important for human beings,
but it is most important to ask who I am or who I am not, and what I ought to do or not to
do. The question of self-identity is, for Heidegger, ontological. No one finds out who he
is, but he decides, and acts upon his decision. We are what we do.
113 Ibid., pp. 169-175.
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Fundamentally, we do not know objects in the world, but we simply use them.
The problem is to explain how we can use them and live with them. This means paying
attention to those intentional acts that are not merely cognitive but also involve caring,
desiring, and manipulating. Such acts are also tied to moods and emotions. No one is a
detached consciousness and can abstract himself from the world around him. He is
essentially a “being-in-the-world” who cannot “bracket existence,” as the Husserlian
epoche requires. Both human existence and that of the world around us are given as the
starting point of all phenomenological description. The study of phenomena and the
study of things-in-themselves are not separable enterprises, because phenomenology and
ontology belong together.
Heidegger’s introduction of the notion of “being-in-the-world” was one of the
most radical moves in modern philosophy, because he rejected not only Husserl’s epoche
but also the entire tradition of epistemological dualism. Heidegger demanded that
philosophy must begin with the single concept of “being-in-the world,” which is not
separable into consciousness on the one hand and objects on the other, whether these
objects have intention or are things “in-themselves.” He distinguished only between
ontic and ontological structure, that is, between those structures that exist before we are
aware that they exist, and those that come into existence only with reflection. He also
rejected the idea, proposed by Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, that consciousness is
essentially self-consciousness. The self is not a peculiar internal object that inhabits
consciousness or lies behind it as a transcendental or formal principle that unifies our
experience. We become “selves” by looking at ourselves as other people look at us, that
is, it develops only in the company of other persons.
Heidegger did not find satisfactory solution to the question whether the objects
are “given in intuition” or “constituted by consciousness.” Husserl held the two notions
together. Heidegger accepted this problem as a necessary peculiarity of human existence.
One can never tell howmuch of what we see is there independent of us, and how much of
what we see is created by our viewpoint, language, and presuppositions. To be a person
means that we are in a position of never being able to know what is given and what one
can produce. There is no answer to the existential question: “Who am I?” One is thrown
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into the world and into a particular situation in which he is not free. We must make
decisions but we do not know “which is which.”114
Heidegger’s conception of time was the ontological foundation of his
existentialism. His lecture, The Concept of Time,115 presents a number of theses that
were expanded and incorporated into his work, Being and Time.116 His main argument
about time was that the world’s time or clock-time is ontic and “inauthentic.” Within it,
events take place. There is no absolute space, absolute time, or absolute simultaneity.
There are only changes in time. Time is something to which a now-point may be
arbitrarily fixed with respect to two other time-points (one earlier and one later), and yet
no now-point of time is privileged over any other. This time is thoroughly uniform,
homogeneous, irreversible, and measurable. Yet, Heidegger had another argument about
time, namely, that personal time is ontological, “authentic,” and immeasurable. I am
now, and my existence is time. The assertion “I am” is the authentic assertion of being
(Dasein). Dasein is an entity characterized by Heidegger as “being-in-the-world,” and
being-in-the-world is “being-with/for-one-another” by dialogue. Third, that I am still
underway with my Dasein, which is not yet at an end. The end of my Dasein is my death,
which is not some point at which a sequence of events suddenly breaks off, but the
extreme possibility of itself. My Dasein is running ahead to its past, which takes
everything with it into the Nothing. This past is not a “what” but a “how” of my Dasein,
and it becomes visible in its everydayness. Heidegger’s last argument on time was that
the fundamental phenomenon of time is, in fact, the future. The fact that time moves
ahead is the authentic and singular future of one’s own Dasein. In its being the future,
time comes back to its past and present. Dasein is time, not in time. Maintaining myself
alongside my past in running ahead, I have time. Being futural as a possibility of Dasein
gives time, because it is time itself. According to Heidegger, time is Dasein as
temporality. Time is the “how,” not the “what.” The question “what is time?” became
the question “who is time?” or perhaps “Am I my time?”117
114 Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. 177-183.
115 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. by WilliamMcNeill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
116 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper
and Row, SCM Press, 1962).
117 Ibid., pp. 1-22.
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For both Kant and Heidegger, time played a quite similar role in the knowing
process. Heidegger’s subjectivity (Dasein) exists as “temporalizing” (Zeitigung) of time,
not as a derivative of eternity.118 However, Heidegger’s epistemology through
phenomenological immediacy was in direct contradiction to Kant’s critical idealism and
the methods of physics. He developed an ontological epistemology in whichthe
philosophical problem of a relation between subject and object was radically
reinterpreted. Knowing is the “inside” mode of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. The notion
of spatial relations between subject and object evaporated in his phenomenological
immediacy. Heidegger also denied Kant’s principle of the irreversibility of temporal
succession. The order of ordinary or “inauthentic” time, past, present, and future, was
reversed in “authentic” time: future, present, and past. Ontic time runs forward, but
ontological time runs backwards. 119
The final influential front of the battleground in Heim’s dimensional thinking was
Einstein’s critical realism and Heisenberg’s quantum idealism. Heim established a
scientific basis for his dimensional thinking from them, which made room for his concept
of two-dimensional time. Einstein’s epistemological philosophy was based, at first, on
Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism, then on Max Planck’s realism, which tried to walk a fine
line between empiricism and rationalism. Mach had argued in his “criterion” of
knowledge that propositions should not be retained in science if observations verifying
them cannot be deduced from them. Thus, he rejected all metaphysical claims as
obscurities. His world-view was anti-realistic, anti-causal, anti-mechanistic, anti-
materialistic, and anti-atomistic. Einstein rejected the positivism, operationalism, and
phenomenalism of Mach and shifted to the position of critical physical realism. Einstein
in his GR gave primacy to sensations and promoted the use of hypothetical postulates that
are not empirical or positivistic in origin. His postulates were the invariant velocity of
light in a vacuum and a generalization of the principle of relativity for the cosmos. Like
Planck, Einstein argued that there is a real outer world existing independently of our act
of knowing, that this real outer world is not directly knowable, that the a priori law of
118 Sandbothe, “Die Verzeitlichung der Zeit,” pp. 118-126.
119 See the interpretation of Heidegger in Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 143-161.
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physical causality is the provable prerequisite for the scientific endeavor, and that
metaphysics is an indispensable and inescapable subject within physics. Like Planck,
Einstein rejected the positivistic implication that sensory perceptions create the physical
world around us, and so avoided solipsism, which is the inescapable consequence of
empiricism and positivism. Thus, Einstein liberated science from the subjectivity of the
human observer.120
Based on Planck’s realism, Einstein reversed Kant’s “Copernican revolution.”
This reversal meant the return to the Leibniz’s relative notion of space and time, to
critical realism from critical idealism, and to the notion that the mind must conform to
objects rather than objects to the mind. Einstein’s Special and General theories of
relativity did not promote any kind of relativism. Rather, they sought principles of
absoluteness, invariance, and reliability. Einstein insisted that there was an
independently existing system of physical reality waiting to be discovered and described
by physicists, not only a system of “objective validity” as Kant had argued. The physical
universe exists prior to and independent of human perceptual activity. Einstein located
Kant’s categories in the physical world where at least some of them could be modified by
the results of experiments. For Einstein, physical reality was not partially created only
when the observer supplies the categories. Reality is not constituted by, or contingent
upon, human mental activities. Human beings are totally unnecessary for the cosmos to
function. Einstein’s solution to the problem of conformity between object and mind was
that our theories and categories must conform to physical objects and processes, as they
exist independently of us.121
The most important notion in Einstein’s SR was that the continuum of space-time
unites space and time in a single objective structure that exists independently of the
physical structures that move within it. The space-time continuum is a “field” for all
physical events and an inert system against which motion could be measured. Einstein
argued that if the laws of this field are covariant, that is, are not dependent on a particular
choice of coordinate systems, then the introduction of absolute space and time is no
longer necessary. That which constitutes the spatial character of reality is then simply the
120 See Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 307-312, and his note 76.
121 Einstein, “Foreword” in Jammer, Concepts of Space, p. xvii.
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four-dimensionality of the field. According to Einstein, “there is no such thing as an
empty space, i.e., a space without a field. Space-time does not claim existence on its
own, but only as a structural quality of the field. I wished to show that space-time is not
necessarily something to which one can ascribe a separate existence, independently of
actual objects of physical reality. Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are
spatially extended. In this way the concept ‘empty space’ loses its meaning.” 122 Thus,
Einstein regarded physical reality as independent of the observer, and consisting of
permanently existing material points in motion relative to space-time. Einstein stated that
if matter were to disappear, space-time would remain as a kind of stage for possible
physical events. SR removed absolute space and time, but defined new absolutes: space-
time, the speed of light, and an externally and objectively real four-dimensional
universe.123
The fundamental question of Einstein’s SR and GR was the form and character of
the laws of nature. His question was, were those laws of nature relative to arbitrarily
chosen coordinate systems, or were they absolute? If the laws of nature are absolute,
their form could not vary merely by measuring different kinds of coordinate systems,
such as those of inertia, gravitation, and acceleration. If the laws of nature are relative,
their form could vary in different referential situations. SR did not attempt to answer this
question, but GR applies to any frame whatsoever. There are no privileged frames
among inert, gravitational, or accelerating reference systems. GR is based upon the
equivalence of inert and gravitational mass. These are not different components but
different aspects of the same function of motion. One consequence of GR is that there is
no absolute gravity, only relative gravity. GR is dependent upon the notion of matter as
the cause of a field that functions as a medium for the transmission of light waves. A
consequence of this field is that the notion of instantaneous or simultaneous action at a
distance is impossible. The causal relation between distant events A and B cannot be
regarded as simultaneous. The event B must follow event A by an interval, which is
122 Einstein, Relativity. The Special and the General Theory, trans. Robert W. Lawson (New York: Three
Rivers Press, 1961), Appendix Five, “Relativity and the Problem of Space,” pp. 155-178. See also
Einstein’s “Note to the Fifteenth Edition,” p. vii.
123 Feynman, Six not-so-easy Pieces, pp. 49-71.
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prescribed by the finite velocity of light in the intervening field, and by the distance
between those events.124
Einstein set forth the criterion that any definition must not be idealistic,
positivistic, limited to observations, or limited to that, which can be measured at a given
time. Einstein believed that an order of causality or the principle of sufficient reason was
there waiting to be discovered, whether observation was or was not in progress. The
epistemological law of non-contradiction was more important than laboratory
experiments or metaphysical speculations based upon observation and positivistic
idealism.125
Against Einstein’s critical realism, the point of departure in Werner Heisenberg’s
philosophical thinking was the epistemological impasse in theoretical physics concerning
the situation established for any given experiment. It is impossible to establish strict
individual causal relations empirically, and therefore science reaches its epistemological
limit, its quantum boundary.126 Heisenberg’s treatment of the problem of determinism or
indeterminism of microphysics was not scientific but metaphysical. He used idealistic,
existential, and dialectical assumptions, and voluntaristic decisions, although he also
argued that metaphysics is not tenable to physics. He optimistically believed that all
contradictions could be resolved, and that an ultimate theory of physical reality was
waiting to be discovered. Like Mach, Heisenberg thought that the task of physics is
simply to provide a formal description of the connection between observations.
Heisenberg’s focus was upon observations and upon a mathematically formal description
of relations between sense data rather than upon a real physical world to which those
observations refer.127
124 Ibid., pp. 93-144. Kant had thought similarly that time had an irreversible sequence, since causes
always preceded effects within a transcendental and absolute time grid, but he did not notice that the
“principle of sufficient reason” presupposed the physical and cosmic field, which serves as the intermediary
medium for action at a distance.
125 Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 312-318.
126 See Werner Heisenberg, Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics, trans. F.C. Hayes (Woodbridge,
CT: Ox Bow Press, 1979), p. 16. Heisenberg emphasized the immaterial dividing line between an observer
and objects is the position in which objects are to be taken as part of the means of observa tion and as part
of observed objects.
127 About Heisenberg’s world-view, see Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 227-276.
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Heisenberg argued based on his uncertainty principle, that the rigid law of
causality is invalid in QM. He rejected causal determinism in favor of the notion of
possibility and voluntarism, as Fichte had argued.128 He dismissed all contradictions
within sub-atomic observations by presupposing that the sub-atomic particles do not exist
continuously between observations. It is obvious that there is no contradiction arising
from that which does not yet exist! Against the classical physics of Einstein, Heisenberg
argued that transcendental reality precedes physical reality, but that they are
complementary. He concluded that the classical description of space-time and the law of
causality disappear at the quantum boundary. Because of the principle of uncertainty,
there is room for the functions of   indeterministic probability of neo-classical space-time.
An observation changes the probability function by discontinuously selecting, from all
possible and potential events, the one that actually occurs. Sub-atomic reality is
somehow a discrete event.129
The presuppositions of classical physics were that (1) the order of events in time
is entirely independent of their order in space, (2) that Euclidean geometry is valid in real
space, (3) that events occur in space-time independently of any observation of those
events, and (4) that the act of observation had some influence on phenomena but such
influence could be reduced by controlling the formulations of experiments. Einstein’s SR
and GR rejected the first assumption, whereas QM rejected the third. Heisenberg
modified these assumptions of classical physics by arguing that the principles of
bivalence and causality are not valid in quantum logic and in the ontology of QM. Atoms
constitute a discontinuous indeterministic world of coexistent non -objectifiable
potentialities and possibilities. Matter was dematerialized.130
In Heisenberg’s worldpicture lies an insurmountable conflict between
materialism and idealism. Heisenberg claimed that it is scientifically necessary to shift
from materialism to idealism. According to his ontology, reality consists of three layers.
128 Heisenberg, Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics, p. 27-28: “The observation of nature by man
shows here a close analogy to the individual act of perception which one can, like Fichte, accept as a
process of Self-limitation of the ego. It means that in every act of perception we select one of the infinite
number of possibilities and thus we also limit the number of possibilities for the future.”
129 Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 123.
130 According to Jaki, Limits, p. 95, “Heisenberg (and Bohr) claimed that the uncertainty principle
definitely discredited the principle of causality… that physicist can literally create matter out of nothing.”
68
The primordial energetic layer of reality is located in, and constituted by, mathematical
and objective idealism. The so-called “central order” of this layer gives non-physical and
non-material meaning for the whole world. The intermediate layer is that of energetic
possibility or potentiality toward an actual occurrence. The third is the objective,
macroscopic, physical, and material layer of nature. The second and third layers are
derivative, contingent, transient, and relative to the first layer, which is absolute, eternal,
and supernatural. Heisenberg thus rejected the ontic position of the critical physical
realism of Einstein and shifted to the ontological positions of Platonic idealism and to the
existentialism of Heidegger.131
131 See Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: the Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1962).
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Chapter II
BASIC CONCEPTS OF HEIM’S DIMENSIONAL THINKING
Karl Heim’s dimensional thinking was influenced by the philosophies analyzed in
the previous Chapter I.2. However, it was not any combination or decisively dependent
on their epistemological or ontological thoughts. Heim created his brilliant ontological
theory of reality on the foundation of those philosophies, but at same time, he also
rethought them and rejected their fatal flaws.
Heim’s purpose in the first of his six -volume work, Glaube und Denken, was to
create an unambiguous conceptual foundation common to science, philosophy, and
theology. He emphasized the point that his task was a phenomeno logical one in the sense
of Husserl’s phenomenology. He thus “bracketed” epistemological questions about
reality, but argued that his dimensional thinking provided solutions also to
epistemological problems. He argued that his “philosophy of spaces” (Philosophie der
Räume) was an endeavor to expand Kant’s pure forms of intuition: space and time.1
Heim made assertions that claimed to describe reality as it is “given.” He
emphasized that his task was ontological rather than epistemological, and that his world-
view did not necessarily presuppose any stance, idealistic or realistic, to reality. He
believed that on this foundation, the simultaneity of God’s transcendence and immanence
could be understood by differently thinking people. On the other hand, Heim’s endeavor
was not only ontological but also epistemological, because Heim had to ask how it is
possible to know anything about reality. Epistemology is as fundamental as ontology in
1
“Wir gehen dabei also, wie man seit Husserl sagt, phänomenologisch zu Werke. Wir klammern die Frage
ein, ob das Erfahrungsganze, in das wir hineingestellt sind, eine letzte Realität ist oder eine
Erscheinungswelt, die die wahre Wirklichkeit wie ein Schleier verhüllt. Es kann sich dabei herausstellen,
daß die phänomenologische Besinnung über die Grenzverhältnisse innerhalb der Ich -Du-Es-Welt, die wir
hier unternehmen, auch eine wertvolle Vorbereitung für die Lösung der erkenntnis-theoretischen Frage
bildet. Aber das ist nicht das Ziel unserer Untersuchung.” “Die ‘Philosophie der Räume’ is nichts anderes
als eine Weiterführung von Kants Lehre von den Anschauungsformen. Nach diese schon ein wenig
voraus-schauenden Vorbemerkung wenden wir uns nun ausführlich der Aufgabe zu, vor die uns das
Problem der Tranzendenz stellt.” GD, pp. 34, 51.
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Heim’s dimensional thinking, although ontology takes priority. Without answers to
epistemological questions, Heim’s system has a structure but no purpose.
In the fourth of his six-volume work, Der christliche Gottesglaube und die
Naturwissenschaft, Heim sought to create a scientific foundation for the consonance
between theology and natural science. In his ontological analysis of reality, Heim tried to
combine both Kant’s transcendental idealism and Einstein’s critical physical realism by
using the phenomenological method of Husserl and the existentialism of Heidegger. In
these two volumes of Heim’s work, the basic concepts Heim used to describe reality are
“space,” “boundary,” and “polarity.”2
1. Space
In the introduction to his philosophy of spaces, Heim outlined the problems of
defining space in the history of physics. 3 Then he defined his own concept of it,
classified types of spaces, and finally explained the principle of their openings, in the
other words, how it is possible to become conscious about spaces or know their existence.
A. Space-problem from Newton to Quantum mechanics
In order to escape the relativity, pluralism, contingency, and incompleteness of
empirically known space, Sir Isaac Newton postulated an infinite and absolute space and
time, identified them with God, and gave them independent metaphysical existence as
God’s manifestation, God’s “sensorium” or aspects, in which God was immanent in
nature. He explained: “Absolute, real, and mathematical time has naturally no relation to
the external world and it flows equably. Absolute space, which has naturally no relation
2 GD, pp. 49-51. “Supra-polarity” could be seen as the fourth basic concept, but in this dissertation, I argue
that “polarity” exists within “supra-polarity” and they are reverse sides of reality, because of two-
dimensional time.
3 Heim’s analysis of space could be found on his GN, pp. 121-133, and WaW, pp. 32-117. Heim used, at
least, the following sources: Hermann Weyl, Raum-Zeit-Materie. Vorlesungen über allgemeine
Relativitätstheorie (Berlin, 1921)and Mathematische Analyse des Raumproblems (Berlin, 1923), and Hans
Reichenbach, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (Weimar, 1928) trans. The Philosophy of Space and Time
by Maria Reichenbach and John Freund, with introductory remarks by Rudolf Carnap (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1958).
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to the material world, is always the same and motionless.” In addition, space is
homogeneous and Euclidean, which means that it must be perfect. Newton believed that
he could empirically prove the existence of this kind absolute space. Absolute space was
an imperceptible container that eliminated relativity from nature and consequently from
science. His famous laws of motion, however, did not coincide with his ideas of
absolute, objective, and infinite space. The fact that absolute rest does not exist meant
that one could not give an event an absolute position i n space, as had been believed since
Aristotle. The classical principle of relativity argues that the laws of mechanics and the
phenomena deduced from them are identical whichever coordinate systems are used.4
Newton was worried by this lack of the absolute position, or absolute space, because it
did not agree with his idea of an absolute God. Therefore, he argued that space must be
absolute and infinite, even though it contradicted his laws of motion. Newton’s concept
of absolute space was based upon a synthesis of two heterogeneous elements. One of
these elements came from the scholastic notion of “substance-accident,” and the other
element involved ideas that identified space as an attribute of God.5
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued against Newton’s notion of space that empty
absolute space is an abstraction, because dimension without dimensions is an attribute
without subject. Space and time were notions that arose from our ways of relating
phenomena. Therefore, space and time cannot be absolute but relative. In fact, for
Leibniz, space and time were unreal, although references to spatial location and temporal
duration provided a convenient shorthand for keeping track of the relations among the
consistent set of monads that make up the actual world.6
4 See Raimo Lehti, ”The Concept of Space in Relativity Theory and Cosmology,” in ICD, p. 1.
5 See Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p. 28, and Jammer, Concepts of Space, pp. 2-3. George Berkeley,
who believed that all material objects, space, and time are illusions, opposed Newton. See his Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). Richard Bentley had argued against Newton in
1692 that in an infinite, homogeneous universe of stars the net effect of gravitational pull is zero because its
pull is the same in every direction. This is the so-called gravitational paradox of an infinite universe.
Therefore, the universe, which obeys the inverse square law of gravitation, must be finite. Newton himself
emphatically stated that the universe is finite in an infinite space. See Jaki, God and Cosmologists, pp. 5-6.
6 According to Max Born, “Physics,” in Scientific American (1950) Encarta Encyclopedia, pp. 1-15,
Newton’s concepts of space and time were still universally accepted in 1900. They imply a restricted
relativity, the mechanical equivalence of an infinite number of “inertial systems” of reference moving with
constant relative velocity. About Leibniz’s concepts of space and time, see Kemerling, “Leibniz: Logic
and Harmony,” in (http://people.delphi.com, 1999), pp. 1-7.
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Immanuel Kant embraced, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Newtonian
concepts of space and time, but he justified them in a new way. According to Kant, space
and time were not objectively real entities, or substances, or accidents, or relations, but
pure forms of intuition a priori. Thus, space was not an empirical concept that could be
found by reasoning a posteriori. For Kant, the only logically possible geometry,
Euclidean, was not empirical, but purely rational.7
Euclidean space is mathematically founded on the axiom of parallel. According
to it, through a point outside a given line it is possible to draw only one line parallel to the
given line. It is possible logically to deduct all geometrical sentences from this postulate,
but the postulate itself is unproved. For many centuries, mathematicians believed that
this postulate could be proved based on the remaining postulates, but all efforts to
discover such a proof proved fruitless. In the 1820s the German mathematician Carl
Friedrich Gauss, the Russian mathematician Nikolay Ivanovich Lobachevsky, and the
Hungarian mathematician János Bolyai independently demonstrated a non-Euclidean
geometry, in which Euclid’s postulate was replaced by a postulate stating that through
any point not on a given straight line an infinite number of parallels to the given line
could be drawn. Although this hyperbolic non-Euclidean geometry is not viewable, it is,
nevertheless, mathematically possible, true, and more general than the Euclidean
geometry, which is its borderline case.8
Later, the German mathematician Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann showed that
a geometry in which no parallel lines occurred, was possible. Riemann did not start from
the axiom of parallel, but from the theory of surfaces ofGauss, in which two-dimensional
surfaces are examined in three -dimensional space. Riemann’s elliptic, non-Euclidean,
geometry was the geometry of the surface of a sphere in which all straight lines are so-
called “great circles.” It is impossible to draw any pair of parallel lines on this surface.
For example, the three-dimensional surface of a ball could be examined as two-
7 Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, pp. 39-57.
8 According to Reichenbach, Space & Time, pp. 1-107, in fact, there is not only one non-Euclidean
geometry but also an infinite group of non-Euclidean geometries and corresponding spaces, whose
structure depends on the value of the constant k. If the constant k grows infinitely in the sentence πk (e r/k-
e-r/k) = 2πr+{πr/3 (r/k) 2 +…}, then its boundary case is the sentence of Euclidean geometry: 2πr.
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dimensional space in which the distance between two points is not a straight line, as in
Euclidean geometry, but the straightest line. These lines are the great circles of the ball.9
For comparatively small distances, Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean
geometry are essentially equivalent. However, in dealing with astronomical space, non-
Euclidean geometry gives a more precise explanation of observed phenomena than does
Euclidean geometry. According to Riemann’s concept of “metric space,” it is possible to
think of n-dimensional spaces, and that every space includes an infinite number of
internally different spaces. These differ from each other only in curvature. The curvature
of two-dimensional Euclidean space is 0, and therefore the axiom of parallel - is valid in
it.10
In the spaces of Riemann, the curvature is constant and positive. This kind of
space is elliptic; for example, the surface of a ball, in which parallel lines cannot be
drawn through a point outside a given line. All lines always cross each other, and the
sum of angles in triangle is always bigger than 180°. In the spaces of Lobachevsky and
Bolyai, the curvature is constant, but negative. This kind of space is hyperbolic, in which
more than one parallel line can be drawn through a point outside a given line, and the
sum of angles in a triangle is always smaller than 180°. All these spaces are
mathematically equally true. The concept of the three-dimensional non-Euclidean space
nullified the mathematical twilight, which had been characteristic for all attempts to solve
the problem of space in physics. Under Riemann's direction, the details in the structure
of space began to take form.11
The starting point of Albert Einstein’s SR was not the concept of space, but
concept of time.12 Einstein’s time was not absolute and mathematical, as Newton had
supposed, but instead relative and physical. Time was dependent on the motion of an
observer. The principle of invariance of the velocity of light in a vacuum (c=299,292.7
9 According to Rolf Nevanlinna, Suhteellisuusteorian periaatteet (Porvoo: WSOY, 1964), pp. 97-98, the
curve, which has this minimum quality, is so called “geodesis.” It is the straight line from the point of view
of this surface. From the curves L between two points p 1 and p2 is the shortest that L, whose length
∫Lds receives the minimum value, when ds = + √G (p) dxdx.
10 Before Riemann, another German mathematician, Grassmann (1809-1877) had proved that Euclidean
three-dimensional space was not the only logically possible Euclidean space. All Euclidean n-dimensional
spaces exist equally, no matter what the value of n is.
11 About Lobatschewsky and Bolyai, see Reichenbach, Space & Time, pp.3, 5, 49-57, 88.
12 About Einstein’s Special Relativity, see Feynman, Six not-so-easy Pieces, pp. 49-71.
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km/s or 185,971.8 mi/s), and its independence from the motion of the observer, was
inconsistent with absolute time. The fundamental postulate of the theory of relativity was
James Clerk Maxwell’s equation that the laws of science should be the same for all freely
moving observers, no matter what their speed is. Einstein extended the idea to the
velocity of light: all observers should measure the same speed of light, no matter how fast
they are moving. The concept of absolute simultaneity of events at different places has
no physical meaning, because the velocity of the fastest signals (light) is the same for all
observers, irrespective of their motion. This idea of equivalence of all inertial system
constituted the notion that Einstein designated as the special principle of relativity.
Einstein SR was based on a theory of Hernrik Antoon Lorentz. If Galileo's
equations of transformation are changed to Lorentz’s equations of transformation, from
these equations follow, that the measuring instrument contracts when moving in the
direction of the motion (the so-called “Lorentz’s contraction”), and the moving distance
of time is dilated (time dilation). In space as defined by Einstein’s SR, however, there
were two limitations. The first limitation of SR was that there were no constant scales of
measurement, which was the basic condition of a mathematical theory of space. The
second limitation of SR was that it was only the theory of motion through space. In
addition, SR does not prove the non-existence of Newton’s absolute space, although
Einstein so believed.13
The Russian mathematician, Hermann Minkowski, developed the concept of the
space-time continuum in 1908. He established an adequate mathematical foundation for
Einstein’s theory. To the three dimensions of space, he added the concept of a fourth
dimension, time (t = √ - c2). The concept of absolute and mathematical space and time,
13 In 1-dimensional physical coordinates K (x, t) and K’ (x’, t’), in which t=t’ (absolute time) and K’ moves
in constant speed v in relation to K, Galileo’s transformations are: (1) x’ = x-vt and x = x’+vt. Lorenz-
transformations, which are grounded on the constancy of the velocity of light, are: (2) x’ = __1_____ (x-
vt) and t =____1_____(t– (v / c2) x. √ 1-v2/ c2
√ 1 - v2/ c2
If the velocity v is very slow in comparison to c, and x is not very big, Galileo’s transformations are valid.
The classical mechanics is so the boundary case of the special theory of relativity. See Nevanlinna,
Suhteellisuusteoria, pp. 186-201. According to Lehti, ”The Concept of Space in Relativity Theory and
Cosmology,” in ICD, pp. 2-5, if we accepts equations (2) as more correct than equations (1), then the
supposition of absolute time leads to the supposition of absolute space. Either all “times” and all “spaces”
are equivalent or there exists a preferred time and a preferred space. Lorentz saw absolute time and
absolute space as meaningful concepts and thus supported the “conspiracy theory of natural laws”, as also
Galileo and Newton had done.
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as separated from each other, was replaced by the concept of the new absolute:
Minkowski’s continuum of four-dimensional space-time. In it, space and time were coor-
dinates, where every point represents an “event.” What happened was that Minkowski
transferred the subject from the realm of physics into that of mathematics. This concept
developed from Einstein’s SR (1905), became, in turn, the framework for Einstein’s GR
(1915).14
The most important consequence of GR was Einstein’s law of the equivalence of
mass (m) and energy (E), expressed by the famous equation E = mc2, in which c is the
velocity of light.15 This law, first regarded as a matter of mainly philosophical interest,
later turned out to have immense practical implications. Einstein extended relativity to
accelerated systems, and he developed a field theory of gravitation that contained
Newton’s theory as its approximation case. The explanation starts from the curvature of
the continuum of space-time by the distribution of mass and energy in it. The
gravitational field is identical with the continuum of space-time in every point of the
universe and with the function of matter. Therefore, gravity as acceleration depends on
the curvature of space-time, and mass tells space-time how to curve, and space-time tells
mass how to move. GR suggests, for example, the existence of “black holes” and that the
universe must have a beginning and, possibly, an end.16
The development of quantum theory began with Max Planck’s proposal in 1900
that matter can emit or absorb energy only in small, discrete packets called “quanta.”
This idea introduced the particle nature of light. In 1905, Einstein used Planck’s work to
14 The four-dimensional space of Minkowski is pseudo-Euclidean, which means that it can be changed to
Euclidean by doing a “Wick rotation”: writing the distance of two space-time points as a finite difference
and as an infinitesimal difference. Only when the continuum is a Euclidean one, is it possible to associate
the co-ordinates x1…x4 with the points of the continuum so that we have simply: ds2 = dx12 +dx22 + dx32 +
dx42. Einstein, Relativity, pp. 96-100. According to Lehti, “The Concept of Space in Relativity Theory
and Cosmology,” in ICD, pp. 7-9, Minkowski’s shift from physics to mathematics means that his theory
and reality are not necessarily correspondent.
15Max Born, “Physics,” p. 3.
16 The special theory of relativity applied to non-gravitational fields. In the general theory of relativity the
Gaussian co-ordinates is: ds2 = g11dx2 + g22dy2 +g33dz2 +g44dt2 +2g12dxdy +2g23dydz +2g13dxdz +2g14dxdt
+2g24dydt +2g34dzdt, when the motion of measurer in connection to measured is accelerating. Matter
determines the metrics of space, and inversely, the metrics of space determines motions of matter in space.
See Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p. 44. According to Lehti, “The Concept of Space in Relativity
Theory and Cosmology,” in ICD, pp. 9-11, SR and GR does not necessarily disprove a unique or
“absolute” system of reference provided by nature itself. Absolute time, space, and motion are accepted in
fact at contemporary cosmology. Absolute space-time is a hypersurface in the homogeneous universe.
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explain the photoelectric effect, in which light hitting metal makes the metal emit
electrons. Ernest Rutherford proved that atoms consisted of electrons bound to a nucleus
in 1911. In 1913, Niels Bohr proposed that classical mechanics could not explain the
structure of the atom and developed a model of the atom with electrons in fixed orbits. In
1924, Louis de Broglie suggested that matter could be described as a wave, just as light
could be described as a particle. The wave model of the electron allowed Erwin
Schrödinger in 1925 to develop a mathematical method of determining the wave
function, and Max Born suggested that this should be interpreted as a probability
amplitude that an electron will be at a particular place at a certain time. In the same
period, Werner Heisenberg developed Schrödinger’s theory of wave function in a
different formalism, called “matrix mechanics.” Wolfgang Pauli developed his
“exclusion principle,” which allowed physicists to calculate the structure of a quantum
atom for the first time. In 1926 Heisenberg, Born, and Ernest Pascual Jordan published a
theory that combined the principles of quantum theory with the classical theory of light,
called “electrodynamics.” The next year Heisenbergmade another important
contribution to quantum theory, when he introduced his “uncertainty principle.” In 1928,
Paul Dirac combined quantum theory with electrodynamics. He formulated a relativistic
theory of the electron that was consistent with both QM and Einstein’s SR. The various
aspects of his theory led to the development of a theory that came to be known as
“quantum electrodynamics” (QED). In the early 1950s Shinichiro Tomonaga, Richard
Feynman, and Julian Schwinger each independently demonstrated that QED successfully
predicted or explained the results of many experiments.17
According to QM, space is a discrete form of energy. A particle can be
delocalized, it can be simultaneously in several energy states, and it can even have
several different identities at once. This schizophrenic behavior is encoded in its wave
function, which can always be written as a superposition of quantum states, each
characterized by a complex probability amplitude. Broglie, applying the principles of
relativity, showed that not only do waves behave like particles, but also particles behave
like waves (wave-particle duality or complementarity). To our senses, no macroscopic
17 Kari Enqvist, Näkymätön todellisuus (Juva: WSOY, 1997), pp. 243-260.
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objects could be both waves and particles. Therefore, the central problem of physics was
to formulate a logically  consistent theory that would eliminate the entanglement of the
particle and wave aspects of light and matter. QM included classical mechanics as a
limiting case and preserved some of its formulas, but differed profoundly from it by
being essentially statistical and indeterminate. It gives exact answers to many questions,
but it can only give probabilities for some values. Heisenberg formulated these features
in his uncertainty principle. Quantum mechanical equations show that accurate
measurement of both the position and the momentum of a subatomic particle at the same
time cannot be possible. This uncertainty does not result from clumsy instruments or
inadequate observational techniques. Instead, it seems that at the core of reality must be
indeterminate, an unfathomable mystery that cannot be overcome.18
Physicists have been then aware of a dark cloud looming on the horizon. There
are two pillars upon which modern physics rests: GR and QM. GR provides a theoretical
framework for understanding the universe on the largest of scales. QM provides a
theoretical framework for understanding the universe on the smallest of scales. However,
the two theories underlying the marvelous progress of physics during the last hundred
years, as they are formulated, cannot both be right. They are mutually incompatible.
During the last thirty years of his life, Einstein tried to solve this dilemma. He searched
passionately for a so-called “unified field theory,” which would be capable of describing
all of nature’s forces within a single, all-encompassing, and coherent framework. He
failed, and since then, all attempts to merge these two theories have failed.19
18 Mathematically, the uncertainty principle can be written as: ∆x∆p > h/4n. ∆x = the uncertainty in
position times ∆p =the uncertainty in momentum must be greater than a constant number equal to Planck’s
constant h divided by 4n (n is a constant equal to 3.14 orpi). This principle means that as a scientist
measures a particle’s position increasingly accurately- so the uncertainty in its position becomes very
small- the uncertainty in its momentum grows larger. Likewise, if the uncertainty in momentum is reduced,
the uncertainty in position grows larger. Eino Kaila, “Zur Metatheorie der Quantenmechanik,”in Acta
Philosophica Fennica, V (1950), pp. 123-131. According to Jaki, Is There a Universe? pp. 48-49, argued,
“it is a non-sequitur to claim that if an interaction cannot be measured exactly, it cannot take place exactly.
The principle of indeterminacy should rather been called the principle of imprecision.”
19 Greene, Elegant Universe, pp. 3-6. S. Serge Haroche, “Entanglement, Decoherence and the Quantum/
Classical Boundary,” in Physics Today, July (1998), pp. 36-42. Enqvist, Olemisen porteilla, pp. 205-218.
Heim, of course, could not know development in physics from the 1960s.
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B. Heim’s Definitions of Space
Heim knew well the development of the problem of space-time in physics. He
often participated in discussions about its consequences for philosophy and theology.
Heim witnessed breakthroughs in thermodynamics, SR and GR, and QM. 20 It seems that
he was also aware of the biggest dilemma in modern physics, the incompatibility of GR
and QM, and, in fact, with his dimensional thinking, he proposed a solution to this
problem.
According to Heim, (1) space is in itself a limitless continuum in which it is
possible to carry out distinctions of contents according to principle of order of its
structure. These kinds of limitless and infinite spaces are distinct dimensionally from
each other. Thus, space is not a container that could be opened from outside, but it is
entirely open and without any kinds of material walls.21 (2) Space is an in itself infinite
continuum, in which according to a certain rule of the structure, a variety of contents is
ordered. Every one of these spaces is a limitless continuum.22 Thus, space is both
limitless and/or an infinite continuum.23 Heim’s definitions of space could be explained
logically by the following equations:
20 According to Horst Beck, Götzendämmerung, pp. 49-51, Einstein had said that Heimwas one of the
three persons who understood his theories of relativity, and made correct deductions from them. See also
Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 8, 50, and Krause, Theologie, Physik und Philosophie, p. 31.
21
“Ein Raum ist jedes in sich unabschließbare Kontinuum, innerhalb dessen nach einem in der Struktur
desselben enthaltenen Ordnungsprinzip eine Mannigfaltigkeit inhaltlicher Unterscheidungen vorgenommen
werden kann. Dieses unabschließbares Ganze kann dann von einer anderen ebenfalls in sich unendlichen
Sphäre dimensional unterschieden werden. Ein Raum in dem Sinne, in dem wir hier von einem Raum
sprechen, ist ja nicht ein in sich abgeschlossenes Ganzes, in dessen äußere Hülle von außenher eine Lücke
gerissen werden könnte, sondern er ist nach allen Seiten offen und durch keinerlei materielle Wände
begrenzt. Wir nennen in diesem Buch ‘Raum’ ein Kontinuum, das unbegrenzt ist und alles Gegebene
umfasst. ” See GD, pp. 61, 219. Compare GN, p. 138, and WW, p. 186.
22
“Ein Raum ist ein in sich unendliches Kontinuum, in dem nach einem bestimmten Strukturgesetz eine
Mannigfaltigkeit von Inhalten angeordnet ist. Jeder Raum ist ein in sich ungeschlossenes Kontinuum.” GD,
p. 179.
23 The formula of the explicit definition is A= def. B, where A is the definiendum and B the definiens. The
formula’s criteria are the following: (1) B must be equivalent with A. (2) B must not directly or indirectly
include A, which means, the definition must not be circular. (3) B must not include negative terms. (4) B
must not be explained in figurative or obscure language. See Cohen & Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and
Scientific Method, pp. 238-241, and Patrick Suppes, Introduction to Logic (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold, 1969), pp. 151-161. An inadequate definition is too large or limited, or simultaneously too large
and too limited. Heim’s definitions of space meet the criteria, but if the latter is true, the former is too
limited. Both definitions together do not meet criteria (1) and (4), because they denote different things.
Heim did not draw a distinction between the astrophysical space, which a posteriori is finite and limitless,
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(1) S1 = def. (x) (fx & hx), and
(2) S2 = def. (x) (gx & hx), where f = limitless in self, g = infinite in self, and h =
continuum.
According to Heim, the qualities of f and g are:
(1) Relevant: f g = def. (Ex) (x ⊃ f & x ⊃ g), which means that there is a real
space, which includes both qualities as its characteristic features.
(2) Relational: (g ⊃ f) & ~ (f ⊃ g). 24
In his definitions of space, Heim used the concepts of the mathematical sets, such
as “infinite,” “finite,” and “continuum.” However, he argued that it is impossible to
describe all existing spaces with the help of the mathematical sets. For example, how can
the “space of bees” be described by human mathematics? We can know that the bees
live with us in four-dimensional reality but they live also in panpsychic reality, which is
unknown to us. There is only a way to become conscious about the different kinds of
spaces: we must exist in that space or dimension. 25
Heim also emphasized, that his endeavor was only to expand Kant’s forms of
intuition, because Kant’s simple and invalid scheme of these forms and of categories of
senses cannot map the complexity of the experienced world.26 As was discussed above,
Kant tried to prove the necessity and a priori form of the concepts of space and time, and
that space and time are intuitions (Anschauung). He concluded that space and time are
nothing more than intuited forms in our senses.27 Kant’s scheme applies only to three-
dimensional and Euclidean space, whereas Heim’s concept of space includes all kinds of
possible spaces: n-dimensional Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Moreover, Kant’s space
and the mathematical space, which a priori is infinite. If Heim used “infinite” and “limitless” in the same
meaning, which is presumable, there are no mathematical contradictions, because in mathematics,
“infinite” and “limitless” are synonyms. See Rudy Rucker,Infinity and the Mind. The Science and
Philosophy of the Infinity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 1-52.
24 R. Kauppi, ”Intentionaalisen logiikan ongelmia,” in Ajatus XIX (1956), pp. 102-103. However, if
definition (1) and (2) are different, f and g are: Irrelevant: f g = def. ~ (Ex) (x ⊃ f & x ⊃ g).
25 GD, pp. 31-32. “Dimension” is also a mathematical term. Hence, it is only by an analogous extension of
the meaning of the term that Heim can speak about non-mathematical dimensions of space.
26 GD, p. 34.
27 See Chapter I.2.A. See also J.Hintikka, ”Kantin oppi matematiikasta: Tutkimuksia sen peruskäsitteistä,
rakenteesta ja esikuvista,” in Ajatus XXII (1959), pp. 5-85, and Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to
Carnap, pp. 7-21.
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and time are forms of intuition only, whereas Heim’s space and time are both physical
and eternal.28 Heim argued, based on Einstein’s GR, that space and time are inseparable
from matter, that is, physical reality. 29
C. Types of Spaces and their Openings
Heim defined four different types of spaces, which fulfill his ideas of spaces:30
(1) A space can be such that it is possible to illustrate and geometrically describe it. This
kind of space includes one-dimensional physical time (Zeit-Raum),31 two-dimensional
surfaces (Flächen-Raum), and three-dimensional, Euclidean space of things or it-space
(Körper-Raum or Es-Raum). This type of space is physical. (2) A space can be such that
it is impossible to illustrate it but one can intuitively imagine and mathematically
describe it. Examples of such a space are, for example, Riemannian n-dimensional
spaces. This type is purely mathematical. (3) A space can be such that it is impossible to
describe it geometrically, because it is outside physical reality. Examples of such spaces
include I-space (Ich-Raum), Thou-space (Du-Raum), and the existential meeting of I-
Thou (Ich-Du-Raum), which are non-objectifiable. This type is psychic or conscious. In
fact, the mind or self is the second dimension of time or, at least, the mind exists in the
second dimension of time, which is non-objectifiable, existential, nunc aeternum. (4) A
space can be such that it is not possible to describe it math ematically or experience it
existentially, because, analogia entis, it is possible to imagine that there are beings who
live in such spaces that are closed for us. For example, the worlds of animals, plants, and
28 GD, p. 34.
29
“Diese Räume sind, wenn wir sie im Sinne der Kantischen Philosophie deuten, zu Anschauungsformen
geworden, die potentiell als objective Möglichkeiten in derWirklichkeit enthalten sind. In diesem Sinne
gehören diese raumzeitlichen Anschauungsformen mit der Materie unzertrennlich zusammen. Sie können
aber nur realisiert werden, wenn bewußte Wesen da sind, die in bestimmten Räumen leben.” WaW, p. 107.
30 GN, pp. 134-145.
31 It is, however, necessary to remember that Heim’s concept of time is two-dimensional. Its one
dimension is physical and temporal, and its other dimension is existential and eternal.
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microphysical entities (the quantum world) are spaces of this kind. This type of space is
panpsychic.32
Because the spaces of every type are limitless and infinite, the answer to the
question of how can we know that a space exists beyond another space is crucial.
According to Heim, the answer is that the new space opens to us in the same way that we
can move from a Euclidean space to a non-Euclidean space. When a space, where we
have existed without knowing it, opens to us, its principle of order is immediately
familiar and as universally applicable as the axiom of parallel in Euclidean geometry.
The distinctive feature of this opening of a new space is a “paradox”: contradictory and
impossible things of the old space are possible in the new space. 33
Heim explains this interdimensional “mystery” by using the metaphors of Edvin
A. Abbot.34 Let us suppose that there is a being who is conscious only about a
mathematical point. It exists in a space, where there is no dimension. Beyond the point,
there is nothing. If this point moves, a line will be formed. It is the one-dimensional
space, “Lineland.” The being in Lineland is conscious only about consecutive relations.
If the line moves sideways, a surface will be formed. It is two-dimensional space,
“Flatland.” The beings of the Flatland are flat, their shapes are geometric objects, and
they are conscious only about consecutive and horizontal relations.
32 Generally, the correct division must fulfill conditions: (1) it must be perfect, (2) the constitutive features
of the concept must exclude each other, (3) it must be grounded on only one principle (fundamentum
divisionis). See Cohen& Nagel, An Introduction, pp. 241-244. It is clear that Heim’s divisions do not
fulfill condition (3), because there are different kinds of principles of order and structural laws as bases of
division, and they do not fulfill condition (2), because Heim’s spaces do not exclude each other but cross
each other.
33 GD, pp. 32, 53, 57.
34 Edvin A. Abbot, Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions by a Square, originally published in 1884
and reprinted in New York: Signet, 1984. There are many similar metaphors of interdimensionality. The
Christian spiritualist A.T. Schofield, in his book AnotherWorld (1888), argued that God and the spirits
resided in the fourth dimension. Heim refers to this book in hisGD (1931), p. 50. In 1893, the theologian
Arthur Willink wrote The World of the Unseen, in which he claimed that it was unworthy of God to reside
in the lowly fourth dimension. He claimed that the only domain magnificent enough for God was infinite-
dimensional space. Oscar Wilde, in his book The Canterville Ghost (1891), supposed the four-dimensional
space as place to escape. H.G.Wells, in his book The Time Machine (1894), popularized a new idea in
science that the fourth dimension might also be viewed as time, not necessarily space. The earliest
speculation of time as the fourth dimension was in the article “Dimension” (1754) by Jean d’Alembert.
Wells, in his book The Invisible Man, knew that a man could become invisible if he could somehow leap
into the fourth dimension. See M. Kaku, Hyperspace, pp. 55-62.
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In Abbot’s story, Mr. Square was living in Flatland. Discussion of the third
dimension was strictly forbidden. Anyone mentioning it was sentenced to severe
punishment. One day, however, his life was permanently turned upside down when a
mysterious Lord Sphere, a three-dimensional being, met him. It appeared to Mr. Square
as a circle that could magically change size. Mr. Square could not understand the
experience before he had a chance tomake a trip to Spaceland. It was a fantastic, almost
mystical experience, which changed his “common sense” life.
If a surface rotated vertically, a cube formed. The cube is the three -dimensional
space, “Spaceland.” The inhabitants of Spaceland, human beings, are conscious of the
consecutive, horizontal, and vertical relations. In this way, we have moved from the
point to the line, from the line to the surface, from the surface to the space, always in the
same analogical way. However, there is no reason to stop here. The same type of
manipulation could continue. If a cube rotates in a certain way, a four-dimensional space
will be formed, where eight corners of the cube correspond to the sixteen corners, and its
six side-squares correspond to the eight cubes of the new hyperspace. If this space
rotates in an analogous way, a five-dimensional space will be formed, and so on
infinitely. Kant’s three-dimensional and Euclidean space is, therefore, only a special
space among all possible spaces.35
Heim’s interpretation of Abbot’s metaphors corresponds only to types (1) and (2)
of spaces discussed above. However, Heim presupposed that the same analogous method
could be applied also to type (3) and (4), because moving from objectifiable space to non-
objectifiable space is as easy as the manipulation in mathematics. However, the opening
of a new space does not happen actively but always passively as a gift. The opening of a
new space is like the turning upside down experience of Mr. Square in Flatland. The new
space has always existed but we could not be conscious of it before its opening, although
35 The construction of spaces analogically is the accepted method in mathematics. Analytical geometry
uses this method for constructing n-dimensional Euclidean or non-Euclidian systems. For usual perception,
the number three is the insurmountable limit, but in analytical geometry, the move from three to four
dimensions is as easy as from two to three dimensions. However, four-dimensional space of the theory of
relativity is not interpreted geometrically but physically. Helmholtz had proved that we could intuitively
represent non-Euclidean spaces. He thus showed that Euclidean geometry is not necessity of intuition, as
Kant had argued. See Nevanlinna, Suhteellisuusteoria, pp. 107-121, and Coffa, Semantic Tradition from
Kant to Carnap, pp. 47-61.
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we have always existed within it. From the vantage point of the new dimension, one can
look “down” and see reality in a new broad perspective.36
2. Boundary
The second basic concept in Heim’s dimensional thinking is “boundary” (Grenze).
Heim did not use this concept in his earlier thinking at all. Instead, he used concept of
“distinction” in the same meaning as his subsequent concept of “boundary.” There were
two different kinds of distinctions: an elementary or first-grade distinction and the
paradoxal or second-grade distinction. The former distinction is between a space and its
contents, and the latter distinction between spaces. Heim also used the concept of
“relation” similarly. There are two kinds of relations: disjunctive (either-or) and
conjunctive (both-and). 37 Heim defined only the mathematical concept of boundary.
According to his definition, in differential geometry, the straight line is tangent to the
circle at a point, which means that the straight line and the circle touch each other at that
point. The circle and the tangent have one mutual point, through which could be drawn
infinitely many straight lines and circles. The circle and the tangent are in a disjunctive
relation in that point. If the radius of the circle grows infinitely, then the circle and its
tangent combine. The circle is a straight line, with an infinite radius, and the straight line
is a circle with an infinite radius, and these parallels cut each other in an infinitely far
point. Thus, the circle and the straight line are also in a conjunctive relation. Heim
argued that this mathematical proposition is valid in the continuum of space-time or
between two perspective center-points, and the proposition is the indirect proof of the
non-objectifiable.38
36 GN, pp. 134-145. A similar opening of a new space or dimension happens by going through a
“wormhole.” Using such a wormhole, one can, in theory, warp drive, leap across light-years of space, and
go faster than the speed of light without violating relativity. An Oxford mathematician, Lewis Carroll
discovered this bizarre possibility 100 years ago, and Einstein’s theories of relativity have proved it. See
Kaku, Hyperspace, pp. 339-341.
37 GD (1931), pp. 50-76.
38 GG, pp. 112-116. Heim referred to Paul Natorp’s book Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten
Wissenschaften (Leipzig und Berlin, 1910), p. 4.
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A. Heim’s Definitions of Boundary
According to Heim, there are two different kinds of boundaries in all relations of
intra-mundane transcendence: the boundary of content, and the boundary of dimension.
These boundaries are similar for both idealists and realists. They are not dependent on
epistemological opinions about reality at all, because their character is ontological.
The boundary of content prevails between two or more mathematical, physical, or
phenomenal entities within one and the same space, and it is objectifiable. The boundary
of dimension prevails between two or more limitless and infinite spaces. In fact, the
physically interpreted dimensional boundary is the velocity of light between spaces.39
B. The Boundary of Content
Heim’s examples about the objectifiable boundary of content concern
mathematical or physical entities and phenomena. However, Heim does not clearly
distinguish mathematical (m), physical (f), and phenomenal (φ) languages.
40
In a one-dimensional mathematical space, the boundary is a point, which divides
any straight line into two parts. In one-dimensional and physical time-space, the
boundary is a moment or a point in time that divides time into the past and future. In
39 GD, pp. 46, 49. Heim’s defined the boundaries: “…die beiden Dinge sich in einem gemeinsamen Raum
befinden, den sie miteinander teilen müssen, und daß innerhalb dieses Raumes das eine Ding den Raum
einschräkt, der dem andern Ding zur Verfügung steht. Wir wollen dieses Verhältnis die inhaltliche Grenze
nennen, weil es sich um eine Beziehung handelt, in der Inhalte eines desselben Raums zueinander stehen.”
“Eine völlig andere Art der Begrenzung findet statt, when zum Beispiel eine Ebene da ist, die in sich
unendlich ist, und außerdem eine zweite Ebene, die ebenfalls grezenlos ist, die aber in einem Winkel gegen
die erste Ebene geneigt ist…jede der beiden Ebenen, nachdem sie sich in der Schnittlinie begegnet sind,
ungestört ins Unendliche weiter. Beide behalten also nach wie vor ihren grenzenlosen Charakter. Und doch
grenzen sie sich gegeneinander ab. Wir wollen diese zweite Art der Begrenzung im Unterschied von
inhaltlichen Grenze die dimensionalen Grenze nennen, weil wir sie in den Dimensionen des Raums am
anschaulichsten vor uns haben.” GD, pp. 52-53. However, according to Rucker, Infinity and the Mind, pp.
31-32, there is no boundary, for example, in a finite circle, the surface of a ball, or hyper-ball, which is our
astro-physical universe.
40 About f- and φ-languages, see E. Kaila, Inhimillinen tieto (Helsinki, 1939), pp. 187-191.
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one-dimensional and phenomenal time-space, for example, between two sounds, the
boundary is a point at which the one sound ends and the other begins.41
In two-dimensional mathematical space, the boundary is a one-dimensional line,
which cuts the plane in two. In two-dimensional physical space, for example, between
two countries on the globe, the boundary is a borderline. In three-dimensional
mathematical space, the boundary is a two-dimensional plane that cuts the body into two
segments. In three-dimensional physical space, for example between two rooms, the
boundary is a wall.
Heim gave many trivial examples about the boundary of content, and it is possible
to continue them infinitely, but all of them are only about mathematical spaces. For
example, in four-dimensional mathematical space, the boundary is a three-dimensional
body. If the number of the dimensions in a space is (n), the number of the dimensions in
the boundary is (n-1). There is a limitation in Heim’s examples, namely, all his examples
represent only types (1) and (2) of the spaces argued above. Heim did not give examples
about the boundary of content in phenomenal spaces, even though his definitions
theoretically include these also. Further, Heim noted the existence of the boundary of
content in different cases, but he did not direct attention to its form. In mathematical
spaces, the form of a boundary could be a point, a line, a plane, a body, and so on. In
physical spaces, it could be a “dimensional” point, line, plane, or body. In the
phenomenal spaces, it is always a “temporal” duration, because psychic events are
dimensional in time.42
41 Because Heim did not distinguish f- and φ-languages, he thought that the phenomenal moment is a point.
However, it has been known that the phenomenal moment has the duration of between 0.4 and 3.0 seconds.
The phenomenal difference of this succession and structure of hearing or “gestalt” is clear. There are two
possibilities: A is audible but B is not yet. Then B is audible but not A. This is Heim’s example. Or, AB
is audible (the tones are audible simultaneously but they can be distinguished). The phenomenal moment is
divided into a center and its boundary areas. Heim’s example is inadequate, because tone -space (Ton-
Raum) is four- or eight-dimensional, in which time is only a dimension. See Kai von Fieandt,
Havaitsemisen maailma (Porvoo, 1962), pp. 244-261.
42 Ibid., p. 242
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C. The Boundary of Dimension
According to Heim’s definition of the boundary of dimension, between the two
(or more) limitless and infinite space-continuums there is a paradoxal dimensional
boundary. If two limitless and infinite mathematical planes cut each other, the line
between them does not divide these limitless planar spaces into four limited planes. If
this were possible, the line would be the boundary of content. Instead, both planes
conserve their limitlessness, but also dimensionally limit each other. It is impossible to
describe graphically the boundary of dimension, but it is possible to imagine
“paradoxically.” Heim uses the example of the flatlander from Edwin A. Abbot’s book,
mentioned earlier, that the world or space of the flatlander is two-dimensional. The third
dimension is a logical impossibility to the flatlander. If the third dimension, which is
perpendicular to the two-dimensional flatland, suddenly opens up to the flatlander, he
must realize that there are not two infinities, but three. According to Heim, this
“paradox” disproves the logical law of bivalency.43
The experience of the flatlander is the same as the next situation in our three-
dimensional space (Figure 1):
B C
A
G
E F
The shape could be seen as a two -dimensional plane, there are three
squares ABCD, ADEF, and CDFG. It is also possible to see it as a three-
dimensional quadrangular from above. Heim notes only these two possibilities,
43 Heim’s “paradoxes” are perceptional, and differ from the ordinary paradoxes or antinomies, which in the
history of formal logic are classified the following: (1) semantical antinomies (liar-, Grelling-, and
Richard-paradox), (2) logical antinomies (Russell- and Burali-Fort-paradox), and (3) epistemological
antinomies. See I.M. Bohenski, Formale Logik. (Freiburg: Orbis Academicus: Band III, 1956), p. 620.
There are also Kant’s paralogisms and cosmological antinomies, which are, however, invalid, even in
Kant’s own epistemology. See Jaki, God and Cosmologists, p. 11.
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but there are also other possibilities. The shape could be seen as a three-
dimensional box without its three walls, from above, and from the under side.44
According to Heim, the dimensional boundary can be discovered in the following
cases: between one-dimensional time-space (within physical time), and the two
dimensional plane-space, between two two-dimensional plane-spaces, between the
worlds of “I” and “Thou,” between “I”-space and “It”-space, and finally, between “I”-
space and “Thou”-space. One must note that Heim’s cases belong only to types (1) and
(3) of the spaces, defined above. However, the definition of the dimensional boundary
obviously implies that the boundary of dimension is between any two infinite spaces in
spite of the number of dimensions or the type of space. For example, between n-
dimensional type of space (2) and the “I” space (3) might be a dimensional boundary. No
one may have any kind of experience about it, but we can intuitively imagine its
existence.
It is important to notice that Heim used the concept of boundary also in a third
meaning. Boundary is not only between contents and between dimensions of
intramundane reality but also between supramundane and intramundane reality, that is
between God and the world. What kind of boundary exists between transcendence and
immanence? The answering to this question was the most important task of Heim’s
whole life work, as we shall see in the next chapter, II.3.45
D. Distinctions caused by the Double-Meaning of Boundary
According to Heim, usually the words “boundary,” “opposite,” “other kind,”
“beyond,” “outside,” and so on, are used in an “objectifiable” (gegenständlich) sense
(Sinn). If these kind words are used in this naïve way, the consequences are conceptual
contradictions and confusions, which are common even in scientific thinking. If these
44 About the perception of the visual depth-dimension, see Fieandt, Havaitsemisen maailma, pp. 217-219.
45 GD, pp. 53-61.
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words are used correctly, in the senses of both content and dimension, the contradictions
and confusions could be avoided.46
Heim argued that the double meaning of concept of the boundary cause five
distinctions: contents and spaces, unity and difference of contents and dimensions, part-
relation of contents and dimensions, contact between contents and confrontation or
meeting between spaces, and knowing ways of contents and dimensions.
The distinction between contents and spaces could be seen in Heim’s definition of
concept of space. Each, in itself a limitless and an infinite continuum is a space in which
the contents are ordered according to a certain principle of structure. In every space there
are contents, between which is the boundary of content. Between spaces, there is the
boundary of dimension.47
The unity and the difference of contents can be immediately noticed in the
following case. In the three-dimensional physical space between two rooms, there is the
wall or the boundary of content. The rooms are different rooms, but the wall between
them is the same for both. However, the dimensional unity and difference cannot be
immediately noticed. We can explain it only paradoxically. The two limitless and
infinite space-continuums are in a relation of either-or, but both spaces describe the same
reality, because they are infinite. Heim illustrated this proposition pictorially. If we look
at two pictures taken at different times of the same object, we can immediately notice that
they are different pictures. They are taken from two different aspects. However, we
cannot immediately notice that they represent the same object. The pictures are the
disappearing small parts of the two infinite plane-spaces, which are cutting each other.
Between these spaces, there is the boundary of dimension. Actually, we only believe that
the pictures present the same object.48
46 Heim did not exactly distinguish the sense of word (Sinn) and meaning or reference or significance
(Bedeutung), but uses both mixed. According to Gottlob Frege, the correct relation of sense and meaning
is: “word → sense →meaning.” About Frege, see G.H. von Wright, Logiikka, filosofia ja kieli.
Ajattelijoita ja ajatussuuntia nykyajan filosofiassa, trans. J. Hintikka ja T. Nyberg (Helsinki, 1968), pp.
192-195, and Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 62-82. Husserl, on the other hand,
argued “sense” equals “meaning” (Sinn=Bedeutung). Heim followed Husserl’s thinking. Husserl’s scheme
of was: “I (Ich) noema→ object,” and the whole process is an act. See W. Stegmüller,
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1965), p. 62.
47 GD, pp. 60-61.
48 GD, pp. 61-66.
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The part-relation of contents is the relation between the wholeness and its parts in
one and same space-continuum. It is some kind of quantitative relation. For example, in
three-dimensional physical space, the hand is a part of the human body, and in two-
dimensional physical space, the area of Tübingen is a part of Germany. On the other
hand, the part-relation of dimensions is qualitative, and there are two possible relations:
the dimensional coordination and subordination. The former prevails between spaces that
have the same number of dimensions. The latter prevails between spaces that have a
different number of dimensions. The dimensional part-relation prevails between two
space-continuums that are in a relationship of the dimensional subordination to each
other. According to Heim, it is paradoxical, because, for example, the infinite one-
dimensional mathematical line is a part of the two-dimensional mathematical plane-
space, and it is a part of the three-dimensional space, and so on infinitely.49
Two contents of the same continuum of space are either separated or in contact
with each other. The distance between them can be from zero to infinity. In the one-
dimensional space of sound between two sounds can be a pause, or these two sounds
overlap. Between two space-continuums, which are in a relation of coordination, is no
distance that could vary, because the paradoxical confrontation or meeting prevails
between them. The two infinite space-continuums cut each other without loosing their
own infinity. For example, two one-dimensional lines within a two-dimensional plane-
space can cut each other at a point P, which does not divide these spaces to the four finite
parts but belongs to the two infinite spaces created by the lines. Heim argued that in
mathematical topology, it is not common to speak of two infinities, but only one infinity
of the same dimension.50
The act of knowing creates a phenomenological wholeness whose poles are the
conscious subject and the perceived object. According to Heim, it is impossible to
definite the concept of “knowing,” because it is inseparable from the “act” of knowing.
Knowing is thus an indefinite and ultimate “word” or “function” (Urwort or Urfunktion),
as are both the terms “reality” and “existence.” Knowledge and knowing have different
meanings. All scientific methods (descriptive-inductive, intuitive-phenomenological,
49 GD, pp. 66-69.
50 GD, pp. 69-71, note 1, p. 70.
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transcendental-logical, analytical, and so on) suppose what knowledge is. It is mistake to
define what knowledge is with these methods, because of petitio principii, or we get into
spin: regressus ad infinitum (object→ language→ meta-language→ meta-meta-language
and so on infinitely). We can avoid these errors if we agree beforehand what knowledge
is. Therefore, like Husserl, Heim made a phenomenological convention, which is
important for understanding his dimensional thinking.51
The scheme of the act of knowing in Husserl’s phenomenology was: intentional
act A = (transcendental act of transcendental subject S ↔noema(s) N) → (transcendent
object O). So: A = (S ↔N) → (O), in which O is inside phenomenological parentheses.
In the intentional act the transcendental subject, which is constituted by acts, is the pure
consciousness. The noemas are either a part of the class of objects or senses of
perceptions. The objects are the transcendent entities that are put in parentheses in the
phenomenological reduction. Phenomenology is the science of noemas. According to
W.V. Quine, the intentional rhetoric must be send back to the stimulus -response-scheme:
S→R. Because Heim was influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, as we have argued
above, the criticism of phenomenology concerns also Heim’s work. However, if Quine’s
argument is right, also the analytical philosophy itself is wrong.52
According to Heim, the knowledge way of contents means that we
characteristically know about contents of a space-continuum making perceptions and
inductive conclusions by a posteriori. For example, the discovery of a new star or galaxy
is to know it by way of “content.” Instead, the discovery of a new space or dimension is
to know it by way of “dimension,” which means, by way of asynthetic a priori
argument. Discovering new spaces does not happen by making observations and
inductive conclusions, but the discovery takes place, when the space opens to us
immediately and perfectly. We do not only know that it exists but immediately also its
structure and principle of order, according to which its contents are organized. Because
the dimensional way of knowing is immediate and intuitive, it is more fundamental than
the knowing way of content.53
51 Victor Kraft, Erkenntnislehre (Wien, 1960), p.21.
52 See Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen, pp. 63-74.
53 GD, pp. 71-75.
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According to logical empirism, however, there are no synthetic judgments a
priori, as Immanuel Kant had believed. Only analytical sentences can be a priori, and
only synthetic sentences can be a posteriori. Analytical sentences do not apply to reality.
They are formally true in spite of experience, and from them nothing follows for
experience, because the analytical sentences have no actual content. Synthetic sentences,
on the other hand, have a certain actual content, because they describe reality. Heim
accepted Kant’s doctrine of “synthetic judgments a priori,” but he did not argue in favor
of “judgments” but paradoxical “events” of the dimensional knowing way. 54
3. Polarity
Heim’s concept of space argues that reality is constructed of limitless and infinite
continuums that are n-dimensional, and that could be seen or unseen, experienced or
inexperienced, objectifiable or non-objectifiable. His concept of boundary explains how
infinite spaces border each other, and how their contents are separated from each other.
These two concepts could be sufficient as a basis for dimensional thinking, because their
fundamental quality is “dimensional” or “dimension.” Against “Occam’s razor,”
however, Heim needed a new concept for his dimensional doctrine. The concept of
“polarity” was necessary because the concept of boundary explained only the relations in
intra-mundane spaces. The ultimate questions of Heim’s thinking were, what kind is the
boundary between immanence and transcendence, what kind of relation is between them,
54 According to A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), pp. 77-80,
analytical propositions are tautologies, but they increase knowledge, because they explain how certain
symbols can be used. There are synthetical and analytical sentences. Both increase knowledge, but the
synthetical sentences are more important than the analytical sentences. According to Heim, there are
synthetical and synthetic-analytical sentences. Both increase knowledge, but the latter are more important
than the former. According to Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1961), pp. 20-24, the dichotomy “analytical-synthetical” is one of the metaphysical dogmas of
empirism. Only logical truth is clear. Analytical truth is unclear. However, according to Popper, “there
are, no doubt, synthetic a priori judgments, but they are often a posteriori false.” Hence, they can
sometimes be true a posteriori. See Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, p. 332.
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and how it is possible to know something about God or is it impossible to know any thing
about God?
Heim did not use the concept of polarity in his early work. However, the
“polarity” as such was very important in Heim’s world-view. The other concepts had
taken its place, like “relation,” “alternative,” “exchange,” “either-or,” “antinomy,” and
“compensation-phenomenon.” Heim often used these terms to justify his “polar”
thinking. In fact, it was similar to the method of idealism (thesis→ antithesis
→synthesis), or to the scholastic method (sic et non). The first time the concept of
polarity appears in Heim’s texts in the essay “Der gegenwärtige Stand der Debatte
zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft” (1908). Heim borrowed this concept from
Schelling’s speculative system of “ideal-realism.”55 The concept of polarity was for
Heim “a form of the world” (Weltformel) or “a law of the world (Weltgesetz).56
Polar relation is, for example, between two complementary colors. According to
Heim, there are no colors without this polar relation, because one color is no color, and a
single dimension is no dimension. Therefore, between infinite spaces, there is not only
the dimensional boundary but also the polar relation. The spaces constitute each other.
There is no past without presence, no “I” without “Thou,” and no objectifiable without
non-objectifiable. There must be the last “dimension of dimensions,” which is also in a
polar relation with all intramundane reality. Thus, it is impossible that reality exists
without God and God without reality. They both necessarily presuppose each other. In
other words, Heim argued that both God and the world are necessary. 57 Later, Heim’s
concept of “supra-polarity” presupposed that only God is necessary but the world is
contingent, as we will see in the next chapter.
55 GL, pp. 39-68, and GN, pp. 146-154. See also Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 29,82, and
Chapter I.2.
56
“Dimensionen sind immer nur im Verhältnis zueinander da. Sie bedingen sich gegenseitig. Wir nennen
dieses Verhältnis ein polares Verhältnis, d.h. eine Unterscheidung, bei der die beiden unterschiedenen
Elemente einander gegenseitig konstituieren.” GD (1931), p. 70.
57 GD (1931), pp. 166, 224, 320-321, 351.
93
A. Intra-mundane polarity
Heim defined the concept of polarity in the following way: the polarity is the
distinctive double relation between two infinite and limitless spaces or two contents of an
infinite and limitless space.58 For example, in three -dimensional physical space motion
and rest constitute each other, that is, a condition of motion exists only if a condition of
rest exists, and vice versa. Moreover, the polar relation of motion and rest is in a similar
relationship to the original condition of “indifference,” which is either real or imagined.
The relation between motion and rest is polar, because it can be understood as the
differentiation of an original unity (Ureinheit). However, polarity is neither the relation
of cause and effect nor the relation of argument and consequence. It is the given original
relation (Urverhältnis). We could illustrate the law of the double polarity in the
following way (Figure 2):
where P means “pole,” Po “the opposite pole”, and Pi “indifference pole.”
According to Heim, the law of double polarity rules all relations of contents and
dimensions. All opposites are variations of the same theme of the “cosmic symphony.”
For example, the following relations of energy are polar: motion↔rest↔original balance,
color↔countercolor↔light, light↔shadow↔original light or night, sound↔other
sound↔original sound or silence.59 The law of double polarity holds true in every field
of energy: there is no power without the opposite power, and every tension is the
58
“Die Polarität steht noch diesseits aller kausalen und logischen Beziehungen. Sie ist das Urverhältnis, an
dem alle innerweltlichen Verhältnisse gleichermaßen teilhaben. Es ist darum aus keinem dieser besonderen
Verhältnisse ableitbar oder aus ihm zu erklären. Es ist sui generis.” JH, pp. 19, 21.
59 See W. Heisenberg, Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics, pp. 60-76. Heisenberg compared the
teaching on colors of Goethe and Newton. For Goethe, colors were created by polar combinations
of dark and light, for Newton, by light alone. Newton’s theory was scientific, and Goethe’s theory artistic.
For Heim, polarity was a dynamical and absolute simultaneity.
P Po
Pi
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differentiation of the energetic condition of indifference. This condition of indifference
is both the first and the last condition of the universe: infinite energy or non-energy,
infinite heat or coldness, life or death. All energetic events or causal relations can be
understood as a differentiation of the original condition and as a transition back to the
“lost paradise.”
Polarity also rules human lives. Existence is the continuous undulation between
joy and suffering, action and passion. The effort toward a goal is suffering, and the
achieving it is joy. When the purpose is achieved, it becomes a new starting point, and so
on infinitely. Polarity also rules the fundamental categories of time, space, and the
dimensional relations between spaces. In time-space, in which the principle of the order
of contents is successional, the elements of the limitless and infinite time-continuum:
past, present, and future, depend on each other. Time has neither a beginning nor an end,
because every start-point is the end-point of the time-period before it, and every end-
point is the start-point of a period after it. Time and all events of the universe have
neither causal reason nor any ultimate purpose. However, it is possible to think that the
time-continuum is the effect of a “Big Bang” in the condition of indifference. The
mystics named this condition nunc aeternum. 60
In three-dimensional physical space, it is possible to say “here,” if there is
something “there.” Not every point in the universe in itself can be anywhere, because as
such it could be everywhere and nowhere. The place of any point in the universe is
determined by the polar relation to some other point or points. Behind this polar relation,
there is a possible condition of indifference in which there are no “here-there” relations.
Polarity also belongs to the non-objectifiable dimensional relations of spaces. For
example, “I” am through “Thou,” and vice versa. In the same way, “I” am through “it,”
and vice versa. These polar relations are neither causal nor logical. Behind them, there is
a possible condition of indifference: an original unity, like that which occurs in teaching
of eastern mysticism.61
Reality and consciousness are not contents of anything that could exist in itself,
but all objectifiable and non-objectifiable entities are both quantitatively (Dasein) and
60 GD, pp. 153-155, 179-184, and GN, pp. 52-58.
61 GN, pp. 147-150.
95
qualitatively (Sosein) dependent on the existence of an opposite pole. It is not possible to
perceive or to imagine any content or space without some relation. The continuum of
relation goes on limitlessly. However, Heim did not say, if it is infinite or not. He thus
avoided Kant’s antinomy of “finite and infinite.”62
In fact, polarity and the dimensionality are analogous with the concept of the
“field” in physics and of “complementarity” in particle physics or in the other words, the
absolute simultaneity between spaces. The conflict between GR and QM could be
understood as a dimensional and polar function of time.63
B. Supra-Polarity
According to Heim, polarity is a “world-formula” (Weltformel). It rules in all
four types of intra-mundane spaces and between them. However, one must ask, “Is polar
reality the only form of existence?” If polar reality is the only one, it is possible to think
in two ways, either positively or negatively. Chinese Taoism and the nihilism of
Nietzsche take a positive stance. Philosophy of the Vedanta and Buddhism take a
negative stance. If polar reality is not the only one, another reality or form of existence is
not impossible, unless the polarity in it is “abolished” positively.
According to Heim, “supra-polarity” is abolished polarity positively, because
both are spaces. On the other hand, he also argued that supra-polar space is “non-polar”
and “non-spatial.” He thus jumps to supra-polarity by way of a negation. However,
according to logical empirism, logical negation does not imply existence, which means, it
is impossible to say anything about existence of the supra-polar space. According to
logical empirism, it is therefore impossible that the supra-polar space exists. Heim can
only postulate it. Yet, according to principle of ontological tolerance, Putnam’s practical
62 From the viewpoint of contemporary science, Kant’s first antinomy of “infinite and finite” has lost its
physical meaning, because the universe is not infinite, but finite and limitless. There could be no first
antinomy even based on premises of his epistemology. In arguing the first and second antinomies, Kant
shifted from empiricist to idealist grounds and back. See Jaki, God and Cosmologists, p. 11. See also W.H.
Newton-Smith, “The Beginning of Time,” in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray
MacBeath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 172-176. In both cases Kant’s arguments take
place under the assumption that time had no beginning.
63 Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 82-83, and Chapter IV.3.
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realism, and Popper’s three-world ontology, “supra-polarity” can exist as a practical and
theoretically essential postulate, because it is a necessary concept in Heim’s dimensional
thinking.64
Supra-polar reality is space in the same sense as polar reality and its spaces.
Supra-polar space is transcendent, but not in the usual meaning, because between it and
polar reality are neither the boundary of content nor the boundary of dimension. The
supra-polar space exists neither “in transcendence” nor “in immanence.” It is not
“above,” “under,” “beyond,” “supernatural,” and so on, in the usual meaning of these
words. Those terms do not lead from a polar form of existence. If supra-polar space is
not polar, the polar spaces cannot be either beside it or outside of it, because then the
double law of polarity rules between them. Therefore, there is only one possibility left
that the supra-polar space is in a non-spatial (nicht räumlich) or non-dimensional way
present in every moment everywhere in all polar spaces and it includes the whole reality.
Thus, supra-polarity, as genuine transcendence, is, at the same time, temporally
transcendent and immanent, because its dimension of time is not physical but only
eternal. 65
Heim argued that the discovery of supra-polar space is “the second Copernican
revolution” in human history. The first one was the discovery of a non-objectifiable
reality by Fichte and Rickert, where “I” and “Thou” meet each other. The second one is
more important, because with supra-polarity it is possible to fulfill the idea of quantum
physicist Pascual Jordan: the translation of content of the faith into the language of
modern science.66
64 About Putnam’s and Popper’s thought, see Sami Pihström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta? Realismi ja
pragmatismi nykyisessä tieteenfilosofiassa Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 1997), pp. 155-164, and
Structuring the World. The Issue of Realism and the Nature of Ontological Problems in Classical and
Contemporary Pragmatism. Acta Philosophica Fennica. Vol 59 (Helsinki: Hakapaino, 1996).
65 GD, pp. 202-207, JH, pp. 34-46, and GN, pp. 154-169,191-196.
66 Pascal Jordan, Unbekannter Karl Heim, pp. 107-113, eulogized Heim: “Endlich ein Theologe, der das
Gewicht und die Bedeutung der Naturwissenschaften in der heutigen Welt in voller Breite und Tiefe zu
würdigen weiss.” However, the discovery of “supra-polar space“ and “thinking in spaces” by Heim, have
been the target of a severe criticism. Physicist Arthur Neuberg, “Besprechung: Heim GN und WW,” in
Theologische Literatur-zeitung 77 (1952), pp. 304-308, and “Besprechung: HeimWaW,” in Theologische
Literaturzeitung 78 (1953), pp. 303-306 said about Heim’s thinking: “Der exakte Naturforscher hört ein
seltsames Klingen, eine Fremdsprache, die ihm etwas Unfassliches ist… Das ‘Denken in Räumen,’ in
‘nicht-gegenständlichen Räumen’ wird dem Experimentalforscher als ‘Denken in Träumen’ erscheinen, in
einer illusionären Welt, weil wir damit nichts anfangen können.”
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Chapter III
THE INTENSION OF HEIM’S DIMENSIONAL THINKING
We have analyzed the three basic concepts of Heim’s dimensional thinking:
space, boundary, and polarity. The concept of space says that reality is constructed by
limitless and infinite spaces, whose dimensions are (n). There are: physical,
mathematical, psychic or conscious, and panpsychic spaces. The opening of a new space
is always a paradox, and it happens passively as a gift, that is, as a synthetic event a
priori.
The concept of boundary says that there is a dimensional boundary between
limitless and infinite continuums of space, and a boundary of content between contents of
a given space. The dimensional boundary is the velocity of light. From these meanings
follow certain distinctions: that of content and space, of unity and difference of content
and dimension, of the relation of parts of content and dimension, of contact of contents
and confrontation or meeting of dimensions, and finally of knowing way of content and
dimension.
The concept of polarity says that between spaces, and between contents within a
space, is a double polarity that is neither causal nor logical: ((pole↔opposite
pole)↔indifference condition)). In fact, polarity is the absolute simultaneity between
spaces. In addition, there is also another form of reality, in which polarity is abolished
positively, namely, supra-polarity. Supra-polarity is genuinely transcendent space, which
non-spatially is present in every polar space, and which appears only passively as a gift,
that is, as a synthetic event a priori.
According to the basic concepts of Heim’s dimensional thinking, reality has two
realms or forms: polar and supra-polar. Polar spaces are intra-mundane (innerweltliche)
reality, in which as an effect of double meaning of the concept of boundary could be
distinguished dimensional relations. Supra-polar space is genuinely transcendent reality
that differs from intra-mundane relations of transcendence, because it is not spatially
transcendent but only temporally transcendent. The temporal transcendence means that
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the dimension of time in supra-polar space is not physical but only eternal. However,
reality is the relational unity between the two realms, not any two-story house.1
It is logical to divide the analysis of intension in Heim’s dimensional thinking into
two parts: that concerning polar spaces and that of supra-polar space. Then I will
formalize his dimensional thinking.
1. Polar spaces
Heim argued that the world of “I-Thou-it” is an undivided unity. However, there
are some important dimensional and polar relations in this reality. It must draw at least
two dimensional boundaries, namely, the boundary between “I” and “Thou,” and the
boundary between “I” and “it.” There are four relations in intra-mundane reality. First,
there is the dimensional relation between “I” and “my it” (I / i). Next, there is the
dimensional relation between “Thou“ and “your it” (T / t). Then, there is the dimensional
relation between “I” and “Thou” (I /T), and finally, the dimensional relation between “my
it” and “your it” (i / t).2 There are intra- and inter-individual differences between these
dimensional relations. These variations arise as a function of time, and all four relations
always prevail at the same time. Qualitatively, these four relations could be reduced to
three. Heim presupposed that I / i ≡T / t. If the former part of this equation, I/i, were the
only certainty, it follows that knowledge and experience can be only phenomenal and
subjective, thus solipsistic. If Heim’s equation is true, as it possibly is, it follows that
knowledge and experience are realistic and intersubjective.3 Heim’s presupposition
1 Some scholars have argued that Heim’s world-view is dualistic. See, for example, Holmstrand, Karl
Heim on Philosophy, Science and the Transcendence of God, pp. 117-140, and Hille, Das Ringen, pp. 428-
430. However, Heim’s critics have not understood that transcendence is not spatial but temporal. See also
Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 100, 107.
2 According to Heim, the parts of “I-Thou-it”-world are: I, T, i, and t. It is logically possible that between
these parts, there are nine relations, from which Heim mentioned only four. See GD, p. 79. The other
relations are: I/t, T/I, i/I, t/T, t/i.
3 GD, pp. 80-81. The identity I/i ≡ T/t is possibly true in space-type (3), but whether it is true in space-type
(4), is controversial. Heim ignored this problem.
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makes room for his hidden purpose to unify idealism (phenomenalism) and realism
(physicalism).4
The three phenomenal and physical dimensional relations of reality are: i / t, I / i,
and I / T. These construct an inseparable unity of reality. It is possible to analyze them
separately because their structural laws and principles of order are different. According
to Heim, structural law rules the quality of a space and its contents. Thus, a structural
law can be either dimensional or contential. The principle of order provides the means,
by which the contents of a space are organized.5 In this dissertation, however, I will
analyze those three relations together, because it is more systematic than if I were to
follow Heim’s thinking word for word. My analysis focuses on spaces, dimensional
boundaries, dimensional unity and difference, dimensional relations of parts, dimensional
confrontation or meeting, and finally, dimensional way of knowing.
I should add two remarks of this analysis. First, it is not necessary also to
analyze the contents of spaces and boundaries of contents, because this dissertation
covers only Heim’s dimensional thinking. Second, the spaces are analyzed before the
dimensional boundaries. My analysis differs radically when compared with Heim’s
work, because I argue that the double meaning of the concept of boundary is a
consequence from Heim’s definition of the concept of space. In fact, it would be
meaningless to speak at first about boundaries between spaces, and then spaces
themselves, as Heim did.
A. Spaces
In the intra-mundane reality of “I-Thou-it” are the dimensional relations of “i/t,”
“I/i,” and “I/T.” The embryos of these relations, “i,” “t,” “I,” and “T,” are limitless and
infinite spaces. In addition, there are also two other spaces : “w”-space or “world-space”
4 About phenomenalism (idealism) and physicalism (realism), see E. Kaila, Inhimillinen tieto, pp. 187-191,
G.H. von Wright, Looginen empirismi. Eräs nykyisen filosofian pääsuunta (Helsinki, 1945), pp. 133-140,
E. Kaila, “Über das System der Wirklichkeitsbegriffe. Ein Beitrag zum logischen Empirismus,” in Acta
Philosophica Fennica, 2 (1936) and “Über den physikalischen Realitätsbegriff. Zweiter Beitrag zum
logischen Empirismus,” in Acta Philosophica Fennica 4 (1942).
5 GD, pp. 77-78.
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(Weltraum), whose parts are “i” and “t,” and “W”-space or “we-space” (Wir-Raum),
whose parts are “I” and “T.” Thus, the polar reality of “I-Thou-it” is constructed from
two types of spaces: physical and conscious.
Heim started his space-philosophy with a short historical survey of western
metaphysics of “I” (Ich). According to Heim, the most remarkable philosophical ideas
about “I” or “self” have been in the metaphysics of Plato, in Kant’s transcendentalism, in
the German absolute idealism of Fichte, in the Neo-Kantianism of Rickert, and in the
existentialism of Heidegger. 6
According to Heim, Plato was the discoverer of “self” or “soul.” According to
Plato, there are two worlds: the visible and variable world of the senses, and the invisible
and invariable world of ideas. “Soul,” which is an indivisible substance, belongs to the
invisible and invariable world. Kant adopted these notions from Plato. “I” or “self-
consciousness” is “consciousness in general” (das Bewusstsein überhaupt), in which
every individual substance participates. Therefore, “I” is not an individual substance
beside other similar entities, like things, that can be itemized. Fichte transformed Kant’s
thoughts by arguing that there are two different kinds of “I”: the absolute and the relative.
The “absolute I” is an invariable and eternal, thinking and willing, and non-objectifiable
“subject.” It is not substance. The object or correlate of the “absolute I” is the individual
and psychological “relative I,” which is variable and transient. 7 Rickert formulated the
basic ideas of “I” in a more radical way than Kant and Fichte did. “I” is the non-
objectifiable “epistemological subject” in which every empirical (physical,
psychophysical, and psychic) subject participates. According to the existential
phenomenology of Heidegger, the existence of “I” (Dasein) is characteristically
existential which means, it is “to be” in three basic relations: “to be in the world” (in-der-
Welt-Sein), “to be toward death” (Sein zum Tode), and “to be together” (Mitsein).
Existence is the primary intentional relation of “I” and “Thou,” in which “I” exists only
as constituted by “Thou.” The Cartesian idea that “Cogito, ergo sum,” is the most fatal
6 GD, pp. 82-161, and GN, pp. 30-43, 103-110.
7 See Chapter I.2.B. Compare also Schelling’s concept of self. According to M. Vater, “Odyssey of
Consciousness,” in Schelling, System, pp. xii-xiii, Schelling’s “self”’ or “I” is the unitive consciousness.
The self is primordially both activity and limitation. Inside the process, it consciously makes itself to be
both subject and object, finite and infinite. The self is doubled in that it appears to itself. It loses the
abstract simplicity of Fichte’s self-positing (I=I). It ceases to be in-itself and becomes for-itself.
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flaw (proton pseudos), because the absolute and solipsistic ego cannot exist. According
to Heim, the correct sentence must be “Sum, ergo cogito.” 8
In the opinion of Heim, since Heidegger, it has been impossible to use the concept
of “existence” naïvely or unambiguously. It is impossible that existence (and knowledge
about existence) is only ontic. It must also be ontological. This means that the existence
of “I” (Dasein) is wholly different from the existence of an “it” world (Vorhandensein).
The physical or ontic form of existence and the ontological form of existence must be
separated. However, in the opinion of Heim, Heidegger used language unsatisfactorily,
because for Heidegger both concepts, “physical” and “existential,” concern contents.
Heim argued instead that the languages of contents and dimensions must be separated.
Thus, the concept of the “physical” or “ontic” is applicable only to contents, and the
concept of the “existential” or “ontological” is applicable only to dimensions.9
According to Heim, “I” is the energetic, volitional, non -objectifiable, and present
reality, and as such, it has neither content nor “gestalt.” I speak about “I” in the first
person, but it is not my physical body, because my body is an object of my act of
knowing, and the tool of my will. “I” has no psychic content, like self-consciousness,
self-awareness, feelings, imaginations, thoughts, and so on, because it is the seer, and it
experiences. Heim’s proposition could be illustrated by this simple optical fact: the
seeing point itself is invisible. As soon as it becomes visible, it is no longer the seeing
point. I cannot make myself into my own object or walk over my own shadow, as, for
example, Fichte thought. Introspection leads to regressus ad infinitum. The “invisible”
and “non-objectifiable” qualities of the “I” are, however, different with the invisibility of
the electrons and other sub-atomic particles or my brain, whose existence is evident
8 About “Cogito, ergo sum” of Descartes, see Jaakko Hintikka, “Cogito, ergo sum: Inference or
Performance?” Philosophical Review 71 (1962), pp. 3-32. According to Hintikka, the implication of
statement “Cogito, ergo sum” is (1): A (b) → (Ex)(x = b & A (x)). Descartes notes that he thinks: A (b),
and concludes that he exists: (Ex) (x = b). Conclusion is logically true, if (1) is true. In fact, he realized
that the sentence “I am not” is a contradiction, and the sentence “I am” proves itself existentially. Hence,
Descartes must presuppose what he wanted to prove.
9 Heim agreed with Heidegger’s ontology in his essay, “Ontologie und Theologie,” in Zeitschrift für
Theologie und Kirche 11 (1930), pp. 325-338. According to Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 378-
380, in ontic reality of Kant and Einstein, personhood is the center of consciousness, perception is discrete,
and between subject and object prevails distinction, whereas in ontological reality of Heidegger, Tillich,
Bohr, Heisenberg, there is no personhood, the category of center is removed, and the split is before subject-
object. Heim’s concept of dimensionality means that a relation prevails between ontic and ontological
realities, that subject and object imply each other. Thus, he could unify Kant’s and Heidegger’s thinking.
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indirectly. In the same way that we can examine only the effects of energy, we cannot
objectify “I” but only its effects, that is, after its volitional decisions.
It seems that it is possible to speak about “I” only “nonically,” in other words, by
denying all relations.10 Heim argued, against Fritz Künkel, that it is possible to talk
exactly about “I” only by using existential propositions. These propositions are
judgments whose origin is immediately within me. Based on Heidegger’s existentialism,
Heim concluded that “I” is primary reality, in which there are two factors: constant and
variable. The constant factor is “I myself,” ens realissimum, which is “given,” “non-
objectifiable,” and the perspectival center of the world. However, it does not exist in
four-dimensional space but beyond it, that is, in the second, eternal, dimension of time.
The variable factor has a certain place in the four -dimensional continuum of space-time,
which I call my body. Both are passively received or “given,” and as such, are my
destiny. Heim argued that the separation of the constant and variable factor of “I” is
necessary, because the “transmigration of souls” could be imagined.11
The immaterial and non-objectifiable quality of “I” has been the subject of heavy
criticism, especially, from the point of view of materialistic monism. Friedrich Karl
Schumann argued that the idealistic concept of “non-objectifiable” is something mystical.
It is impossible to say anything at all about it, because it has no content. J. Rehmke
argued, like Husserl, that it is senseless. “I” cannot be a non-objectifiable entity, because
I can know something about myself. “I” is the object of knowledge. It is a certain type
of thing that differs from other things because it is impossible to localize it. It is non-
spatial being, analogous to the spatial thing. There is only material reality.12 According
to Heim, it is impossible to verify or falsify the monistic and materialistic world-views of
10 Heim refers to the book of Fritz Künkel, Einführung in die Charakterkunde (1930). According to Colin
McGinn, The Mysterious Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York: Basic Books, 1999),
pp. 1-6, the meanings of “consciousness” and “self-consciousness” are different. “Consciousness” is
ontological or biological, and “self-consciousness” is an epistemological concept.
11 It is possible to imagine that one and same soul transmigrates to another body. In the same way, it is
possible to imagine that “I” could change to another “I.” However, Heim rejected these ideas. He agreed
with Plato who said that “soul” is invariable. However, for Heim “soul” is not any “substance” but only
invariable “subject,” which is inseparable from its variable “object” or ”body,” where it is “incarnated.”
According to the Bible (1.Cor.15), in the resurrection, the soul and the body will be free from temporality
and change to eternal entities. See GN, pp. 110-121. If time travel is possible, as Gödel and some others
believed, transmigration could be possible as well. See Kaku, Hyperspace, pp. 232-251.
12 GD, pp. 117-120. See also Friedrich Karl Schumann, Der Gottesgedanke und der Zerfall der Moderne
(Tübingen, 1929), pp. 200-220.
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Schumann and Rehmke, because the origin of these world-views is not experience but
prejudice. Heim’s argument must be proved. The Rehmke’s statement, “There is only
the material reality,” is equivalent to the sentences, “There is no non-material reality” or
“Every reality is material.” Thus, ~(∃x)~Ax = (x) Ax. In Heim’s opinion, it is
impossible to verify or falsify these statements. Nevertheless, his argument is too strict
according to Popper’s principle of confirmation. According to Popper, it is possible to
falsify (x)-sentences but not to verify them. Although, in every tested case it appears ‘A’,
it is always possible that later some ‘~A’ appears. On the other hand, it is possible to
verify (∃x)-sentences but not to falsify them. Heim’s argument could be true, if the form
of sentence is (x)(∃y) Axy. Moreover, Heim justified his argument by arguing that the
origin of Rehmke’s world-view is not based on statements of experience. However,
Heim did not exactly define what kinds of statements he intended. Are these phenomenal
φ-sentences or physical f-sentences? In each case, Heim’s statement is also impossible to
prove because Eino Kaila, who was a member of Vienna Circle, has proved that it is not
possible to verify or falsify either f-sentences or φ-sentences, but only to test them.13
Heim battled against all absolute world-views: materialism, realism, idealism, and
dialectical theology. His own position was a relative or relational monism.14 When
Rehmke, a prominent materialist in Heim’s lifetime, said that from the sentence “I know
something about myself” follows necessarily the sentence “I am material.” Heim argued
that it is not the whole truth. The sentence “I am non-material” is neither necessarily
impossible nor contradictio adiecto. Rehmke’s sentence is: (x) (kx → y), and Heim’s
sentence is (x) (kx → ~y), in which x = “I,” k = “I know,” and y = “I am material.” The
implication is untrue only if the antecedent is true and the subsequent is untrue.
Therefore, neither Rehmke nor Heim can conclude that in every case, “I am material” or
“I am non-material” is the logical truth. Heim argued that inductive argumentation is
inadequate because it is applicable only to contents. Heim’s argumentation is
13 See Kaila, Inhimillinen tieto, pp. 181-225, and A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, pp. 5-16.
14 GD, pp. 15-51.
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dimensional. Heim argued that it is possible to know synthetically a priori that “I am
non-material being.” 15
According to Heim’s conclusion, “I” is non-material and non-objectifiable. It is
not only the epistemological subject but also the volitional subject. I am both a knowing
and a willing person. “I” is the invisible agent. As an ontic being, “I” cannot be free, but
as an ontological being “I” is free. “I” is a form of reality that cannot be analyzed
introspectively, because it is impossible to know quantity of “I.” Although, it is
impossible to measure the power of the will, we usually believe in it. We can only
measure the effect from the motions of will. My actions are the visible effect of my
will.16 It is necessary to think that the will is non-material and non-objectifiable. The
conclusion of this proposition is that, in fact, the sentences “There is a non-material will
within me” and “I is non-objectifiable” make the non-material subject into the material
object of knowledge. Heim argued that, because our language is imperfect, we use it
improperly, but this does not mean that the language could factually objectify non-
objectifiable reality. We know immediately the existence of it, because we exist in it.
When I use the word “I,” I do not talk about “I” but from “I.”17
Heim’s conception of I-space could be presented in the following propositions:
“I” is immediately given, present, non-material, and non-objectifiable space. “I” is the
perspectival center of reality. “I” is the epistemological and volitional  subject. The
existence of “I” is polar. “I” is identical with the constant factor of “I.”
According to Heim, the problem of “I” or “self” has been discussed in western
philosophy since Plato, whereas the problem of “Thou” or the “other consciousness” has
been the subject of analysis only since Heidegger.18 According to a Neo-Kantian idealist
Rickert, “I” must consider itself as the perspectival center of reality because there is only
15 One should notice that the sentences of Rehmke and Heim together are (x) (kx → y ∨ ~y), which is
identically true, but factually not necessary.
16 GN, pp. 52-66. Modern experimental psychology does not anymore use the term “will” as agent of
action but “motivation” that is analyzed as a function: S→O→R. However, motives are unknown. It is
possible to define them only operationally. See Anitra Karsten, Motivation und affektives Geschehen
(Bern, 1968), pp. 281-284.
17 According to Heim, we must use the one and same language in two different meaning: of content and of
dimension. Kant had separated theoretical and practical languages from each other. We know theoretically
and think practically.
18 GD, pp. 79,140-151, and GN, pp. 43-52.
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one non-objectifiable and invisible epistemological subject. Real individual su bjects, in
turn, belong to the objectifiable reality of experience. When I say “Thou,” I objectify
you. However, this conception is a fatal mistake for idealism. It talks about the non-
objectifiable “I” but denies the existence of the non-objectifiable “Thou.” If there is a
non-objectifiable “I,” it is necessary to be able to imagine that there are other subjects
that belong to same non-objectifiable reality. In the opinion of Heim, the ideas of
Heidegger and Martin Buber are ontologically consistent and true.19 According to
existentialism, if we say “Thou,” it means that something dark and strange enters into the
quiet and well-organized world of “I” and shakes its grounds. It is necessary to think that
there is reality that is not only “to be in the world” ( in-der-Welt-Sein) or “to be toward
death” (Sein zum Tode) but also “to be together” (Mitsein). Heim used Heidegger’s
ontological terminology and Buber’s dialogical terminology, but with a different
meaning. For Heim, reality of the people is “Mitwelt,” their existence is “Mitsein,” to be
in the sight of other people is “Mitdasein,” and the existence of “I” is “Dasein.”
However, the “I” of Heidegger’s reality is finite because we are mortal, whereas Heim’s
“I” is infinite because it is space. Buber’s relation of “I-Thou” or dialogue is direct,
whereas Heim’s “I-Thou” relation is dimensional and indirect. 20
According to Heim, shocking fact is that there are two perspectival centers in
reality, two constants, which are bound to their own variables. The seeing and knowing
point is in two places, and both of them demand that only “I” am the perspectival center
of reality. However, the two “I’s” (Iche) is, even linguistically, an inadequate expression,
because one must use the word “I” in German (and in English) only in its singular form.
If a plural form were possible, then “I” loses its quality to be non-objectifiable and
changes to one itemized object among others. However, even against the linguistic rules,
it must use the word “I” in plural. Like Fichte, Heim argued that “Thou” is “Non-I,”
which is “I” (Ein Du ist ein Nicht-Ich, das ein Ich ist). Dietrich Bonhoeffer argued
19 Heim referred to Buber’s most widely known work, Ich und Du, (Berlin, 1922). Buber’s philosophy of
dialogue, a religious existentialism, centered on the distinction between direct, mutual relations, “I-Thou”-
relationship or dialogue, in which each person confirms the other as of unique value, and indirect,
utilitarian relations, “I-It”-relationship or monologue, in which each person knows and uses others but does
not really see or value them for themselves. In ontic reality, these conceptions are invalid. They can be
thought as true only ontologically.
20 About Heidegger and Buber, Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen, pp. 184-185.
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against Heim that this thought is inconsistent. If it is so that “T” equals “non-I” equals
“I,” it is contradictory both in classical and in intuitionist logic. The sentence means that
“I” am “Thou” and “I” am “Non-Thou” are simultaneously true.21 This sentence is
consistent only in the logic of Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Bohr, and Heisenberg. In their
logic, the law of non-contradictory is not universal.22 Bonhoeffer was right in his
criticism, but he did not understand Heim’s dimensional thinking. Heim meant that
looking from I-space, “T” = “~I,” and that “~I” is also non -objectifiable. In other words,
T ≠ I but both are non-objectifiable selves.
Heim’s picture of Thou-space could be presented with the following propositions:
“Thou” is immediately given, present, non-material, and non-objectifiable space. “Thou”
is a perspectival center of reality. “Thou” is the epistemological and volitional subject.
The existence of “Thou” is polar. “Thou” is identical with the constant factor of “Thou.”
“Thou” is the “eternally strange other.”
I- and T-spaces, which are, according to Heim’s definition of space, limitless and
infinite continuums, have similar form, and they do not have any content. In addition,
both spaces belong to reality, which was called by Heim “We-space,” and in this
dissertation, for reasons of my formal presentation, “W-space.” 23
“I” is the seeing point that never can see itself. Mutatis mutandis, the same
proposition holds for “Thou.” There is always a distance between seer and seen, by
virtue of which scientific analysis is possible. This distance is a temporal time difference.
Only “become” (gewordensein) can be the object of the scientific research, never
anything present or “becoming” (werden).24 It is also physiologically obvious. We
become conscious of phenomena only after they have happened. On this basis, Heim
argued that the relation between “I” and “it” or “object” is identical with the relation
21 See D. Bonhoeffer, “Karl Heim. Glaube und Denken 1932,” in Gesammelte Schriften, Band III, pp. 138-
159, and GD (1937), p. 244.
22 von Wright, Logiikka, filosofia ja kieli, pp. 90-100, 112. According to Morrison, Einstein, Kant and
Tillich, pp. 378-380, Kant and Einstein obeyed the law of non-contradiction. It was an absolute logical law
for them. Heidegger, Tillich, Bohr, and Heisenberg obeyed it in ontic reality, but rejected it in ontological
reality, whereas Heim unified both contradictory realities, ontic and ontological, by thinking dimensionally.
23 GD, pp. 117-128, 140-151, GN, pp. 67-77, and WW, pp. 132-133, 187.
24 The terms “become” and “becoming” are too narrow for Heim’s dimensional thinking. Therefore, the
terms “to be become” (gewordensein) and “to be becoming” (werden) were better, but because they are not
grammatical forms in English, I cannot use them. In Finnish, it is possible to use “olla tullut” (to be
become) and “olla tulemassa” (to be becoming), which makes those terms dimensional in Heim’s meaning.
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between “become” and “becoming.” This means that “I” is identical with “becoming,” or
at least that “I” belongs to the world of “becoming.” The formula of Heim’s argument
is, thus, I: i ≡ W: w, in which “W” equals “becoming” and “w” equals “become.” The
argument is inconsistent, because the identity I ≡ W and the inclusion I ⊂ W cannot be
the same thing.25
According to Heim, the propositions “become” and “becoming” and the concept
of time, have two meanings that correspond to the objectifiable and non-objectifiable
dimensions. The first meaning is secondary “become” or “process” (Vorgang) that
includes the perceptual picture of a continuous sequence of the successive temporal
moments: t1, t2, t3, → tn in the physical continuum of time. The second meaning is
primary “becoming” or “transition” (Übergang) that is the “place” or “situation” in which
the secondary “become” appears into existence. In other words, the “not yet become”
(ungeworden) reality becomes the “already become” (geworden) reality. Physical
dimension of time and eternal dimension of time correspond to these forms of becoming.
Physical time is the objectifiable, one-dimensional continuum that continues forward and
backward infinitely and that can be measured by using physical measurements. Eternal
time is the non-objectifiable continuum of I- or T-space, which is unchangeably bound
with a certain place in the experienced world. In other words, a certain point among all
other similar points within the continuum of physical time “suddenly” receives from non-
objectifiable reality an accent that distinguishes it from others. It becomes present in a
causally and logically inexplicable way. Therefore, the concepts of time found in Kant’s
transcendental idealism and in German absolute idealism were false. According to Kant,
time is only a form of intuition, and it is not temporal but outside physical time.
According to German absolute idealism, “I” is a supra-temporal soul-monad that is
looking outside of time how it is running. Heim argued that these ideas are the secondary
or physical pictures of primary time. In fact, Heim’s concept of time is two-dimensional,
that is, physical and ontological, or objectifiable and non-objectifiable, or temporal and
eternal.
25 GD (1937), pp. 251-261.
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The eternal now-point, nunc aeternum, is a space. It includes in itself the factual
past and potential future. The types of space (3) and (4), discussed in Chapter II, belong
to it, that is, I-space, T-space, the will of both, and the consciousness of animals, plants,
and other organic and inorganic spaces. These all determine nunc aeternum, which is the
crossing point of destiny in our world. Heim argued that we must take seriously a
positive attitude toward the animate and panpsychic nature of non-human reality. It is
possible to conclude either inductively ex analogia hominis, or based on an ontological
concept of time. We must think continuously, because nature does not make jumps
(natura non facit saltus). On the other hand, we could also think complementarily, as in
QM, that nature makes jumps (natura facit saltus). In every case, the principle of
continuity is more probable than the principle of discontinuity. 26
On one side of nunc aeternum (Unvollendet), there are limitlessly variable
possibilities that are taking shape but have not taken it yet, and on the other side, there is
eternally invariable reality (Vollendet), which has passed it. Therefore, there are two
ways of being (Seinsart): “becoming” (Werden) and “become” (Gewordensein), which
form synthesis. The past-presence and the future-presence are united in the present -
presence.
Heim’s ontological concept of time differs from that of Heidegger. According to
Heidegger, there are quantitative and infinite “objective” time, and qualitative and finite
“subjective” or “existential” time. Subjective time is finite, because human beings are
temporally finite, that is, mortal (Sein zum Tode). According to Heim, ontological time is
not finite but infinite space, nunc aeternum.27
Heim’s picture of W-space could be presented in the following propos itions: W-
space is non-material and non-objectifiable time-space, our nunc aeternum. In W-space
prevails inclusion (I & T) ⊂ W, in which “W” equals, not only We-space, but also
“becoming” (Werden) or We-reality. The existence of W-space is also polar, because it
is the condition of indifference of polar time-space.
26 Heim referred to similar thoughts of G. Bruno, J. Kepler, E. Häckel, G. Th. Fechner, M. Curie, H. Weyl,
R.M. Rilke, H. Bergson, A.S. Eddington, and P. Jordan. See GN, pp. 77-103, and WaW, pp. 41-50, 205-
213. Heim did not mention other famous “panpsychists,” like Pythagoras, Plotin, Leibniz, Schope nhauer,
and Whitehead.
27 Heim thought quite similarly with Heracleitos, St Augustine, Goethe, Ostwald, and Spengler. See
Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen, pp. 153-155, 172-174.
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“I” and “Thou,” which belong to W-space are the two perspectival centers of W-
reality (Werden). Heim argued that they are also the perspectival centers of w-reality
(Gewordensein), as the scheme of the subject-object presupposes. It is impossible to
analyze reality itself, as if it would have no perspectives. There is no reality in itself but
only reality from an observer’s perspective. Kant had argued that the thing-in-itself and
the universe as the whole are always unknown or noumenal entities, about which it is
impossible to express positive or negative propositions. Heim thought that it was
possible to imagine reality as itself. It is a space that is the sum of all experiences of
every subject in every moment. However, such a space is abstract and inconceivable in
our three- or four-dimensional view.28
The perspectival center of i-space is “I.” “I” is the epistemological subject whose
object is just “my space” (meine Gegenstandwelt). i-space is the complete four-
dimensional continuum of space, which is closed. It includes the so-called outside world
(Aussenwelt): my psychical world and physical body, your body and your psychical
expressions, micro-cosmos and macro-cosmos. The concepts Aussenwelt and Innenwelt,
Heim borrowed from Heinrich Rickert, and the corresponding concepts Aussenbild and
Innenbild from Arthur Eddington.29 However, Heim did not realize that because the
universe is limitless and finite, and because it includes complete three-dimensional space
and physical time, it has only its inside, not any spatial or temporal outside, as Heim’s
definition of the perspectival center also presupposed.30
According to Heim, I can move in this space everywhere, but always I stay in my
own world, that is, in the world as seen from my perspective, and that world has only one
perspectival center. I can change my lookout spot at the speed of light or in my
imagination. However, I can never have two aspects simultaneously only consecutively.
In other words, there is a logically disjunctive relation of either-or. The center of my
consciousness-space (Bewusstseinsraum) is either here or there, but not both here and
28 GD, pp. 82-88, GN, pp. 67-77, and WaW, pp. 32-117.
29 GN, pp. 69, 78.
30 CompareUuno Saarnio, Mitä tiedämme äärettömästä? (Porvoo, 1969), p.35.
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there simultaneously. However, because in Heim’s dimensional thinking time is two-
dimensional, it means that time travel is a probable possibility.31
Heim’s picture of i-space could be presented in the following propositions:
i-space is objectifiable and phenomenal space of my consciousness (Bewusstseinsraum).
The perspectival center of i-space is I-space. The existence of i-space is polar.
A paradox of w-reality is that there are two perspectival centers simultaneously in
one reality. Thus, about this same reality, there are at least two different world -views. In
addition, both of them demand the center position, which only one of them could have.32
According to Heim, this proposition is a logical contradiction. Because i-space is a
limitless and infinite continuum, another space cannot exist outside it. However, there is
another space that Heim called “the space of the other consciousness” or “your space,”
which is called, for reasons of my formal presentation in this dissertation, “t”-space. In
fact, there is not necessarily any logical contradiction in the sentence : i = (~i = t).
Heim’s dimensional doctrine is quite similar to Leibniz’s doctrine of monads. According
to Leibniz, there are no windows in monads, because the perception of the universe
happens through infinity. The effect is that two monads never experience their own
reality exactly as the same.
Leibniz imagined the world as an infinite number of infinitely small units of
force, called monads, each of which is a closed word but which mirrors all the other
monads in its own system of perceptions. All monads are spiritual entities, but those with
the most confused perceptions form inanimate objects and those with the clearest
perceptions, including self-consciousness and reason, constitute the souls and minds of
humanity. God is the Monad of monads, who creates all other monads and predestinates
31 Against Heim, it must be argued that his law of disjunction is not universal. According to Heim, the law
is valid in every polar space but not in the supra-polar space. However, we can live without knowing it in
many spaces simultaneously. In the universe, where we could move at the speed of light, time contracts to
become infinitely short but not zero. The law of disjunction is valid in this case. See Nevanlinna,
Suhteellisuusteoria, pp. 320-321. However, in W-space, this is not valid, because in it time is eternal. I
can imagine that I am in many places simultaneously. For example, in Gödel’s universe, where by making
a round trip on a rocket ship in a sufficiently wide curve, it is possible to travel into any region of the past,
present, and future, and back again. See Kaku, Hyperspace, pp. 240-251. In propositional logic “or” and
in predicative logic, “exist” correspond to each other, if the set of beings is finite. In an infinite set, there is
not full correspondence. The same is valid concerning the words “and” or “all.” According to Heim,
physical time-space is infinite. Therefore, he cannot inductively conclude that sometime in the future there
will be or in the past there has been no occasion in which the being “I” is simultaneously in many places.
32 GD, pp. 82-88.
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their development in accordance with a preestablished harmony that results in the
interaction between monads.33 Heim argued that it is impossible to explain any
universally applicable rule about the structure of t-space because its type and dimension
can be anything. In every case, it has a perspectival center, and its relation with other
spaces is polar.
Heim’s picture of t-space could be presented by following propositions: t-space is
material and objectifiable phenomenal space of “your consciousness.” The perspectival
center of t-space is T-space. The existence of t-space is polar.
The spaces “i” and “t” are formally similar but they are not identical. Both spaces
are objectifiable, and they belong to reality, which Heim called “world-space”
(Weltraum). In this dissertation, for reasons discussed above, we will use the term “w-
space.” What is the exact meaning of w-space? This question is an interesting part in
Heim’s dimensional thinking because w-space is reality or the universe, which is the
object of science.34
We have stated that, according to Heim, I: i = W: w and (I & T) ⊂ W. In the
same way, Heim presupposed that also (i & t) ⊂ w is valid. He argued that his
presupposition is contradictory to common sense, but that is usual in science. For
example in geometry, the illustration of kinematics in the three -dimensional Euclidean
space is done with help of four-dimensional event-coordinates, in which time is the fourth
dimension. Einstein fulfilled the program, initiated sixty years earlier by Riemann, to use
higher dimensions to simplify the laws of the universe. In the same way, in three-value
logic, the so-called proof of independence must be done from the “larger perspective,”
that means, from four-value logic. w-space is non-viewable and poly-dimensional
(übergreifender) as compared to its limitless and infinite part-spaces “i” and “t,” which
are four-dimensional. In every case, w-space is the same as w-reality, in which the
secondary coming or the temporal succession of “become” prevails in the continuum of
33 Saarnio, Mitä tiedämme äärettömästä, pp. 19-20, 40.
34 GD, pp. 87-88, 117-127.
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physical time. Thus, w-reality is at least four-dimensional space, from which three-
dimensional reality of common sense could be described.35
The secondary “become” is the object of science and history. Like Husserl, Heim
thought that the objectifiable thing is always passed the present and become the
invariable entity. At the same time, it moves continuously away toward the past when
new events pass the present and push it farther back in physical time. 36 However, it is
impossible to say that the past has been, and is now definitively over. This mistake
occurs, if “I” is detached from physical time. Thus, only the present is real, and all others
are either “no more” or “not yet.” The opposite poles of W- and w-reality form the
synthesis: W→w→W, which means that the event that has passed the present, returns to
the present for its potential, either positive or negative, energy. Heim’s example of this
proposition is the feeling of guilt.
Heim’s picture of w-space could be presented in the following propositions: w -
space is a material, objectifiable, and invariable world-space of our consciousness. In w-
space prevails inclusion (i & t) ⊂ w. The existence of w-space is polar.
B. Dimensional Boundaries
According to Heim, there are three basic relations in the “I -Thou-it” world: i/t, I/i,
and I/T, which form an inseparable unity. From the viewpoint of “I,” the three
dimensional boundaries correspond to these relations. The dimensional boundary is
between i- and t-spaces, between I- and i-spaces, and between I- and T-spaces.37
The first issue to solve concerns what kind of relation prevails between the world
experienced by myself, “i,” and the world experienced by you, “t,” that is, what kind is
the boundary of “i/t.”
35 Nevanlinna, Suhteellisuusteoria, p. 171, and Kaku, Hyperspace, pp. 98, 104-105. According to Heim’s
definition, every space is an infinite continuum. However, w -space cannot be infinite if it is exactly same
as G-reality, because the universe is finite but limitless.
36 Heim referred to Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins in his GD, p.
109.
37 According to Heim’s definition of the dimensional boundary, it prevails between any two spaces no
matter the type or dimension of spaces. Therefore, one should realize that between spaces I, T, W, i, t, and
w, could be fifteen dimensional boundaries, and from the viewpoint of “I” five, not just three.
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Our common experience is that these worlds are absolutely closed to each other.
No one can see directly what others see but we can indirectly make conclusions based on
reactions of others. However, there are always “dead spots” in which “I” is like a “Lone
Ranger.” The reason is neither unwillingness nor apathy but the basic quality of this
relation. Between i- and t-space, there is a dimensional boundary, not a boundary of
content. The boundary of content means that “i” and “t” are one and the same space in
which there are two comparable rooms, whereas the dimensional boundary means that
“I” and “T” exist in two different spaces, either here or there but not in both spaces
simultaneously. It is impossible to see any point of boundary between “i” and “t”
because both are limitless. However, between these spaces is a “boundary,” the
paradoxical dimensional boundary. The “paradox” means that there is an unresolved
dissonance between “i” and “t.” 38
Rudolf Carnap, a member of Vienna Circle, tried to resolve this dissonance by
using the fourth basic proposition of logical empirism, the so-called principle of logical
behaviorism. He tried to resolve the dissonance between “i” and “t” at the level of
scientific invariance. Phenomenal φ-sentences, which describe immediate experiences of
“T,” are intersubjectively identical with physical f-sentences, which describe bodily
conditions of “T.” 39 According to Heim, it is impossible to resolve the problem at the
three-dimensional or even four-dimensional level of “i” and “t.” It could be possible only
in the level of “w,” from which the whole reality can be described exactly and without
remainders. However, human beings cannot do it, because of the dimensional boundary
between “i”- and “w”- spaces.
The second issue is what kind of boundary separates me from my own world, that
is, what kind is the boundary of “I/i.” I-space is non-objectifiable, whereas i-space is an
objectifiable continuum. Because both are spaces, the boundary of content cannot prevail
between them. Only the dimensional boundary can. The boundary of content means that
“I” and “i” are the same space, which is impossible. A simple optical fact proves this
situation: the seeing point itself is unseen. Between “I” and “i“ or, in other words,
38 GD, pp. 82-88.
39 Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1966), pp. 57-58, 140,
160. See also Kaila, Inhimillinen tieto, pp. 250-263, and G.H. von Wright, Looginen empirismi, pp. 106-
108, 133-140.
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between subject and object is always a certain distance because they belong to different
spaces, and therefore, a dimensional boundary prevails between them.40
According to Heim, the distance between I-space and i-space is temporal.
Because physical time is objectifiable, it must mean that the boundary of content prevails
between these spaces that is impossible according to the definition of boundary. There is
a possible solution to this confusion. The boundary between “I” and “i” is a boundary of
content only in the case that “I” and “i” are contents of a space, but because they are two
different spaces, “I” and “i” must be in the relation of dimensional subordination: (I & i)
⊂ i, as was discussed in the previous Chapter. 41
The dimensional boundary is always paradoxical because it is possible to know
only by the way of synthetic a priori. In this case, the sentences “I am in the world” or
“My existence is to be in the world” (in-der-Welt-Sein) are contential. The existence of
“I” (Dasein) and its relation with “i” are as fully different as the existence of a thing-
world (Vorhandensein) and the relation between things (Einandergegenüberstehen).
Heidegger separated the physical and existential modes of existence (Seinsmodi), but this
separation is insufficient. We must resolve in what meaning we do use the prepositions
“in” and “towards.” According to Heim, it is possible to use each of them in the meaning
of content, and of dimension. The paradox of dimensionality in the relation between “I”
and “i” appears clearly in a situation in which “I” sees the opposites of the experienced
world together. It is a point from which two consecutive events are experienced
simultaneously. Heim referred to Kant, who argued that the experience is possible only
in this way.42 Concerning contents, this is contradictory, because the conjunction “and”
and the disjunction “or” are non-connectable. Dimensionally there is no contradiction,
because of the statement I: i = W: w. In other words, both relations are two different
aspects of the same reality, or they are the same dimensional relation seen from two
complementary aspects. W and w are opposites of each other, and “I” and “i” are in the
relation of subject-object to each other. Either-or and both-and are thus dimensionally
complementary.
40 GD, pp. 98-105, 117-128.
41 See Chapter II.1.D.
42 Heim argued with Kant’s doctrine of “Synthesis der transzendentalen Apperzeption”.
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In Heim’s dimensional thinking, it is possible that W and w form a synthesis,
which could be formalized as “W ↔ w.” Moreover, between “I” and “i” prevails the
dimensional subordination of I ⊂ i. Because subject and object cannot be absolute, “I”
and “i” belong inseparably together. However, they cannot be identical, because “I” is
non-objectifiable, and “i” is objectifiable. Heim argued that i-space has two modes. It is
both phenomenal or consciousness-space (Bewusstseinsraum) and physical space
(Gegenstandswelt). If i-space as physical space were absolute, it would not exist, and the
consciousness-space would be the only possible mode of “i.” However, if i-space as
physical space is relative, it is possible to avoid this contradiction. Thus, the synthesis
I↔i is relative, and in it prevail the unity and the difference of phenomenal and physical
reality.43
The third issue Heim addressed is how the invisible, knowing and willing subjects
“I and Thou” relate to each other, that is, what kind is the boundary of “I/T.” 44 They
both belong to the limitless spaces “i” and “t” as perspectival centers of them. There are
thus two simultaneously valid propositions: “You are infinitely far from me,” and “You
are infinitely near me.” Contentially, “I” and “T” could be two contents of the same
space, but then these sentences would be contradictory. The boundary of content means
that the law of bivalence prevails between contents of the same space. Only
dimensionally are these propositions consistent, because “I” and “T” are two limitless
and infinite spaces whose boundary is always dimensional.
The dimensional boundary I/T is of a different kind, as is the dimensional
boundary i/t. In the basic proposition “I-it,” “I” is the subject who experiences and uses
the object, whereas in the basic proposition “I-Thou,” “I” is the conscious person who
cannot experience and use “Thou.” I cannot speak about you by using “it,” because
“Thou” is non-objectifiable. It is possible to use the word “it” concerning “I” and “Thou”
in an indirect or “inauthentic” meaning, but not in a direct or “authentic” meaning.45
Together, “I” and “T” can be only in an intentional relation, as Martin Buber argued. In
43 WnW, pp. 50-65.
44 GD, pp. 140-151, and GN, pp. 67-77.
45 GD, pp. 148-151. The concept of “authentic” and “inauthentic” are from Heidegger, see Chapter I.2.
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this relation, “I” exits as constituted by “T,” and vice versa, because their existence is
existential.46
C. Dimensional Unity and Difference
Between spaces does not prevail only the dimensional boundary “I/t,” “I/i,” and
“I/T,” but also the relation of the dimensional unity and difference.47
The limitless phenomenal spaces “i” and “t” cannot exist side by side in empty
space because it is impossible to find a shared boundary of content between them. These
spaces are in an exclusive (i ≠ t) relation with each other. In addition, they are different
spaces in the absolute meaning. However, they are identical (i = t) in a certain invisible
way. It is possible only to explain paradoxically their identity: i- and t-spaces are two
different world-views about the same reality, because, as spaces, they are infinite. In a
practical sense, this situation presents a conflict between them, because they both demand
sovereignty.
According to this epistemological antinomy, although I, as a knowing subject,
cannot go over my own shadow or subjective limits, I know certainly, that there is an
object beyond my consciousness, to which my knowledge-act is directed. In Heim’s
opinion, the paradoxical dimensional unity in the difference between “i” and “t” is the
key to solve this epistemological antinomy. Heim argued that the origin of this antinomy
is the notion that I know that beyond my subjectivity exists objectivity, to which my
knowing is intentionally directed, because I also know that my consciousness is not the
only consciousness. The solution to this antinomy is, according to Heim, that the
boundary between subjectivity and objectivity is dimensional. My consciousness is
subjective, because “I” belong to it. However, it is also objective, because my
knowledge-act is directed toward reality, which is the same for all subjects. The problem
46 Heim directly quoted Martin Buber’s book, Ich und Du. See GD, pp. 140-143.
47 GD, pp. 88-90, 128-133, 151-153.
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is that I can never reach objective reality, because the dimensional boundary exists
between subject and object. Objective reality can only passively open upon my ego.48
In his solution to the antinomy found in the relation of subject and object, Heim
referred to Nicolai Hartmann’s book Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis.
According to Hartmann’s critical realism, a boundary (Objektionsgrenze) exists between
subject and object, and crossing it means “knowing of non-knowing” (Wissen des
Nichtwissens). Beyond this zone is another boundary (Erkennbarkeitsgrenze), and
beyond it is an irrational or transintelligible zone. The knowledge of it is, nevertheless,
possible because subject and object belong to the same reality. The transcendence of the
object gradually collapses into the relation of different subjects to it and to each other.
The difference between Heim and Hartmann is, however, that subject and object in
Heim’s ontology belong to different spaces within same reality.49
The present I-space and past i-space cannot be two space-continuums in an
adjacent and conjunctive relation, but they can be in an exclusive and disjunctive relation.
However, in this exclusive relation they constitute an invisible unity: they both include
the same reality but are seen from two opposite aspects. The origin of “I” is not from the
supernatural space but from this world. I am of the world. I am not an alien in the world
(welt-fremd), and the world is not strange to me (ich-fremd). 50 Nevertheless, Heim
sometimes thought that the origin of “I” is from the supra-polar space of God. When
Heim rejected idealism for realism, idealism also continued to influence in Heim’s
thinking. The reason is obviously that Heim’s purpose was to unify them.51
The dimensional difference “I ≠ i” corresponds to our common sense, but the
dimensional unity “I = i” is problematic. Heim argued that “I = i” appears as merely
speculation, as long as content and dimension are mixed. If “I” and “i” are contents of
the same reality, the argument is absurd because it means that “I” and “i” are two
different objects of experience within the same space. Dimensionally, however, the
48 There is no epistemological antinomy of the relation subject and object in the extreme forms of realism
and idealism, that is, in naïve realism and in solipsism. The antinomy exists somewhere between these
poles, and it originates from the attempt to unify realism and idealism. Heim tried to unify them. He also
argued that subject can “reach” the object over the dimensional boundary. GD, pp. 132-133.
49 About Hartmann, see Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen, pp. 245-254.
50 GD, pp. 128-133.
51 GN, pp. 191-196.
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argument is meaningful and without contradiction because “I” only is the subject, and “i”
only is the object that is separated from the subject by a dimensional boundary. Thus, the
argument that an object and its representation are identical is meaningless and
contradictory. Heim’s proof is a contra-position: (~T→ ~P) = (P→T), in which theorem
T is I = i, and premise P is o = r (object = representation). The conclusion is identically
true. However, although this conclusion is logically true, it can be factually false, if P is
false. From a false premise can logically follow anything, because a false sentence can
imply all sentences.
The dimensional difference (I ≠ T) means that between present spaces “I” and “T”
is an exclusive disjunction: either “I” or “T.” “I” can be in the same moment only in one
place, because singularity is its essence. Thus, dimensional unity (I = T) means that both
“I” and “T” want to be at the same “I-place” (Ich-Stelle) or the perspectival center of
reality. The demand to make absolute my own world-view is visible in the field of
knowledge, willing and action. The demand cannot, nevertheless, remove the prevailing
disharmony between “I” and “T.” Only the honest concession of difference and the
honoring of “Thou” can lead to the real meeting of “I” and “Thou.” Thus, either the
world-view of “I” is true or the world-view of “Thou” is true. In either case, the
perspectival center of reality is the same for both “I” and “Thou”. It constitutes the
dimensional spot of identity, which combines the once exclusive I-space and T-space. In
fact, Heim’s conception of dimensional unity and difference was an important part in his
endeavor to combine idealism and realism.53
53 GD, pp. 151-153. The dimensional spot of identity (Ich-Stelle), in which I=T, is problematic because no
one knows where it is. Is it in “I” or in “T,” in “I” and “T,” or beyond “I” and “T?” In Heim’s opi nion, it
can be in both “I” and “T,” thus, in “W”-space. In the psychology of identity, this kind “spot” can exist in
every above-mentioned place. There are two types of identity: “public identity” and “self-identity.” The
first means that I have as many social “I” as there are people who know me, that is, I have an objective
public identity. The other people see me as a certain kind of person, and I see my own effect on other
people, that is, I have a subjective public identity. The second means that in any given moment, my
identity actually is seen, but not my whole identity, that is, I have an actual identity. I have also invisible
potential capacities, that is, I have a potential identity, or I want to be something else what I am, that is, I
have an ideal identity. Another difficult issue concerns, how identification occurs. Heim argued that it
occurs by honoring “Thou,” but this notion is vague. The imitation is directed to the similarities of the
public behavior of the subject and its model, whereas identification is directed to the similarities of
meaning.
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D. Dimensional Part-relation
The dimensional boundary and a unity and difference prevail between spaces “i”
and “t,” “I” and “i,” and “I” and “T.” The dimensional relation of parts or dimensional
inclusion and subordination also occupy a position between these spaces. 54
Dimensional coordination prevails between i-space and t-space, because their
number of dimension, in principle, is the same. This is possible only if there is a space
with which “i” and “t” are in the relation of dimensional subordination. It is impossible
to imagine what kind of subordination this is, but its existence is necessary to assume. In
fact, we know exactly as much about this space as about the invisible dimensional unity
“i = t.” Namely, it is the space that unites spaces “i” and “t” into w-space or world-space
(Weltraum), as was discussed above. Dimensional part-relation between i-space and t-
spaces could be explained as the following sentence: (i & t) ⊂ w.55
Dimensional coordination prevails between the present I-space and the past i-
space. This is possible as a relation of parts of “I” and “i,” only if there is a space in
which “I” and “i” are in the relation of dimensional subordination. Both my world and I,
or the limitless I-space and i-space, belong to “space of my consciousness”
(Bewusstseinswelt), which is i-space. In this space, I can experience at every moment the
disjunctive relation of “becoming”(Werden) and “become”(Geworden), that is, the
conflict between will and action.
Dimensional part-relation between I-space and i-space is the most paradoxical. In
fact, it is a contradiction if we think that “I” and “i” are contents of the same space,
because i-space is an object, and thus, it cannot include itself and its observer. The
solution to this contradiction is the dimensional presupposition that “i-space” has two
meanings: phenomenal and physical. The physical meaning leads to contradiction, but
the phenomenal meaning avoids it. Heim’s mistake here was that he did not explain
when i-space is physical or phenomenal. If the i-space is only phenomenal, it means that
there is no physical reality. In that case, Heim’s en  deavor to combine idealism and
realism failed and leads to solipsism. Realism lost, and idealism overcame, as was
54 GD, pp. 91, 133-134, 153.
55 Chapter III.1.A.
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discussed above. Dimensional part-relation between “I” and “i” could be explained as
the following sentence: (I & i) ⊂ i. 56
The spaces of the eternal “becoming” or present, “I” and “T,” are not only parts of
the spaces of the “become,” “i” and “t,” and their combination w-space which is the first,
physical dimension of time, but they also belong to W-space, where they exist in a
relation of dimensional coordination with each other, and in a relation of subordination of
W-space, which is the second, eternal dimension of time, as was discussed above.
Dimensional part-relation between I-space and T-space could be explained as the
following sentence: (I & T) ⊂ W. 57
E. Dimensional Confrontation or Meeting
Between spaces “i” and “t,” “I” and “i,” and “I” and “T” prevails the dimensional
boundary, unity and difference, and part-relation, as does the dimensional confrontation
or meeting.58
Heim’s problem was to show how it is possible that two limitless and infinite
spaces can open upon each other. The answer can be discovered only if we at first
analyze an analogy to the visible world. In the same limitless and infinite space, two
contents or objects can touch each other. However, two spaces, which are in a relation of
dimensional coordination, cannot touch each other like objects. They have no visible
boundary. However, they have a certain common zone of confrontation, where they
invade each other in a space, within which they are in a relation of subordination to one
another. The same situation must prevail between i- and t-space, which are in a relation
of coordination with each other, and in a relation of subordination with w-space. This
situation cannot be illustrated, because i-space is four-dimensional, and w-space is n-
dimensional. The condition of visibility in this case is that the spaces have the same
dimensional number. Visibility could be possible if i-space were also similarly n-
dimensional, as w-space is, but this is impossible.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 GD, pp. 92-97, 134-138, 153-161. The term “confrontation” describes the negative or disharmonious
aspect, and “meeting” the positive or harmonious aspect between spaces.
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The mutual invasion through each other of i-space and t-space can be discovered
only in one way. I know that in my space or i-space, there exists an invisible place in
which a confrontation or meeting occurs with your space or t-space. This place also
belongs to t-space. Thus, it has dimensionally an identical content in both spaces, i │ t.
However, although the content of the place of meeting is identical, I cannot know, how it
is seen from t-space, because I cannot see inside t-space. If there is another meeting
place in the i- and t-space, where they both can open upon each other, then the meeting
place can be whatever point of i- and t-space, because between them prevails the
dimensional unity i = t.
According to Heim, the place of confrontation in i-space between I- and i-space
cannot be anything else but the perspectival center point from which reality is seen. This
point has a paradoxical feature. On the one hand, it is not any point but the invisible and
non-objectifiable blind point in the world -view. On the other hand, it is at every moment
becoming to a point, which has a certain place in the time-space continuum. Thus, the
dimensional confrontation of I- and i-space is the relation of temporal transition, I│i.
The timeless and eternal zero-point changes to the center of the continuum of time. This
point has two faces: one is looking at the present, the other at the past. Heidegger argued
that existence itself is a process from the timeless and non-local situation to the temporal
and local situation (Geworfensein in das Da). In Heim’s words, Heidegger claimed that
I-space changes to i-space. In the dimensional doctrine of Heim, it is impossible, because
I-space has no content, and I- and i-space are two polar, eternal, and temporal aspects of
the same reality.59
I│T is the temporal relation of transition. Inside this event, there is a basic
distinction (Urunterscheidung) that is inexplicable and undefined. It is impossible to
resolve this paradox by thinking that “I” and “T” are contents of a space without getting
into circular reasoning. The only possibility is to note that all happening is dimensionally
both action and passion. Action and passion cannot belong to w -reality or the secondary
becoming of w-space, because all “become” has already happened. Thus, they must
necessary belong to W-reality or the primary “becoming” of W-space. In fact, action and
59 About Heidegger’s thought, see Stegmüller, Hauptströmungen, pp. 142-145.
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passion are two ways or qualities of W-reality. In the confrontation of I - and T-space,
both become conscious of disharmony between them in actu: I-action equals T-passion,
and T-action equals I-passion. My will causes suffering for you, and vice versa.
According to Heim, the disharmony between the will and the counter-will can change to
harmony in two ways: if either one of them resigns itself to the other, or if both are equal
to each other. “I” and “T” cannot meet each other universally, but only event by event.
Heim’s answer to the problem, where is the place of meeting or confrontation
between I- and T-space, is simple: because “I” and “i” belong inseparably together, also
I│T and i│t formulate an inseparable unity. One of the most important places of
confrontation is a word, which belongs already as spoken, written, and printed word in w-
space, and as a just occurring act in W-space. When I, for example, hear a word, both the
confrontation I│T and i│t occur, but only I│T means the action and passion. In other
words, I hear a word (passion), which you say (action), and vice versa. According to
Heim, it is necessary to realize that not all utterances mean the real and personal meeting
between “I” and “Thou,” but rather a real confrontation or conflict between them. For
example, a scientific discussion leads seldom to a personal meeting of minds. On the
other hand, someone dead can meet me now in such way that I experience him/her as a
will, who has power to guide me toward the certain solution in my situation.
According to Heim, the real I│T can happen only in W-space, whereas the
meeting or confrontation of “I” and “Thou” always occurs, when i│t. This is the
situation in our world. However, Heim presupposed that the same situation prevails also
between the living and the dead. In other words, Heim argued that there are other T-
spaces whose centers are constants without variables. Are they polar or supra- polar?
Heim did not answer.60
60 About this issue, see the discussion in the next chapter “Supra-Polarity.”
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F. Dimensional Knowledge
The knowing of the dimensional boundary, of unity and difference, of part-
relation, and of confrontation or meeting between spaces “i” and “t,” “I” and “i,” and “I”
and “T” can be discovered only dimensionally.61
According to Heim, the knowing act (i ╪ t) of “I” as a perspective center is a
posteriori if is directed toward the contents of i-space. Thus, it is possible to perceive
and to make inductive conclusions from contents. On the other hand, the knowing act
that is directed toward the unknown t-space cannot occur as content within a space
because it is impossible inductively to conclude its content. This knowing way can be
only a dimensional or synthetic a priori knowing between spaces. We can immediately
be conscious of the existence of t-space and its principle of order when it opens upon us.
Heim’s argument leads to some contradictions. For example, it is impossible to
understand Heim’s thought by a posteriori at all but only by synthetic a priori, if (or
when) it opens upon someone. Kant tried, but never succeeded, to find a sufficient
solution to the issue of synthetic judgments a priori, how such judgments are possible, or,
in other words, how can we have a priori knowledge of propositions in which the
predicate concept is not part of the subject concept. Kant’s solution was that something
must be the basis of synthetic judgments, and it cannot be concepts. Thus, it has to be
intuitions, such as empirical intuitions of the sort that Hume liked. Nevertheless, we have
now discovered that some synthetic judgments are a priori, so they cannot be based on
empirical intuition. Hence, there must be a very special non-empirical sort of intuition –
let us simply call it “pure intuition.” However, Heim did not think about the judgments
of contents of synthetic a priori, but in his dimensional thinking, these are synthetic a
priori events in two-dimensional time-space.62
The knowing act (I ╪ i), which is directed toward i-space, is dimensional, because
the dimensional boundary is between I-space and i-space. It means, for example, that the
propositions “I exist behind the objective world as a subject who makes observations” or
“The invisible will exists behind its action,” are synthetic propositions a priori. I know
61 GD, pp. 97, 138-139, 161.
62 Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 7-21, and Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp.
52-111.
124
absolutely that i- and I-space are different spaces, which have their own structural laws
and principles of order. According to Heim, because (I & i) ⊂ i, the knowing act directed
toward the i-space, can be only dimensional. If it concerns also contents, it would be
contradictory with the argument i ╪ t, as was discussed above.63
The common sense way to know is not possible concerning the relation between
I-space and T-space. The dimensional way to know (I ╪ T) is primary in this case. Only
dimensionally can we realize the structural laws and principles of order of spaces.
Because T-space is transcendental toward I-space, the knowing act toward it, and vice
versa, is dimensional.
The dimensional way of knowing corresponds to the existential way of talking. I
explain by words an existential proposition from my space (I-space) about myself (i-
space). You hear it, and either understand or misunderstand it from your space (T-space).
From the correspondence of dimensional way of knowing and existential way of talking,
Heim concluded that the existence of “I” and “Thou” is existential. From it follows that
the so-called absolute ego of the German speculative idealists was a fiction.64
2. Supra-polar Space
We have defined the concept of supra-polarity in chapter II.3.B, and noticed that
it is genuine transcendence. Supra-polar space differs from the intra-mundane relations
of transcendence in that its content and dimension are not spatially transcendent, but it is
every moment present in the every polar space. According to Heim, this supra-polar
space was God’s space. However, sometimes Heim argued that it was not only God’s
space but also the space of Satan, of will, and of faith, which also have a supra-polar
quality.
We must first analyze the intension of the space of God, the necessity of God’s
supra-polarity, Heim's idea of God and His eternal presence, and how God’s supra-polar
space can open upon us. Then we must analyze the intension of all other supra-polar
63 See Chapter III.1.F.
64 GD, pp. 150-152.
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spaces, namely, those of Satan, and Heim’s idea of the supra-polar character of will and
of faith.
A. Space of God
As we have discussed in the Chapter II, if God exists at all, He alone must be the
supra-polar Being, and if there is supra-polar space, it must be God’s space. Because it is
space, it opens upon us in the same way as the polar spaces, if at all. We must first
analyze Heim’s arguments on the necessity of God’s supra-polarity.65 After that, we can
understand God-space itself, and its opening.
Heim’s argument for the necessity of God’s supra-polarity starts from the two
questions of every thinking and willing person: “Where does it all come from?” and
“What is the last legitimization or sanction of our actions?” There are three answers to
each of these questions. These six answers are also three forms of human religiosity and
morality. The three answers to the first question “Where does all come from?” are the
following:
First in the sequence of cause and effect, we go backwards until we find a cause,
on which we could explain everything. This kind of first cause, prima causa, or primus
movens, is either scientific, for example, “singularity,” or mythological, for example, a
“demiurge.” Heim called this solution “worship of the created” (Kreaturenvergötterung).
However, this solution is inadequate, because physical time-space is an infinite and polar
continuum. We could thus always continue asking the next question “What is the
beginning of this beginning?” Heim’s concept of physical time oscillated with Kant’s
first antinomy. The universe has a beginning in time, or it has no beginning. Both are
logically true. Therefore, Heim’s physical time is sometimes infinite space, like here;
sometimes it is finite but limitless space. In every case, Heim agreed with the universal
law in science ex nihilo nil fit.66
65 GD, pp. 76-77, 172-207, JH, pp. 8-46, and GN, pp. 154-169. According to Peter van Inwangen, God,
Knowledge, and Mystery. Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995),
p. 13, there is such a thing as logical necessity and impossibility but not possibility. A state of affairs is
logically necessary if and only if its negation is logically impossible.
66 WW, p. 37. Heim, thus, rejected creation ex nihilo scientifically impossible.
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There is no first cause, but the infinite sequence of cause and effect that creates
itself. Heim called this solution “pantheism.” According to Heim, the nihilism of
Nietzsche represents the mythological form of pantheism in which the universe is eternal.
Kant’s critical idealism and especially Vaihinger’s fictionalism represents the critical
form of pantheism in which the direction of the sequence of cause and effect is
determined by an imaginary point, focus imaginarius. However, this kind of intuitive or
fictional point is only a regulative principle or postulate, which cannot lead out of
polarity.67
The sequence of cause and effect continues until the so-called condition of
indifference, in which all opposites are combined into a unity. Heim called this solution
“indifference-religion.” Eastern mysticism is an endeavor to eliminate bound aries
between subject and object, and then reduce the numerous subjects to one transsubjective
reality. This kind of unity or coincidentia oppositorum eliminates the boundary between
dream and reality, but it cannot lead out of polarity, because it is a part of polarity.
Heim’s own former concept of transperspectivity, which was the basis in his GG, does
not lead out of polarity, either. It is identical with the transsubjectivity of eastern
mysticism, because according to Heim, perspectivity equals subjectivity.
The second question “What is the last legitimization or sanction of the action and
the direction of life?” is more important to Heim than the former question, although both
belong together. The will as the last instance can exist only in W-reality, never in w-
reality, to which all world-interpretations belong. The three answers to this question are
as follows:
The last instance must be some “Thou,” which belongs to W-space, and whose
will is stronger than my will, because my own commands are not absolute. However, this
solution is a circulus vitiosus, because I give you the authority to rule me, but I want to
obey you as long as I think you are stronger than I am. The sequence can be continued
infinitely.
67 Saarnio, Das Dasein Gottes, pp. 20-61, claimed that God’s existence is a categorically necessary fact in
Kant’s epistemology. The question is what kind God is this logically proved, epistemological, and
categorical god.
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The last instance is the infinite W-space. Then we must ask, from where has it
received its legitimization? It can be neither the necessity of history nor the necessity of
nature and biological evolution, which are polar ent ities.
The last instance is the transsubjective and absolute “I” (All-Ich), which resides
behind W-space. This solution from the German absolute idealism corresponded with
Heim’s earlier thinking, but it cannot lead us out of polarity, either.
Kant had claimed that the categorical imperative of his autonomous ethics is
adequate and universal, whether God exists or not. According to Heim, Kant’s
categorical imperative is not adequate and universal, because I can always change it. The
absolute law of ethics requires necessarily a supra-polar stance.68 The above-mentioned
solutions lead to purpose, which corresponds exactly to the force that is necessary to
achieve that purpose. These solutions only prove the boundary, which we cannot cross.
Here is the “transcendental horizon” of Heim’s dimensional thinking. There is no
theoretical or practical thought, belief, or proof, which can lead out of the polar spaces,
and all attempts to try to escape from polarity are a petitio principii. Heim opposed
Kant’s argument about noumena. Kant had argued in his Critique of Practical Reason
that the realm of noumena, in which the categories have been technically inoperative,
becomes thinkable as a realm of intelligible reality that is available to us in a world
distinct from the world of sensible nature. Thus, a dualistic metaphysics emerges and is
offered as a solution to contradiction between natural determinism and ethical freedom.
Kantian dualism includes a mode to think of, but not know, the existence of the “soul,”
“God,“ “immortality,” and “free will.”
According to Heim, however, something requires that polarity cannot be the only
possible reality. The something is prayer, which is not monologue but dialogue with
God. The prayer is some kind of ultima ratio that proves that, if God exists at all, He
must have necessarily a supra- polar character on which His omnipresence and
omnipotence is possible. Therefore, it is logically impossible that God is not supra-polar.
The supra-polarity, the “second Copernican revolution” discovered by Heim, has been
the target of heavy criticism and regrettable misunderstanding. It has had very few
68 GD, pp. 192-199, and GN, pp. 212-223.
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supporters, or even persons who have understood it correctly. The arguments against
Heim’s supra-polarity usually start from the argument, which in itself is also
metaphysical, that there is no bridge from science and knowledge to faith. The crossing
into faith is possible only by postulating new thinkable entities (as Kant did) or by a jump
of the soul (Seelensprung), not by continuously concluding.69
According to Hans-Rudolf Müller-Schwefe, Heim’s thinking must be understood
as metaphysical. Because it is metaphysical, Heim could see and use concepts of
thinking and believing harmoniously. Thinking was not “memory” (Andenken) for Heim,
as it was for Heidegger, but “design in advance” (Vorausentwerfen), which was followed
by realization.70 According to Friso Melzer, Heim even did not try to prove (beweisen)
the supra-polarity of God but only to give a testimony (bezeugen) to it.71 Osmo Tiililä
argued that Heim’s endeavor was only to prove the consistency between faith and
knowledge, not to translate truths of faith into truths of reason. The same polar reality,
which is an object of science, is imagined in a totally new dimension, when it is seen in
the light of faith, which is conscious of the supra-polarity.72 Walter Künneth argued that
Heim’s basic attitude is not “science contra belief” but “unbelief contra belief.” 73 Paul L.
Holmer argued against Heim, “It is not at all clear how this ‘non-objective,’ ‘non-polar
space’ is known to be actual. That the words have a use in Heim’s writings cannot be
denied. However, the point is that he does not admit that he is expressing an attitude or
re-aligning the known facts about nature and people to cohere more satisfactorily to his
intention. The words about non-polar space are used as if they were descriptive…
whether or not there is an objective reference to metaphysical language.” Holmer also
69 For example, Arthur Neuberg in Theologische Literaturzeitung 77 (1952), p. 307, argued that Heim’s
proof is inadequate. “Woher weiss man denn, dass Gott überpolar ist und nicht polar ist…Denn Übergang
zum Glauben ist nur durch Seelensprung zu erreichen, nicht durch kontinuierlichen Schlussketten. Es gibt
keine sichere Denkbrücke zwischen Glauben und Wissenschaft.”
70 H.-R. Müller-Schwefe, “Karl Heim,” in Tendenzen der Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Geschichte in
Porträts, ed. H.J. Schultz (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 132-136. “(Heims) Denken wird nicht kritisch, sondern
spekulativ verstanden… Weil der Ansatz spekulativ ist, kann Heim sein ganzes Leben hindurch Glauben
und Denken in Harmonie miteinander sehen und gebrauchen. Denken ist für ihm im ursprünglichen Sinne
– umgekehrt als für Heidegger- kein ‘Andenken’, sondern ein Vorausentwerfen, dem die Verwirklichung
folgt.”
71 Friso Melzer, “Karl Heim (1874-1958),” in Themelios 5/6 (1969), pp. 67-71.
72 OsmoTiililä, Systemaattinen teologia I (Kuopio, 1951), pp. 68-70.
73 Walter Künneth, “Karl Heims systematisches Lebenswerk,” in Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung
8 (1954), pp. 20-23.
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argued that Heim tried to construct a metaphysical structure, which is already vulnerable
even without waiting for future scientific discoveries.74 Nevertheless, Heim’s critics
have not realized that Heim consistently proved the logical impossibility of all kinds
polar proofs about God’s existence. His dimensional thinking shows without
contradiction that there is a transcendental horizon, which cannot be crossed by any
knowledge, thinking, or believing.
Ingmar Holmstrand argued against Heim’s concept of transcendence. What is the
connection or distinction between the polar and the supra-polar reality? Is it a
discontinuity or continuity? If continuity is accentuated, then the transcendence of the
supra-polar space is not a real or genuine transcendence, and the doctrine of analogia
entis must be rejected. The problem is, however, what is the boundary that prevails
between polar spaces and the supra-polar space? It can be neither the boundary of
content nor of dimension. Because Heim used the words “abolish” or “nullify”
(Aufhebung), it may be a new type of boundary. Holmstrand argued that “but if the
continuity-aspect is not preferred, then Heim’s theological program as a whole becomes
unnecessary and his apologetics unreasonable, at least concerning the problem of God’s
transcendence… But if the continuity-interpretation is accepted, then Heim’s theological
program becomes very natural.” The second interesting feature in Holmstrand’s analysis
was that he saw similarities between Heim’s concept of supra-polarity and Kuhn’s theory
of paradigm. Heim’s dimensional thinking and especially his “second Copernican turn,”
the concept of supra-polarity, can be seen as a theory of paradigm.75 I argue that without
the necessity of God’s supra-polarity, which is continuous to polarity, Heim’s thinking
does not differ from Barth’s theology at all. Moreover, God’s revelation in Christ’s
incarnation presupposes the continuity between the supra-polar and polar reality.
Without continuity, God’s revelation is meaningless.
74 Paul L Holmer, “Karl Heim and the Sacrifice of Intellect,” in Lutheran Quarterly, 6 (1954), pp. 207-219.
Holmer’s analysis of Heim was not about GD but only GN and WnW. In addition, Holmer claimed, for
example, that ego is “non-polar,” which is false. Altogether, Holmer did not understand the motif of
Heim’s dimensional thinking, because he thought that Heim tried to prove God’s existence.
75 Holmstrand, Karl Heim on Philosophy, Science and the Transcendence of God, pp. 132-140. See also
claims of Daniel W. Hackmann, “Die Bedeutung von Karl Heims Begriffspaar ‘polar’ und ‘überpolar’ für
das Gespräch zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft,” in GDJ (1993), pp. 32-51, that both continuity
and discontinuity prevail between polarity and supra-polarity in Heim’s dimensional doctrine.
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Although Heim argued that supra-polar space is God’s space, this concept is not
the old trick by which God and world are closed under the same denominator and
imagined through an analogia entis. The issue is reversed: God’s eternal presence
disproves the principle of analogia entis. As Kant argued, space is not an ens or a thing-
in-itself (Ding an sich) but a relation (Beziehung) between the observer and reality. In
the same way, because language is not the content of a book but its form, through which
the content becomes clear to the reader, then also the supra-polar space is not God but
only the aspect that is turned toward us.76
Supra-polar space is, in fact, the fifth type of space, and the boundary between it
and polar reality is the third type of boundary, which is neither the boundary of content
nor of dimension. What kind of boundary is it? Heim did not clearly explain. The only
expressions used by Heim are “dead point” (der tote Punkt), which is non-dimensional,
and the verb “to abolish” (aufheben), which means the negation or cancellation of all
polar relations.77
Heim’s concept of space stated that both God and the world are continuous
realities. Thus, God is necessarily not only transcendent but also immanent. God’s
supra-polar space can be present every moment in all points of the polar spaces and in all
their contents simultaneously because God’s aspect toward polar reality is a supra-polar
one. The supra-polarity of God is same as the omnipresence of God. The way from all
points to God is as long as or as short as the way from God to these points. Heim argued
that this fact does not express pantheism, because God is not identical with polar reality.
God is only eternally present in polar reality and at the same time, non -spatially and non-
dimensionally beyond it.
According to Heim, time is, on the one hand, the temporal, objectifiable, physical,
and polar space. On the other hand, it is the eternal, non -objectifiable, existential space,
both polar and supra-polar. Time is eternal, as both polar and supra-polar space, because
W-space is a nunc aeternum, and God’s supra-polar space is eternity. If this is so, then
one of the dimensions of time belongs to polar reality, and the other one to both polar and
76 GD, pp. 172-178, 202-207, JH, pp. 34-46, and GN, pp. 154-169.
77 The definition of the concept of boundary requires that the boundary between polar spaces and the supra-
polar space is dimensional. Only at one time did Heim use “spatial” (dimensional) term in this case. See
WnW, p. 150: “Es ist vielmehr eine ‘räumliche’ Grenze…”
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supra-polar reality. The former is temporal, and the latter is eternal. Because God is the
eternal present, and W-space is the panpsychic nunc aeternum, W-space must also belong
to supra-polar reality or at least participate in it. The crossing point of polar and supra-
polar reality is precisely nunc aeternum, in which God is both transcendent and
immanent, “God with us” (Immanuel).
Because Heim referred to Jacob Böhme, N.H. Søe supposed him to be pantheist.78
However, the definition of Heim’s concept of space, in which “infinite” is the most
important predicate means that pantheism is impossible. Namely, if God is identical with
the world, He could not be omnipresent, and God’s omnipresence could not exist
everywhere as wholeness because the universe cannot exist everywhere as wholeness.
Therefore, Heim’s supra-polar space is formally some kind of metaphysical infinity, but
its content is something else.79
His German and English critics usually categorize Heim as an epigone of Karl
Barth. In Heim’s thought, there are Barth’s fideistic elements as we have often
mentioned, but the logical outcome of his ontology and cosmology is not at all fideistic.
It is rather a species of “panentheism.” Panentheism is the belief that the Being of God
includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him, but (as
against pantheism) this Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe.
Panentheism differs on the one hand from theism, according to which God literally
transcends the universe as its Creator and on the other hand from pantheism, for which
God does not transcend the universe in any sense at all. Heim’s “panpsychism” is the
cosmological obverse of that which, theologically considered, is panentheism. If
panentheism is true, namely, the only conception of the relation of God to the universe in
which the demands of logic, religion, and science are met to some degree that satisfies
reason and feeling alike.80
About God and His supra-polar space, Heim used at least the following terms:
“Urraum,” “Ursein,” “Ursprung,” “Uranfang,” “Urwert,” “Urwillen,” “Urkraft,” and “Ur-
Du.” These archetypal terms mean that if God exists at all, He is the beginning and the
78 See Søe, Religionsfilosofi, pp. 61-62. Compare GN, pp. 196-212.
79 See Saarnio, Mitä tiedämme äärettömästä? pp. 14-22.
80 See The Oxford Dictionary of Christian Church (New York, 1957). This edition has been updated, but in
it are definitions of concepts as used in Heim’s lifetime.
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end of all polar reality. Heim argued that God is the absolute person, from whom the
limitless sequence of wills, “I” or “Thou” or so on, begins and to whom it ends. “I am
who I am.” (Exodus 3:14). God is omniscient, from whom the limitless sequence of
world-aspects, “i” or “t” and so on, begins and to whom it ends. God is the beginning
(arkhee) and the end (telos): time-space (Raumzeitlichkeit) begins from Him and ends to
Him.81
We live in the archetypal space of God, but it is not God Himself in whom we
live. Supra-polar space is the space or relation (Beziehung), in which God is present for
us. This ultimate reality remains that which is totally other, totally incomprehensible, and
entirely inaccessible to our intuition, thought, and observation. We stand before the
infinite, eternal, perfect, and self-existent person, Thou (Ur-Du), in whose omnipresence
we all live.82 If God exists, the world is not “all in all,” and if there is something beyond
God, God is not “all in all.” An atheist argues that there is only the material world
beyond which there is nothing. Panentheist argues that this material world is God’s
world. Both world-views are limitless and infinite spaces, but the boundary between
them is neither the boundary of content nor of dimension. In other words, there is a
battleground (Kampfzone), where both win at every moment. Heim argued that atheistic
“secularism” and panentheistic “belief in God” have a supra-polar character. It is
possible that both “beliefs” can be present, at least, in every point of W-space, and
through that space potentially also in every point of w-space.
In terms of relation of the I-Thou, the problem of transcendence of a polar space
into the supra-polar space is the problem of how I can pass from the intuition of you as
Thou to the revelation of God as a cosmic Thou. There is but one way from polar reality
into supra-polar reality; prayer in faith, which requires that the supra-polar God exist.
Praying is not a monologue but rather a dialogue. We cannot talk about God but only to
God. The dialogue is possible only if God has at first started it, in other words, if supra-
81 According to Søe, Religionsfilosofi, pp. 60-63, Heim’s ontological and theological terminology
demonstrates that he tried to unify three fundamentally opposite views of God: those of Platonism and neo-
Platonism, of personalism, and of Biblical faith. However, it is impossible to conclude from terminology
alone what Heim tried to do. Heim strongly opposed Platonism in its all forms. They and all other forms
of human thinking do not lead out of polarity, which is the transcendental horizon, according to Heim. See
also van Inwangen, God, Knowledge, and Mystery, pp. 194-195. Heim preferred the word “Ur -Du” for
God either than “Du.”
82 GD, pp. 76-77, 172-178, JH, pp. 141-194, and GN, pp. 196-212.
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polar space has opened upon us. According to Heim, the opening of the supra-polar
space happens in the same way as the polar spaces open upon us: as a pure gift. In both
cases, when the space opens, the logical law of bivalency is not adequate anymore. The
only difference in the opening of spaces is that the opening of the polar spaces may widen
our world-view, but the opening of the supra-polar space gives us a new comprehensive
aspect toward entire reality. God, who is the center of supra-polar space, gets in touch
with me –if He wills it at all – and meets with me in the Word through the Holy Spirit.
More precisely, God talks to me as the incarnate Word or Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ
meets with me in the Holy Spirit in an analogous way as “I” and “Thou” meet each other
in space in which they are in the relation of subordination. However, this meeting of “I”
and “Thou” or I│T is independent from both temporal and spatial distance. Heim agreed
with Bultmann that the meeting between “I” and Christ cannot be an I│i-relation, but he
rejected Bultmann’s argument that it cannot be an I│T-relation either.83
When the supra-polar space of God opens upon us as a gift of God’s revelation,
the absolute and seeing faith arises immediately: the supra-polar space has always been
there, but I have lived in it blindly. In opinion of the atheist, this kind of belief requires a
sacrifice of the intellect. The atheist believes so, because he/she is like the “flatlander”
who thinks that to talk about the three-dimensional space is meaningless, although he/she
lives in it every moment. Heim argued based on Fichte’s metaphor that the opening of
spaces corresponds to the psychological development of mankind. There was at first only
the objectifiable it-world in which we lived. Then we realized that there was also non-
objectifiable reality, which prevails in “I” and “Thou.” The third phase of this
development is “thinking in spaces,” which makes possible Heim’s revolutionary new
world-view.
B. Other Supra-polar Spaces
Supra-polar reality is wholly God’s space, because God is “all in all.” However,
there exist other beings who possess features of the supra-polar space. Heim also argued
83
“Ist aber Christus gegenüber nicht nur die Du-Beziehung unmöglich, sondern auch das Es-Verhältnis
ausgeschaltet, so kann unser Glaubengehorsam ihn selbst überhaupt nicht mehr zum Inhalt haben.” JH, p.
180.
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that such opposing world-views as “secularism” and “belief in God” are somehow supra-
polar. This means that supra-polar space is a battleground of opposite wills and beliefs.
Supra-polar space is wholly God’s space, but it is also at the same time the space of
satanic power. In addition, the mathematical entity “number” also has supra-polar
character, because it is eternally the same and an independent entity in every point of
every world. Heim did not speak of supra-polarity of mathematics, but he argued, for
example, that arithmetic has absolutely proved indeterminacy in QM. It is possible only
if arithmetic is supra-polar, that is, absolutely independent tool.84
Belief in satanic power is inseparable from the biblical world-view. Heim argued
about it inflexibly and from the perspective of Jesus.85 Satan cannot be an impersonal
power but the personal will, which has risen in revolt against God. It is not any limited
human will, but it is a pure, absolute hatred of God. It knows who God is and what God
wills. Satan cannot be only a polar will but also a supra-polar will that is omnipresent in
all polar spaces. Therefore, it is not only the will that affects me but is in me. In other
words, the satanic will is not some strange will to me, but it has become my will.
If absolute satanic power belongs to supra-polar space, it means two irresolvable
antinomies, because there are two opposite propositions both of which are necessarily
true: the antinomy of omnipresence and the antinomy of omnipotence. Supra-polar God
is omnipresent. There is also an omnipresent and supra-polar Satan. Because God is “all
in all,” he must also be in Satan. Satan is God’s Satan (Gottes Teufel), as Luther argued.
As for the antinomy of omnipotence: God and Satan are omnipotent and absolutely
opposite supra-polar powers that cannot be reconciled. Heim argued that these two
antinomies prevail at the same time.86
Heim noted that these antinomies are not constructed by theologians, but they
arise from a biblical basis and the experience of faith. Both the monistic picture of the
84 JH, pp. 87-102, and WnW, pp. 128-135. According to Schulte, Vom Weltbilde Karl Heims, pp. 17, 20,
“will” and “belief”, even “I” and “T,” are supra-polar. Hans Schwarz, “Christus oder die Verzweiflung?
Über das Lebenswerk Karl Heims,” in Evangelium und Wissenschaft, 36 (1999), pp. 4-13, argued that,
according to Heim, only God’s space is supra-polar.
85 Paul Althaus named Heim’s Christology “Christomonism,” whereas Friedrich Hochgrebe, “Der letzte
Antrieb in K. Heims Denken,” in Deutsches Pfarrerblatt, 64 (1964), pp. 28-31, said it is “Brunnerian
eristics.” See also Walter Künneth, “Karl Heims systematisches Lebenswerk,” in Evangelisch-Lutherische
Kirchenzeitung, 8 (1954), pp. 20-23.
86 JH, pp. 102-106. In fact, Heim’s thought was similar to Luther. See Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin
Luthers (Gütersloh: Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963), pp. 144-150.
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omnipotent God and the dualistic picture of the fight between the two supra-polar powers
belong inseparably together “in belief.” However, “in knowing” there is no synthesis
between them. In fact, these antinomies are antinomies of the polarity and supra-polarity.
There is the polarity between God and Satan, which is impossible, because they are
supra-polar. Heim did not try to resolve this contradictory in any way. It is God’s task in
the end of time, his own theodicy. Now we can only take all from God’s hands, from the
left or from the right hand, as Luther said. It is our destiny until the end of time.87
According to Heim, both polar and supra-polar realities are also the battlegrounds
of the cosmic wills. God’s will is a universal and supra-polar goodness, which can be
present in every polar space simultaneously. In the w-space, it is creatio continua
through nature and W-space. However, Satan’s universal, supra-polar, evil, and an
absolutely opposite will is also present in every polar space simultaneously.88
The law of double polarity does not belong to supra-polarity. However, Heim
used it to describe the battle between wills in reality. The battle between opposite wills is
that of two opposite energetic powers, from which one must be stronger, and the other
must be weaker. Without the energetic tension between these wills, there is neither
power nor event in reality. This tension is the shaking of the original equilibrium.89
Heim’s assertion that there is no power without the opposite power, is true in polar
reality, but is it true also in the supra-polar reality? Heim answered that there are the
God’s omnipotent will and Satan’s omnipotent will in supra-polar space. There are two
opposite world-views that form a unity: God only is the omnipotent power, and yet there
87 It is almost impossible to find even the words “Satan” or “evil” in contemporary theological books. For
example, Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age. Being and Becoming-Natural, Divine, and
Human (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 127 and note 72, mentioned only in one note of his 438
pages “’natural’ evils,” but not anything about “personal evil.” John Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 36, and 82-85 and Science and Theology (Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 93-95, is more interested in “evil” than Peacocke. The problems of theodicy, of
physical evil and moral evil, are the most perplexing of all difficulties that confront the religious believer.
Polkinghorne’s solution is that God allows the whole universe to be itself. The cross of Christ is our guide,
that God is no determinist. He is Providence.
88 JH, pp. 94-115. See also Verena Grüter, Begegnung mit dem göttlichen Du, pp. 123-137.
89
“Alle Kraftwirkungen sind nur da, wenn ein Gegensatz zwischen zwei energetischen Zuständen
entstanden ist. Kraft ist nur vorhanden als Überwindung von Widerstand, als Kampf mit etwas anderem,
das schwächer ist und an dessen Überwindung die Kraft gemessen werden kann. Ohne Gegenkraft gibt es
keine Kraft. Die Spannung zwischen zwei energetischen Zuständen, durch die allein irgend etwas in der
Welt geschieht, ist die Aufhebung des energetischen Gleichgewichts, in dem sich alles im Urzustand
befindet.” See JH, pp. 21, and 36.
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are two omnipotent powers, God and Satan. The original equilibrium was God alone in
His nunc aeternum.
The willing “I” and “T” participate in the cosmic battle in supra-polar space. This
participation is not a possibility but necessity. This means that the unity of seen and
unseen world created by God is in God, and participates in his will. If God is God, He
must “be all in all,” “act all in all,” and “all is from Him, through Him and to Him.” The
inverse side of panentheism in Heim’s thought is the participation of the creatures in
God. This means that there is only one reality or “hyperspace” in which there are polar
or supra-polar relations between part-spaces and their contents. Through participation,
God’s will becomes immanent, and our wills become transcendent. So God is, in Heim’s
thinking, at the same time transcendent and immanent.90
Both polar and supra-polar spaces are also battlegrounds of two opposing beliefs.
Heim strongly rejected the belief of German idealism, according to which, the knowing
of God’s essence and will is a part of our self-consciousness. We need only to dive into
the depth of ourselves to be in God. This conception cannot be true because then there
were no unbelieving in God, no godlessness, and no atheism. According to Heim, the
supra-polar God does not live in us. We are infinitely far from God (Gottesferne).
Therefore, our lives are full of sufferings, and we are mortal. Death is the total
destruction. Not only my body (i-space) is mortal but also my mind (I-space). Our lives
without God or belief in Him are not our destiny but our guilt. Jesus Christ did not battle
against destiny but against the satanic will and unbelief, both of which have a supra-polar
quality.91
In the battle among wills and world-views, we do not ask, “How could I find a
merciful God?” not even “Does God exist?” or “Is the world only a pure coincidence?”
Heim argued that the situation is much more radical: in our days of nihilistic secularism,
it is not meaningful to talk about God at all. Wittgenstein stated that about which we
cannot talk we must keep silent. We are no longer God-fearing but godless. Our
90 JH, pp. 31-46. “Alles, was in Gott ist, muß teilhaben an seinem Wesen. Denn gäbe es ein anderes,
nichtgöttliches Sein, das außerhalb des göttlichen Seins stände, so wäre dieses ein Gegenpol zum göttlichen
Sein.”
91 JH, pp. 73-86.
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godlessness (Gottlosigkeit) is not an exception, or a mistake, but a supra-polar will to
power, as Nietzsche argued: If God exists, how could I tolerate that I am not God?
Every theoretical or practical action implies trust (Vertrauen) on that which our
world-view is based. The trust is also intentionally directed to some object, and is
dependent upon it. This object is “our God,” a concrete or an abstract idol (Abgott). Our
destiny is the attempt to find a base upon which the questions “Why does anything
exist?” and “From where do our ethical actions receive their legitimacy?” could get a
trustworthy answer. However, we cannot find any reliable answer from polar reality.
We have two possibilities. Either we trust our own idol(s) or we believe in God.
Because God’s space, according to Heim, is the supra-polar reality, not our knowledge,
or our thinking, nor our believing can reach God. There is no human way from the
polarity to God’s supra-polarity. God is transcendent for us. Only if God’s supra-polar
space opens upon us, can our eyes open, and we will realize that we have always been
living in His hands. God has answered our ultimate questions by both general revelation
and especially by the special revelation of the incarnate God, Jesus Christ, who alone
must be our Lord. Therefore, it is impossible actively to believe in God but only
passively as a gift. This understanding of belief in God as a passive gift is the influence
of the Holy Spirit, and as such a testimony of the Holy Spirit. Like the will, belief has in
this limited meaning a supra-polar quality, in which the I-space can participate, because
God’s supra-polar reality with His gift is omnipresent in nunc aeternum, which is W-
space. According to German absolute idealism, God has lived in us since we were born,
but according to Heim, we have been living in God since we were born.92
92 JH, pp. 8-46
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3. A Formal Presentation of Heim’s Dimensional Thinking
The first endeavor of this dissertation was the critical analysis of the basic
concepts and the intension of Heim’s dimensional doctrine. I will now try to formalize it,
because the discussion would be easier with a meta-language. The formalization is
trivial, but in it, there is a possible explanation of the concepts and the intension of
Heim’s dimensional thinking. In the first-order predicate logic, a formalized appearance
of Heim’s dimensional doctrine is the following: 93
Space (S):
Every limitless (L) and infinite (F) continuum (C) is space.
S = Def. (x) (Lx & Fx & Cx), in which L and F are relevant and relational.
Space types:
S (1) Physical
S (2) Mathematical
S (3) Conscious (self or mind)
S (4) Panpsychic
Dimensions of spaces: 0 → ∞
Contents of spaces: s1, s2, s3, s4…sn
Boundary (B):
Boundary of Content: Bc = /, for example, s 1 / s2
Boundary of Dimension: Bd = /, for example, S1 / S2, in which / = c-1 (velocity of light)
(1) Content and Space: s ⊂ S = Df. (x) (x ∈ s → x ∈ S)
(2) Unity of Contents: s1 = s2 = Df. (∃x) (x ∈ s1 & x ∈ s2), in which x = B
Difference of Contents: s1 ≠ s2 = Df. (∃x) (x ∈ s1 ∨ x ∈ s2)
Unity of Dimensions: S1 = S2 = Df. (x) (x ∈ S1 & x ∈ S2), in which x = s
Difference of Dimensions: S1 ≠ S2 = Df. (x) (x ∈ S1 ∨ x ∈ S2)
(3) Part-relation of Contents: s1 ⊂ s2 = Df. (x) (x ∈ s1 → x ∈ s2)
Part-relation of Dimensions: S1 ⊂ S2 = Df. (x) (x ∈ S1 → x ∈ S2), in which x = s
(4) Contact of Contents: s1│ s2 = Df. (∃x) (x ∈ s1 & x ∈ s2), in which x = Bc
Meeting of Dimensions: S1│ S2 = Df. (∃x) (x ∈ S1 & x ∈ S2), in which x = s
93 See Suppes, Introduction to Logic, pp. 43-57, 177-207.
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(5) Knowledge of Contents: S ╪ s = Df. (x) (x = a posteriori)
Knowledge of Dimensions: S1╪S2 = Df. (x) (x = synthetic a priori)
Polarity (P):
Intra-mundane polarity: Pp = Df. (x) (y) (z) ((x ↔ y) ↔ z), in which x = S, y = s, z =
indifference pole. Polarity is the absolute simultaneity between x, y, and z.
Supra-polarity: Ps = Df. ~ Pp
Spaces (S):
S (1): i, t, and w
S (3): I, T, and W
S (4): T and t
Boundary (B):
Bd: i / t, I / i ≡ T / t, and I / T
i = t: Df. (s) (s ∈ i & s ∈ t)
i ≠ t: Df. (s) (s ∈ i ∨ s ∈ t)
I = i: Df. (s) (s ∈ I & s ∈ i)
I ≠ i: Df. (s) (s ∈ I ∨ s ∈ i)
I = T: Df. (s) (s ∈ I & s ∈ T)
I ≠ T: Df. (s) (s ∈ I ∨ s ∈ T)
(i&t) ⊂ w: Df. (s) (s ∈ (i ∨ t) → s ∈ w
(I&i) ⊂ i: Df. (s) (s ∈(I ∨ i) → s ∈ i)
(I&T)⊂ W: Df. (s) (s ∈ (I ∨ T) → s ∈ W
i │ t: Df. (∃s) (s ∈ i & s ∈ t)
I │ i: Df. (I) (I = I) & I ∈ i)
I │ T: Df. (∃s) (s ∈ I & s ∈ T)
i ╪ t: Df. Synthetic a priori i → t
I ╪ i: Df. Synthetic a priori i → I
I ╪ T: Df. Synthetic a priori I →T
Polarity (P):
Pp: Df. ((I↔T)↔W)&((I↔i)↔i)&((i↔t)↔w)
Ps: Df. ~ Pp = S God. (S satan) ∨ (S will) ∨ (S belief): supra-polar character (~ Pp)
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Pp
Ps
The intension of the dimensional thinking could be illustrated as the
following diagram (Figure 3): 94
I i
W w
T t
All Pp-spaces are limitless and infinite. = Polarity
Ps is present in all points of all spaces. = Omnipresence
= Non-objectifiable
Reality according to the Heim’s concepts space (S), boundary (B), and polarity
(P), and the intension of his dimensional doctrine, is monistic, and there are three levels
of relations: transcendent, non-objectifiable, and objectifiable. Dimensional boundaries
and polarity prevail between the intramundane spaces in the supra-polar hyperspace.
Corresponding to reality, Heim’s world-view is panentheistic. It is also dynamic,
because of the polarity between the objectifiable and non-objectifiable spaces. Namely,
reality is not experienced only as a static state but also as dynamic action.
The issue of how it is possible to “communicate dimensionally” is the subject of
the next chapter. In other words, what is the extension of Heim’s dimensional thinking?
How did Heim apply his dimensional thinking? The purpose of Heim’s dimensional
thinking was to give the unambiguous conceptual and ontological foundation for thinking
and believing in God’s revelation and action in scientific context. Does this mean that
94 There is an illustration in the dissertation of Ingemar Holmstrand, Karl Heim on Philosophy, Science and
the Transcendence of God, p. 17. However, it is insufficient, because, for example, it does not include Ps .
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Heim has only constructed a basis on which other thinkers can, if they wish, build their
own interpretations of reality?
I argue that Heim’s dimensional thinking is not only the conceptual foundation
for believing in and thinking of God’s revelation and action. It has not only theological
contributions but also philosophical and scientific ones. Therefore, in the next chapter,
concerning the extension of Heim’s dimensional thinking, we will systematically analyze
its contributions to philosophy, science, and theology.
142
Chapter IV
EXTENSION OF HEIM’S DIMENSIONAL THINKING
The extension of a concept usually means the class of existing entities to which
the concept is applicable. In this chapter, we use the concept of “extension” in a large
meaning. We ask, what are the contributions of Heim’s dimensional thinking to
philosophy, science, and theology.
1. Contributions to Philosophy
The point of departure in Heim’s dimensional thinking was ontological rather
than epistemological to provide an unambiguous conceptual foun dation consonant with
philosophy, science, and theology. According to Heim, this ontological endeavor was to
expand Kant’s epistemological forms of intuition. Heim claimed that Kant’s
epistemological scheme can only map sensations, and thus are not able to map an
ontological side of objective reality, which is independent from our sensations and the
ability of the mind to construct it.1 Heim also tried to build a new ontological and
dynamic world-view that brings together seemingly incompatible methods of analysis
and phenomenology.2 Therefore, I will first analyze the contribution of Heim’s
dimensional thinking to Kant’s critical idealism. The second contribution was a logical
consequence of Heim’s dimensional thinking to the controversy between idealism and
realism. According to Heim, after Einstein’s SR and GR, it is no longer possible to
assume a position either of idealism or of realism because both belong inseparably
together.3 Heim claimed that it is possible to combine idealism and realism. Heim’s
1 GD, pp. 31,34.
2 GD, pp. 29-30.
3 See Heim, “Gedanken eines Theologen zu Einsteins Relativitätstheorie,” in GL, pp. 125-143. Einstein
took the position of critical physical realism, and rejected all kind of idealism, as we have seen in Chapter I.
Heim stated that his dimensional doctrine is independent of any epistemological stance about reality,
because it was an ontological doctrine. GD, pp. 49-51.
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endeavor was to break down epistemological boundaries within the onlogical unity of
reality. However, the synthesis of realism and idealism is possible only if it is based on
the concept of two-dimensional time. On the idea of the concept of one-dimensional
physical time, it is possible to take either the position of idealism or realism. The third
contribution belongs to the above-mentioned problems, which are fundamentally
“subject-object” problems. Namely, Heim’s dimensional thinking also provides a serious
solution to the problem of “mind-body.”
A. Kant’s critical idealism
Heim’s dimensional thinking was mainly a debate with Kant. In order to
understand the contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for Kant’s critical idealism,
we must at first analyze some criticisms about the flaws of Kant’s thinking. Then it will
be possible to point to a new treatment of Heim’s dimensional thinking for Kant’s critical
idealism.
Almost every significant philosophical thought since 1800 has been a response to
Kant and, especially, his understanding of a priori knowledge. Kant’s “Copernican
Revolution” presented a theory of experience and a non-Platonist account of the a priori.
It was an argument for universal categories, but the price was the technical restriction of
the categories to the “inside” of the mind: to one’s experience and to the perceiving
activities of the mind. Kant identified two sources of a prior i: the mind has a receptive
capacity, or sensibility, which was necessarily a spatio-temporal character of sensation,
and the mind possesses a conceptual capacity, or understanding that applies concepts to
sensory experience.
Kant’s fundamental question was: “How are such synthetic a priori judgments
possible?” His intention was to achieve a certainty for metaphysics. Therefore, he
wanted to show that philosophers and natural scientists were not able, and would never
be able, to give final answers to the questions about the nature of the physical world, the
human mind, and about the existence and attributes of God, because of the
insurmountable transcendental horizon of our understanding. The actual consequence of
Kant’s endeavor was a radical agnosticism and a ghostly status for the thing-in-itself,
144
although the existence of objects was systematically maintained to avoid subjective
idealism and solipsism. Kant, however, could not develop adequate justification for the
universality and necessity of the individual categories of space, time, substance, and
causality. For example, the notion of universal causal order is dependent on physical
time, not on intuition of time.4
Kant was not quite bold enough to step onto the new intellectual ground he had
liberated. He still found the idea that we could know thing-in-themselves problematic.
Even as he attacked the “myth of the given” found in empiricism and the “blindness” of
non-conceptualized experience, he clung to the empiricist notion of “impressions,” which
are given in atomistic bits and then synthesized to give us objects. Moreover, as he
argued for the active roles of understanding and imagination in perception, Kant retained
the quite conservative belief that there is but one set of categories and consequently one
possible conception of the world. He did not think far enough ahead of his idea to realize
that if we supply the categories by which objects are synthesized, then we might also
supply other categories. Kant’s system was built, in fact, on a semantic swamp, and it
took most of the nineteenth century before these confusions were recognized and
neutralized. Post-Kantian philosophy could be characterized most simply as the decline
and fall of pure intuition.5
Neo-Kantianism is the label for a variety of movements in post-Kantian
epistemological thought, which believed that what Kant meant (even without saying it
clearly) was profound and true. The Kantian absolutists accepted Kant’s factual claims in
their original forms. The Neo-Kantian absolutists accepted Kant's claim of uniqueness,
but replaced his synthetic a priori judgments and categories with a different one. The
Neo-Kantian pluralists rejected his claims of uniqueness and, hence, of completeness.
Einstein’s critical physical realism could also belong to this epistemological line of post-
Kantian philosophies.6
4 Morrison, Einstein, Kant and Tillich, pp. 108-111.
5 Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 19, Gary Hatfield, “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant,
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), p. ix, and Coffa, Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, pp. 1-21.
6 Ibid., p. 57, and Körner, “Introduction,” in Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, p. x.
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There was a sharp disagreement over the correctness of Kant’s factual claims,
even among philosophers who accepted his distinctions between synthetic a posteriori
and synthetic a priori judgments, and between a posteriori and a priori concepts. The
main reason for these disagreements was developments in mathematics and physics.
Non-Euclidean geometry, Einstein’s SR and GR, and QM were incompatible, or at least
difficult to combine, with the Kantian system. For example, the Kant’s a priori principle
of causality and continuity are dubious in a quantum mechanical frame.7
Kant’s transcendental justification of his factual claims, especially transcendental
deduction of his categories has been the subject of the radical and irreconcilable criticism.
For instance, Neo-Kantian pluralists deny the possibility of universally and necessarily
true synthetic a priori judgments. They hold that since the quaestio facti has to be
answered in the negative and since Kant’s factual claim has to be rejected, the quaestio
iuris does not arise. On the other hand, many an alytical philosophers with Kantian
sympathies argue that a logical inference can be validly reconstructed if the Kantian set
of categories is replaced by another set. However, C.D. Broad claimed that Kant’s
invalid logical inference could be replaced by a more modest probabilistic argument.
Kantian absolutists accepted Kant’s factual claims, but argued that his transcendental
deduction is an instance of the irremediably invalid logical fallacy of circular reasoning.
Kant’s correct factual claims can only be justified by showing that his categories are
applicable to an originally obscure and non-propositional cognition, as, for example, in
arithmetic and geometry, where a priori concepts are applicable to the non-propositional
intuitions of time and space.8
Heim’s dimensional thinking provides remarkable contributions to Kant’s
question, “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?”, to Kant’s conceptions of
space and time, and to Kant’s transcendental horizon between phenomena and noumena.9
As was discussed in Chapter I, Kant debated with the epistemological problems
generated by empiricism and rationalism. He tried to prove how are synthetic a priori
judgments possible. He argued that there are synthetic judgments a priori , and that there
7 Ibid., pp. ix-x.
8 Körner, “Introduction,” p. xi.
9 The contributions are indirect logical conclusions from Heim’s dimensional doctrine. Regrettably, Heim
himself did not directly make any conclusions from his dimensional doctrine.
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is one and only one internally consistent set of them in his Critique of Pure Reason . For
Heim, epistemological questions were consequences of ontological questions, and
therefore, he bracketed epistemological questions. He did not ask how the immaterial
mind could conform itself to material objects in the world, as empiricists and rationalists
did, or how the world could conform itself to the mind, as Kant did. Heim did not claim,
as Kant had, that it is the mind itself that gives objects at least some of their
characteristics, because they must conform to the mind’s structure and conceptual
capacities. Instead, he asked, what kind of ontological relations prevail between the mind
and object?10
In the polar world of “I-Thou-It,” there are only infinite and limitless spaces,
which are dimensionally and polarly related to each other. Heim agreed with Kant that
the world is rational and knowable, not a priori through an active analysis of ideas and
derivations done through logic, as Leibniz thought, but a posteriori and synthetically a
priori , when the spaces open upon us. Kant thought that there are synthetic a priori
judgments that are actively constructed by pure reason. He claimed, “What we can know
a priori about objects is limited to that which we ourselves put into those objects.”11
Heim rejected Kant’s claim and argued that the mind is passive in the process of
dimensional knowing. For Heim the opening of spaces was a synthetic a priori and non-
propositional event that occurred in two-dimensional time-space. When an unknown
space opens upon us, we can immediately know its structure and its principles of order.
From the “old” space into a “new” space, it is possible to cross analogically in the same
way as we can cross from a Euclidean space into a non-Euclidean space.
There is a limit between subject and object, which cannot be neglected, as Kant
had tried to show. However, Kant’s transcendental horizon was only the limit of contents
within space and time. Instead, Heim’s boundary was the dimensional horizon between
two spaces. The consequence of this horizon is that we cannot put anything into objects.
Kant argued that the objects are not simply given in experience but rather constituted or
synthesized as a necessary condition for experience by pure concepts of the
understanding. The synthetic a priori claims were true for him because of the structure
10 GD, pp. 30-31.
11 Kant, B xvii, (III 19).
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of the mind that knows them. For Heim, the synthetic a priori events were true, because
they occurred in a physical time-dimension, which is independent of mind, and at the
same time, in the eternal time-dimension, where “I” exist and know them dimensionally.
Thus, the crucial difference between Kant and Heim was that Kant’s thought was directed
into contents of a space and Heim’s thought into spaces. Kant made epistemological and
propositional claims about contents of objects within a space and a time of pure reason,
whereas Heim made non-propositional and ontological conclusions about dimensional
events between spaces “I” and “i,” that is, between the epistemological subject and its
objects.12
Kant’s understanding of self as pure reason that is also an unknown entity was
quite similar to Heim’s thought. However, Kant failed to answer his own question, how
can subjective conditions of thought have objective validity?, because of his incorrect
conception of space-time. Kant had rejected Leibniz’s principle of relativity of space and
time and accepted Newton’s concepts of absolute space and absolute time. He put them
as pure “forms” inside the mind. Space and time were only “sensitive” concepts, whose
applicability was restricted only to sensations or to phenomena, not to objective reality
except as a means of accessing objects by one’s understanding. Kantian space was the
formal a priori condition of outer experiences, and time was the formal a priori condition
of appearances without any physical status. Thus, Kantian conception leads to solipsism,
even if the conditions of knowledge are the same to all knowing subjects, because there is
no space and time without at least one subjective observer. Heim rejected Kant’s
conception and argued that space-time has both physical and phenomenal status. Time
must be the physical and experienced two-dimensional space.13
Kant divided the realm of knowledge into two separated domains, that of
phenomena and that of noumena. He claimed, as an empirical realist, that we only have
empirical knowledge about phenomena based on a posteriori experience of the world
through the senses and, as a transcendental idealist, that these phenomena were
constructed by the a priori or “given” structure of the mind. Knowledge was a product of
12 GD, pp. 71-75. Heim sometimes used the concept “dimensional horizon” against that of ”dimensional
boundary.”
13 GD, p. 34.
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interaction of the senses and the ordering structure of minds. Kant claimed that objects
belong into the realm of noumena, where there are no categories. Metaphysically there is
an external world beyond our private experiences, but epistemologically there is a
transcendental horizon between the phenomenal realm of sensibility and the noumenal
realm of things-in-themselves, the universe as a causal whole, the human self, and God.
Heim agreed with Kant that there is the external world, “i,” but it is not beyond “I.” “I”
is the perspectival and non-objectifiable center of “i.” However, there is a limit or
boundary between them. Heim rejected Kant’s belief that it is impossible to overcome
this boundary and know anything about noumena.14 Because Kant thought contents of
space, his transcendental horizon between phenomena and noumena was like a Plato’s
wall on which we can see shadows from transcendence, but cannot see beyond that wall.
According to Heim’s dimensional thinking, there is no wall or the boundary of content
but rather the dimensional boundary between two spaces, I/i. Moreover, the boundary
can be overcome by the dimensional knowing way, I╪i. This knowing way is synthetic a
priori , when “i” opens upon “I.”15 In addition, because of the dimensional part-relations
((I&i) ⊂ i and (i&t) ⊂ w “I” is the perspectival center of “i,” “T” is the perspectival
center of “t,” and they both are simultaneously perspectival centers of w-reality, it is
possible to know dimensionally, intersubjectively, and continuously more and more, not
only about “things-in-themselves,” but also about the universe as a finite and causal
whole. As an epistemological subject, “I” can know dimensionally something about my
objects, “i,” and also about in itself the non-objectifiable “T,” if those open upon my
consciousness-space “i.”16 God as a genuine transcendence, instead, is the supra-polar
space, and could not be reached by any kind of theoretical or practical polar knowledge.
Heim agreed with Kant that it is possible to believe in and think about God, but it is
impossible to prove God’s existence by any ontological or teleological method. Kant
proved it epistemologically and Heim ontologically. Heim argued that there is no way
from polar reality into supra-polar reality.
14 GD, p. 50.
15 GD, p. 74.
16 GD, pp. 66-69.
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Kant’s categorical imperative was not universal either, because anyone can
always change his or her subjective imperative, and because, as an ultimate justification
of human behavior the categorical imperative does not lead out of polarity of the world.
On the other hand, according to Heim’s panentheism, because supra-polar space is
present in every polar space, it is possible to know passively –as a gift from God-
something about God and His will. The God’s will is the only justification for our action.
It could happen in the dimensional meeting S God │ I, which is a synthetic a priori  event
analogous to the opening of new polar spaces. Everything could be transparent between
polar and supra-polar spaces. Strictly speaking, there was only one “noumenal entity” for
Heim, namely, the non-objectifiable “I,” that is, the epistemological subject. 17
According to Heim’s dimensional thinking, there is not only an epistemological
transcendental horizon between phenomena and noumena but also an ontological and
dimensional boundary that prevails between all kinds of spaces, both objectifiable and
non-objectifiable. This ontological boundary has epistemological consequences. Kant
artificially separated phenomena and noumena, and tried, in fact, to cross his own
shadow.18 Heim argued ontologically that reality is a polar unity with objectifiable and
non-objectifiable realms. In the same way knowledge and faith, theory and practice, facts
and values, cannot be separated because of two-dimensional time, Pp = ((I↔T)↔W) &
((I↔i)↔i) & ((i↔t)↔w). Kant’s epistemological separation of reality into the realms of
phenomena and noumena was, in fact, Platonic and dualistic, and it was based on his
incorrect conception of space-time that space and time are only forms inside the mind and
do not inhere in things-in-themselves. Heim argued instead, that reality is a monistic
unity, and that there are only dimensional relations between non-objectifiable subjects
and their objects, both of which exist in the same polar reality. He bracketed all
epistemological questions of empiricism and rationalism, and provided an impressive
ontological answer to them: the given structure of our world (not only of our minds) is
polar and dimensional within two-dimensional time.
Thus, the most crucial difference between Kant and Heim was a fundamentally
different concept of time. In Kant’s critical idealism, time was only a form of the mind,
17 GD, pp. 195-196, and GN, p. 231.
18 GD, p. 50.
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whereas in Heim’s dimensional thinking it was a two-dimensional space. Since Heim
published his work, all kinds of solutions based on a classical conception of time, are
misleading within the domains of epistemology and ontology. Time is no longer a
content of space.19
B. The Controversy between Idealism and Realism
I have argued that an important contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for
philosophy was the elimination of the controversy between the two philosophical world-
views of idealism and of realism. Heim had already emphasized in his book, Das
Weltbild der Zukunft(1904), that it is possible to eliminate all contradictions between
subject and object, perception and existence, as we have seen in Chapter I. This goal was
realized in his dimensional thinking, whose direct effect was the synthesis of idealism
and realism. Heim’s point of departure was the battle between metaphysical monism and
dualism, and he rejected their demands to be absolute. On the one hand, he argued that
what appears to be “dualism” might only be the difference between the polar reality and
supra-polar reality. His panentheism presupposes that reality is wholeness, “hyperspace,”
and not any dualistic “two-story house.”20
Heim proved that, like Kant’s critical idealism, the German idealism of Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel, the existentialism of Heidegger, the critical realism of Einstein, and
the quantum idealism of Heisenberg were also one-sided, being either idealistic or
realistic, and as such insufficient descriptions of reality. Only Schelling’s “ideal-realism”
was a quite similar endeavor to Heim, namely, to unify idealism and realism. Because
Heim’s dimensional thinking combined ontologically both objectifiable and non-
objectifiable reality, that is, the physical and eternal dimension of time, it was possible to
avoid epistemological controversy and oscillation between idealism and realism.
Heim agreed with Fichte’s “ontology of knowledge” that subject and object,
presentation and thing, belong inseparably together, and that “I” (“I am”) is the center of
reality. Like Fichte, Heim also claimed that a balance between the roles of subject and
19 GD, pp. 30-34, 46-51.
20 GD, pp. 15-34.
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object could be maintained. Nevertheless, he rejected the abstract principle of
subjectivity, the “I-myth,” of Fichte’s thinking.21 The objective world “it” in the totality
of its being and its operation cannot be any process of emergence from one’s self-
consciousness and its imaginative activities, or that the world could be constructed from
the self’s fundamental freedom, because, according to Heim, both the knower and the
known are “given,” and they exist in the same polar reality. Objects do not exist only as
objects in the mind or in the consciousness of “I.” Fichte believed that the noumenal self
expands infinitely to comprehend everything and do everything. Heim rejected these
speculations by emphasizing that there is a dimensional boundary between subject and
object, I/i, which cannot be eliminated. I am in the world, but I cannot construct the
world by putting something in it or make myself identical to the whole world, because of
the dimensional boundary and the polarity between spaces “I” and “i.” Even the
absolute, invariable, and eternal ego in its different modes of German speculative
idealism is not free from the polarity, either. W-space in Heim’s dimensional thinking is
a parallel concept with an absolute ego, but its existence is polar, because it is the eternal
condition of indifference of polar time-space, and dimensional inclusion (I&T) ⊂ W
prevails between “I” and “T.” W-reality (Werden) means “to be becoming,” but neither
“I” nor “T” can become “i” or “t,” and W-reality cannot become w-reality (Geworden),
“to be come,” because time is two-dimensional. The temporal or objectifiable dimension
and the eternal or non-objectifiable dimension of time-space are in dimensional and polar
relation with each other. It follows that the quality of eternality (W) cannot change,
evaporate, or emanate into temporality (w), and vice versa. Although time would be only
the classical and absolute one-dimensional space, as was believed in German idealism,
the speculations about making itself into both subject and object at the same time are not
possible, because of the universal law of non-contradiction: I cannot be both this and that
or here and there simultaneously.
Schelling believed that it was possible to prove the identity of transcendental
idealism and critical realism. He made parallel realism and idealism with the help of his
concept of polarity between the conscious and empirical ego and the unconscious and
21 GD, pp. 44, 98, 164, and GN, pp. 30, 45, 108,117.
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absolute ego within it. However, he, ignoring his own concept of the polarity, argued
that the free ego makes itself to be both subject and object. Heim rejected this
speculation as impossible. Schelling based the synthesis of realism and idealism on his
conception of self-consciousness as a steady, enduring juxtaposition of conscious and
unconscious activities, and as an ongoing translation from unconscious to conscious
activity of the primordial will. Heim agreed with Schelling’s ideas in part, but he
rejected its “I-myth” and conception of time. There are only two kinds of knowing and
willing egos, “I” and “T,” which are non-objectifiable, but not empirical and non-
empirical simultaneously. “I”-space, “T”-space, and “W”-space are the perspectival,
non-objectifiable, and eternal centers of the temporal “i”-space, “t”-space, and “w”-space.
Non-objectifiable spaces cannot change into objectifiable spaces, and vice versa, because
of polarity and two-dimensional time. 22
Like Hegel’s, Heim’s purpose was to clarify Kant’s transcendental idealism from
its epistemological solipsism. Kant had recognized the importance of the differences
between the transcendental ego and the empirical self or person and the metaphysical
notion of the soul, but he was not able to resolve their ontological relationship. Hegel’s
conception of “universal subject” was similar to Heim’s conception of “We-space,” but
its relationship to objects, “we-space,” was false because Hegel’s Geist was floating
above physical time. Hegel argued that our activities are as essential to the object of
knowledge as the object is to our knowledge. He believed that we are responsible for
producing the objects that we are apparently given. Heim rejected this speculation as
impossible. I-, T-, or We-spaces cannot produce or create i-, t-, or we-spaces, whose
perspectival centers they are. Moreover, there are dimensional boundaries between
spaces, whose opening occurs passively as an event of synthetic a priori , and polarity,
which absolutely relates subject and its object inseparably and simultaneously together.
Heim’s dimensional “unity and difference” and Hegel’s “unity in difference,” for
example, were similar, but Hegel’s absolute idealism ignored the role of time as their
unifying foundation. In his epistemology and ontology, the concept of time was for
Hegel as illusory as in Kant’s transcendental idealism.23
22 GN, pp. 146-154.
23 GD, pp.98-139, 162-168.
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Thus, the synthesis of idealism and realism is not an identity but the polar
relation within the two-dimensional time. Idealism and realism belong together as a
time-relation.
Like Heidegger, as was discussed in Chapter I, Heim argued that phenomenology
and ontology, phenomena and things-in-themselves, belong inseparably together but they
are not identical. Like Heidegger, Heim also argued against Husserl that it is impossible
to “bracket” existence, because our existence is essentially “being-in-the-world.” Both
human existence and the existence of the world around us are “given” as the starting
point of all phenomenological description. Like Heidegger, Heim emphasized that reality
is not only ontic but also ontological. The ontological dimension is “inside” the ontic
dimension of reality: (I & i) ⊂ i. However, the ego is not any internal object that inhabits
consciousness, as Heidegger believed. It is the non-objectifiable and perspectival center
of consciousness. Ontic reality does not evolve from the ontological reality of “Dasein.”
In spite of some similar features of conceptions of time in Heim and Heidegger’s
thought, their concepts of time were fundamentally opposing. Heidegger separated the
ontic, measurable, relative, and “inauthentic” time from the ontological, immeasurable,
personal, and “authentic” time, whereas Heim unified them. In addition, Heidegger’s
ontic time runs forward, and his ontological time runs backward, whereas Heim’s two -
dimensional time runs only forward. For Heidegger, the future as time was fundamental,
whereas for Heim, the present as nunc aeternum within physical time was more
fundamental than the future. Heidegger argued that “I am time, I have time, and I give
time,” whereas Heim stated, “I am in time.” Heim’s statement is ontologically the only
possible position, because “I am” represents the eternal dimension of time, and “in time”
its temporal dimension. Heidegger’s existentialism could not be the basis for unifying
idealism and realism, because his existential monism leads to ontological idealism and
epistemological solipsism, where the spatial and temporal relations between subject and
object evaporate in phenomenological immediacy, and existential subjectivity is prior to
external objectivity. The synthesis between idealism and realism is possible only based
on Heim’s concept of time, which unifies and separates the ontic and ontological
dimensions of time.
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As we have seen above in Chapter I, Einstein tried to reject phenomenalism by
accepting the position of critical realism. Yet, his SR was a theory of relations between
phenomenalistic events, rather than a theory of a real world behind sensations. Heim’s
dimensional thinking was largely based on Einstein’s SR, but as an ontological theory it
pertains to both phenomenalistic events and the physically real world behind such
phenomena. Einstein shifted into this position of realism after he had rejected Ernst
Mach’s positivism and accepted Max Planck’s critical realism. Thus, both Heim and
Einstein could avoid solipsism and subjectivism.
Einstein, as a critical physical realist, argued that the space -time continuum unites
space and time in a single, objective structure that exists independently of the structures
that move within it. Moreover, Einstein regarded physical reality as being independent of
the observer. Against Einstein, however, Heim argued that after SR and GR it is not
possible to divide reality into two different realms and to accept either the position of
idealism or realism, because they both belong inseparably together. Einstein had
described the basic laws of nature or the objectifiable reality of “i,” “t,” and “w,” but he
neglected to describe the non-objectifiable reality of the epistemological subjects, “I,”
“T,” and “W.” Moreover, Einstein did not realize the most fundamental law of the world,
namely, the law of polarity. His space-time continuum, w, was only the externally and
objectively real four-dimensional universe. Heim’s dimensional doctrine and its
dimensional inclusions, (i&t) ⊂ w, (I&i) ⊂ i and (I&T) ⊂ W, where the epistemological
subjects “I” and “T” are the non-objectifiable center points of physical reality, show that
Einstein’s theories were unfinished.24 Reality is not only a four-dimensional space-time
but also a five-dimensional time-space continuum, where time has two dimensions, the
objectifiable and temporal, and the non-objectifiable and eternal.
Einstein believed that if matter were to disappear, space-time alone would remain
eternally as a stage or field for physical happenings. Instead, Heim argued that reality as
polar entirety is an inseparable relational wholeness of all kinds of subjects and objects.
Even if the human subjects were to disappear, “T”-space continuums of type (4) would
24 Einstein had confessed to Rudolf Carnap that “what is now, worries me seriously” and that “there is
something essential about the now,” but expressed the belief that, whatever it was, it is “just outside the
realm of science.” See The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Library of Living
Philosophers, 1963), p. 37.
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still remain as centers of physical and phenomenal happenings. SR and GR explain only
the objectifiable side of reality, but they cannot explain its non-objectifiable side, as
Einstein’s battle with Niels Bohr proved. SR and GR were revolutionary, but regrettably,
Einstein could not find solution to the problems between his SR and QM, because his
concept of time was only one-dimensional and, as such incomplete.
Werner Heisenberg’s, partly epistemological and mostly ontological, thinking and
Heim’s dimensional thinking had some similar features. Both of them strongly rejected
materialistic reductionism, which was an endeavor to neglect the quantum boundary.
Heisenberg proved that it is impossible to overcome the quantum boundary between
matter and energy. However, Heim rejected Heisenberg’s phenomenalistic belief that
sub-atomic particles do not exist continuously between observations. For Heim, sub-
atomic energy was a potential but really existing entity that, as non-objectifiable,
belonged to the eternal dimension of time, W-reality. Yet, the effects of energy were
objectifiable and measurable because those belonged to the physical dimension of time,
W-reality. Subatomic particles existed continuously, but their discrete and statistical
character in any situation of measurements was caused by the dimensional boundary
between W- and G-realities.25
Heisenberg argued that even though rigid and absolute causality is valid in
macrophysics, it is invalid in microphysics because of his uncertainty principle. He
rejected determinism in favor of Fichte’s notion of possibility and voluntarism. He
believed that transcendental reality precedes physical reality, but that they are
complementarily in an “either-or” relation. Heim argued that they are not only
disjunctive but also simultaneously in a conjunctive relation of “both-and”, because of
two-dimensional time, where possibility and necessity, indeterminism and determinism,
are not complementary but “polar.” Heisenberg also believed that classical space and
time somehow disappear at the quantum boundary and make room for the indeterministic
probability functions of space-time, where these functions combine subjective and
objective elements. According to Heim, it is impossible that space-time disappears in
25 WnW, pp. 38-40, 130-133, 139-144.
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observational situations. Reality is a five-dimensional W-w-space, where time has two-
dimensions, and both dimensional boundary and polarity prevail between spaces.26
Heisenberg believed that atoms constitute a discontinuous, indeterministic world,
and therefore, subatomic reality must have a non-materialistic status, and the law of
bivalence is not valid in ontology. Heim, instead, argued that, because the core of an
electron is T-space of type (4), which means that it has some kind of unknowable will
and so belongs to W-reality as a non-objectifiable center of w-reality, there is no
discontinuity between W- and w-realities. When, for example, “i”-space open upon “I”-
space synthetically a priori , the principle of bivalence is not valid, because “either-or”
and “both-and,” necessity and possibility, are simultaneous.27
The formal structure of Heim’s dimensional world-view is quite similar to
Heisenberg’s three layers of reality: supra-polar reality, non-objectifiable polar reality,
and objectifiable polar reality. However, Heim’s dimensional doctrine requires not only
the position of idealism but also the position of realism. Idealism and realism belong
inseparably together, because of two-dimensional time. In addition, his law of universal
polarity necessarily implies the relation of idealism-realism, because this mental reality
cannot be without that physical reality, and vice versa.
C. The Mind-body Problem
The mind-body or mind-brain problem has again become a respectable subject of
investigation in contemporary philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and
neuroscience. It has been a battleground of the two opposing world-views, that of
monism and that of dualism. Dualists think that there are two fundamentally different
kinds of phenomena in the world, minds and bodies. Monists think that the world is
made of only one kind of stuff, minds or bodies. Dualists divide into “ substance
dualists” who think that mind and body are two kinds of substances, and “property
dualists” who think that the terms “mental” and “physical” name two kinds of properties
26 WnW, p. 53.
27 WnW, pp. 56-64.
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or features in a way that enables the same substance to have both kinds of properties at
once. Monists divide into “idealists” who think that everything is ultimately mental, and
“materialists” who think that everything is ultimately physical or material.28
During the long history of Western thought no one has found the ult imate solution
to this controversial problem. Biology and physiology have been able to explain some
things about the most complex object known in the universe, the brain, but the mind is
still unexplained. The issue is, can the mind be fully explained by the brain, or are they
separate entities? Moreover, what are the cellular events that compose the mind?29
Consciousness is not self-awareness or self-consciousness. I am conscious. This
means that consciousness is a “given,” something whose existence we cannot dispute. It
is located in the brain, but it is more than the brain. It is impossible that any material
collection of cells, no matter how large and intricately related, could generate
consciousness. A scientific materialist claims that there is nothing more to the mind than
neurons and their electrochemical activities. The neural processes are conscious
processes. However, if this kind of materialism is true, then I am only a “zombie”
deluded into believing that I am conscious, and I cannot know anything about another’s
mind. Thus, the “naïve materialist” is forced to introduce the idea of two different
appearances of the same fact. Therefore, the mind cannot be reduced to the brain, and the
human phenomenology is not reducible to physiology. The mind is not the brain.
Instead, an “emergent materialist” might argue that consciousness is based on neural
processes but is not identical to them. However, there is still the question, with what is
consciousness identical?
Dualism is the belief that there are some empirical and contingent relations or
parallels between brain and mind but no necessary link between them. There is no
possibility of reducing the mind to the brain, because they are separate realms. This
conception leads to two major problems within dualism. The first problem is the
28 Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York: Basic Books,
1999), pp. 18-29, and John R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness(New York: New York Review Books,
1997), pp. xi-xv, 135-144.
29 See Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature, ed. Warren
S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), especially,
Nancey Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues,” pp. 1-29, Malcom Jeeves,
“Brain, Mind, and Behavior,” pp. 73-98, and Nancey Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical
Issues,” pp. 127-148.
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“zombie” problem, in which dualism allows us to subtract the mind from the brain while
leaving the brain completely intact. This possibility implies an “epiphenomenalism” that
claims that mind does not matter, that it makes no difference what happens in the world,
because it does not cause behavior. My zombie twin behaves just like me but it has no
mind at all. The second problem is the “ghost” problem that is the converse of the
zombie problem. If the mind is separate from the body, then not only can the brain exist
without the mind but also the mind can exist without the brain. Thus, the so-called
“disembodiment” becomes a real possibility.
The problem of materialism is that it tries to construct the mind out of properties
that refuse to add up to the mind. The problem of dualism is that it cuts the mind off too
radically from the brain. Therefore, a third solution between materialism and dualism
must be found. Consciousness depends upon an unknowable natural property of the brain
that can be the right kind of mediation between the world and the mind. We need a
qualitative leap in our understanding of mind and brain.30
Solutions of the mind-brain problem have been mainly epistemological. Locke
thought that the mind is a blank slate, a “tabula rasa.” His idea was that intelligence is a
storage of memory, a mental warehouse, and a problem-solving devise. Hume held that
concepts are formed in the mind by a procedure of copying the impressions that the
subject receives from the environment. He argued that there is nothing in the mind that
was not previously in the senses. Thus, the Humean mind is a sensory photocopier.31
Leibniz, who rejected both materialism and dualism, gave a rationalistic solution to the
mind-body problem. He perceived that perception and consciousness could not be
explained mechanically, and, hence, they could not be physical processes. His point was
that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness must be truly one, a single
“I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one
and so cannot be regarded as a single “I” capable of being the subject of a unified mental
life.32
30 McGinn, The Mysterious Flame, pp. 1-29.
31 Ibid., pp. 37-46.
32 Kulstad and Carlin, “Leibniz’s Philosophy of Mind,” pp. 1-12.
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Leibniz’s argument against materialism was that whatever is divisible is not a true
unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence,
matter cannot explain, be identical with, or give rise to perception. Because matter
cannot explain perception, then materialism is false. Leibniz also rejected the dualism of
Descartes, who argued that the world fundamentally consists of two disparate substances:
extended material substance (body) and unextended thinking substance (mind). The
world of Leibniz consisted solely of one type of substance, though there are infinitely
many substances of that type. These substances are partless, unextended entities or
“monads.” Although the mind and the body are composed of the same kind of substance,
they are metaphysically distinct and non-causal but in a “preestablished harmony” with
each other. According to this harmony, no state of a created substance has some state of
another created substance; every non-initial, non-miraculous, state of a created substance
has, as a real cause, some previous state of that very substance; and each created
substance is programmed at creation in such a way that all its natural states and actions
are carried out in conformity with all the natural states and actions of every other created
substance. The real causal relation between mind and body is the mutual conformity or
coordination of mind and body in accordance with the third statement. Each monad is a
complete individual substance that contains all its features, its past, present, and future.
Each monad is also a complete individual substance whose being is independent of
everything else. There can be no interaction between substances, because they are
“windowless” spaces.33
There are, of course, all sorts of natural limitations in our intelligence because we
do not have sensory impressions of all things. The most crucial point of the mind-brain
problem is that we cannot see the mind, because it is the subject who sees and who is an
unobservable entity. Consciousness has a hidden structure, a secret underside, and a
covert essence, as, for example, Sigmund Freud perceived. It seems that there may be
three levels within the mind, that of the surface of consciousness, that of the hidden
structure of consciousness, and that of the unconsciousness, which is both affective and
computational. Consciousness enables us to perceive the world, but it is not itself a
33 Kemerling, “Leibniz: Logic and Harmony,” pp. 1-7.
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perceptible thing, because the mind may be non-spatial. Materialists reject non-spatiality
of the mind, and dualists accept it. In fact, minds are causally connected to matter in
space, so they cannot be entirely outside of space. They must belong to space in some
sense. The mind is a non-spatial relative to our current conception of space. Thus, the
mind-brain problem is not only the problem of the unknowable mind but also the problem
of an inadequate concept of space.34
Heim, by rejecting both materialism and dualism, led us to understand that a
serious solution to the mind-body problem was hidden in his new ontological and
dimensional “thinking in spaces.”35 He argued that consciousness is both a qualitative,
subjective “mental” phenomenon, and at the same time a natural part of the physical
world.36 In Heim’s dimensional doctrine, the mental phenomenon of self-consciousness
belongs to the objectifiable “i”-space, where “I”-space is the non-objectifiable
perspectival center of “i,” and between them prevails the dimensional inclusion: (I & i) ⊂
i. “I” and “i” are also in polar relation with each other, I ↔i, and between them prevails
the dimensional boundary, I/i. For example, I can know at least something about my
consciousness, because it belongs to objectifiable space, which is the physical dimension
of time. Nevertheless, I can never know anything about consciousness itself or “I” -
space, because it belongs to non-objectifiable space, which is the eternal dimension of
time. The seeing point cannot be seen. However, “I” and “i” belong inseparably together
as a polar reality. I can also dimensionally know something about your consciousness,
“t”-space, and even about the non-objectifiable “T”-spaces (both human and panpsychic)
if or when they open upon me. The definition of polar reality: W↔w = ((I↔T)↔W) &
((I↔i)↔i) & (i↔t)↔w) explains Heim’s solution to the mind-body problem. According
to it, the “mental” and subjective phenomena of “I” and “T” and their combination “W”
or W-reality are the qualitative and eternally present “becoming” pole of reality, and the
quantitative, physical, biological, and objective phenomena of “i” and “t” and their
combination “w” or w-reality are the natural and always past “become” pole of reality.
The ontic structure of w-reality is open to investigations of sciences, whereas the
34 McGinn, The Mysterious Flame, pp. 103-137.
35 GD, p. 51.
36 Heim’s position is quite similar to Searle’s “property monism,” found in The Mystery of Consciousness,
p. xiv. See also Murphy, “Human Nature” in Whatever Happened to the Soul? pp. 1-2.
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ontological structure of W-reality is not, because the knower and the known belong to the
two different dimensions of time, between which there is a dimensional boundary.
The main question of the mind -body problem, how the mind emerges from or is
caused by the brain, is misleading or at least one-sided, because, although the brain
processes “cause” states of consciousness, consciousness itself is not the only “emergent
property” of the brain but at the same time the always present epistemological, volitional,
and energetic center of the conscious brain. In Heim’s dimensional thinking, “either-or”
and “both-and” are simultaneous because of two-dimensional time.37
2. Contributions to Physics
In the first half of the twentieth century, scientists completely transformed the
study of physics. Physicists determined the internal structures of the atom, discovered
that mass could actually bend space and time, and found that the smallest known units of
mass and energy behaved paradoxically, both as waves and as particles. The scientific
advances in the second half of the twentieth century have for the most part simply applied
and extended the discoveries of the first half of the century. Max Born argued that the
great experiments and heroic theories have revolutionized our view of the physical world
and brought us closer to its underlying unity.38
From the viewpoint of physics, Heim’s dimensional doctrine was mostly based on
Einstein’s SR. Heim was less influenced by QM. He was interested in its principles of
indeterminacy and complementarity, but rejected the dualistic and idealistic conclusions
of Bohr and Heisenberg. For Heim, the principle of complementarity did not mean
dualism, but the polarity of intra-mundane reality. The indeterminacy principle of the
Copenhagen interpretation of QM made room for Heim’s conception of a two-
37 Heim did not investigate the mind-body problem as a separate problem in his work. See GD, pp. 162-
171, GN, pp. 30-145, and WnW, pp. 50-64, 88-94, 107-117, 141-144, 198-204, 218, 240-247. Heim
rejected the possibility that a “soul” could transmigrate. See GN, pp. 110-121, and chapter III.1. Instead,
he accepted the conception of “panpsychism,” which is space-type (4).
38 See Max Born, “Physics,” pp. 1-15. About the unity of knowledge, see Edward O. Wilson, Consilience.
The Unity of Knowledge(New York: Vintage Books, 1999), pp. 49-71. Heim’s WnWis a description of
this revolutionary development in physics in relation to theology and philosophy.
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dimensional time, in which the physical time-dimension is determined, and the eternal
time-dimension is undetermined. Heim’s dimensional thinking also provides some
interpretations of physics. It has a serious ontological solution to the peculiarities of QM
and an epistemological solution to its interpretations. The most valuable contribution of
Heim’s dimensional doctrine for physics is, however, its conception of two-dimensional
time.
A. Quantum mechanics
In order to understand the contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for QM
and its interpretations, we must first outline of the main problems in QM. Then we must
analyze some important philosophical interpretations of QM. Nils Bohr and Roger
Penrose are our two examples from the huge variety of interpreters, because they
represent “opposite” poles among the interpreters.39 After those analyses it is possible to
point at the contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for the philosophical problems
of QM.
According to physicists, reality could be described by classical and quantum
mechanical physics. In practice, classical physics describes phenomena on a large scale
with one set of laws applying at that level, and QM describes phenomena at the quantum
level of activity with one set of laws applying at it. Most physicists believe that some
day, if QM is understood fully, it will be possible to deduce classical physics from it.
Einstein saw the large-scale universe as a smooth, curved surface in four-
dimensional space-time. Gravitation arises from the structure of that space-time
continuum. The small-scale universe, on the other hand, is a collection of subatomic
particles that cannot be precisely located in space and time but only described in
statistical terms. The equations that describe extremely large gravitational fields are
completely different from, and indeed in conflicting with, those for electromagnetism and
subatomic interactions. Moreover, each theory is incomplete by itself. QM describes
39 See R.I.G. Hughes, The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), in which Hughes has analyzed 177 interpretations of QM.
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only an assortment of particles, mathematical constants and equations without fully
understanding the sense and symmetry underlying them all.
Roger Penrose has illustrated and explained the above-described situation of
physics in his book The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind. 40 Three makeup
constants are found in physics: the gravitational constant (G), the speed of light (c-1),41
and the Dirac-Planck constant (ħ). In Galilean physics, these all three constants are zero.
In Newtonian gravitational theory, G is a non-zero constant. If c-1 is non-zero, we get the
Poincarė-Einstein-Minkowski theory of SR. In Einstein’s GR both G and c-1 are non-
zero. Allowing ħ to be non-zero and G = c-1 = 0, we get the standard QM, and if c-1 is
also non-zero, we get Quantum field theory. A theory of everything (T.O.E.) may be
possible, if we could incorporate all three constants of physics to the Quantum theory of
gravity.
“Mysteries ”of QM are composed mainly of two types: puzzle mysteries (Z),
which are there in physical reality but not yet fully tested and understood, and paradox
mysteries (X), which indicate that the theory is somehow incomplete. The Z-mysteries
include a variety of phenomena, such as wave-particle duality, null measurements, spin,
and non-local effects. One of the most striking problems is “quantum non-locality” or
“quantum entanglement.”42 According to John Bell’s theorem, there is a conflict
between the expectations of QM concerning the joint probabilities of the results of
measurements at points A and B and any “local realistic model.” Penrose argues that in
the non-local effects, events occur at separated points A and B, but they are connected in
mysterious ways. They are entangled in such a way that there is no possibility of using
that entanglement to send a signal from A to B without breaking the consistency of QM
with GR, because it is impossible to send messages faster than light.
40 Roger Penrose (with Abner Shimony, Nancy Cartwright, and Stephen Hawking), The Large, the Small
and the Human Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 91. Fig. 2.22.
41 Penrose uses as a symbol of the velocity of light,”c-1,” instead of the usual symbol, “c.”
42 David Bohm has described it as a phenomenon in which a particle of spin 0 decays into two spin
particles. For example, an electron and positron, going off in opposite directions in two different
polarization states of “up” and “down.” The measurements at points A and B in any “local realistic” model
tells us that the electron is a thing at A, and the positron is another thing at B, and they are not connected in
any way. The measurement of the spin of the electron apparently instantaneously fixes the spin state of the
positron.
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The most essential X-mystery is the so-called “measurement problem,” which
occurs by crossing from the quantum level to the classical level: the rules change when
we magnify something. In other words, the problem arises from the fact that several
principles of physics appear to be in conflict. In particular, the dynamic principles of QM
seem to be in conflict with the postulate of collapse. The linear complex number
weighted superpositions of the quantum level no longer maintain, and the ratios of these
squared moduli become probabilities of two alternatives, but only in a situation of
measurement. The most famous example of this “collapse of the wave function” or
“reduction of the state vector” is “Schrödinger’s cat,” which could be in a state of being
both dead and alive at the same time.
Penrose also argues that Niels Bohr and, especially, his followers in the
Copenhagen school believed in QM, but they did not accept the state vector│Ψ > as
real, but only as the description of reality in the mind. This belief is based on the
viewpoint of “decoherence.”43, according to which, the quantum mechanical state as a
sum of all probability waves is changing continuously and looses its coherence when it
interacts with the external world. Because of decoherence, macroscopic things also
change quickly from one quantum state to another state so that the average of the
unstable probability waves is zero. Instead, the physicists who represent “many-world
view” take the state vector |Ψ> as real. In this view, “Schrödinger’s cat” is indeed both
alive and dead, but those “cats” somehow inhabit different universes. Louis de Broglie,
for instance, stated that the reduction of the state vector has some role to play beyond
standard QM, but no one would expect to find any new effects from QM. Penrose and
his followers also take very seriously the possibility that something new, which is now
missing from QM, will be discovered and change the structure of it. Something is wrong,
if the principle of superposition applies to significantly differing space-time geometries.44
Niels Bohr oscillated between realism and idealism in his debates with Einstein.
As was discussed in Chapter I, Einstein was committed to the position of critical physical
realism. Bohr saw epistemological problems in Einstein’s traditional views of classical
realism and shifted to a position closer to the quantum idealism of Heisenberg. My
43 About “decoherence,” see Enqvist, Olemisen porteilla, pp. 205-218.
44 About the mysteries of QM, see Penrose, The Large, pp. 50-92.
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analysis will now focus on Bohr’s “neo-classical” interpretation of quantum mechanical
problems and on his epistemological solution for them.45
Quantum mechanical problems occur when physicists try to deduce classical
physics from QM. Bohr realized that physicists must use the laws of either the classical
level or the quantum level, because one set of laws applies at the quantum level and
another set of laws applies at the classical level. Bohr tried to avoid this situation by
communicating between those two levels. Thus, it was necessary somehow to combine
idealism and realism. His solution was a new definition of realism explained with the
concept of “complementarity.” It is in principle a very close conception with a form of
experimentally limited operationalism and positivistic idealism. Bohr believed that in
any situation of measurement, the “state vector” is not actually in the world but in the
mind of the observer, and the objective reality of the physical properties is evoked by the
act of observation. Therefore, his complementarity is a kind of interaction of realism and
idealism.
Bohr maintained that the physical properties of quantum systems depend upon
experimental conditions in a fundamental way, including conditions of measurement. He
stated that if quantity Q is measured in system S at time t then Q has a particular value in
S at t. Instead of taking the dependence of properties upon experimental conditions to be
causal in nature, he proposed an analogy with the dependence of relations of simultaneity
upon frames of reference postulated in Einstein’s SR. Like temporal relations in SR,
quantum properties in QM exhibit a hidden relationalism from a classical Newtonian
point of view. Einstein rejected this argument of analogy, arguing instead that under
ideal conditions, observations function like mirrors reflecting an independently existing
reality. Einstein’s position means that physical reality is objective. Reality is
independent of any measurement. Reality passively reflects rather than actively
constitutes that which is observed. One can say that Bohr’s position was close to Kant’s
ideas, whereas Einstein’s position was closer to that of Descartes and Locke.46
There is a methodological and epistemological boundary between the quantum
level and the classical level. Bohr argued that there is no reason to hope that we may
45 See also Morrison, Einstein, Kant, Tillich, pp. 193-226.
46 See Henry Krips, “Measurement in Quantum Theory,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu, 1999), pp. 1-13, and J. Polkinghorne, Science & Theology,pp. 25-34.
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someday achieve a more complete description of the phenomena at the quantum level.
The epistemological lesson of QM is that reality is not only physical but also phenomenal
or mental. Objectivity at the quantum level means the ordering and description of
experiences of reality during interactions between observational systems and sub-atomic
processes. Specific properties of momentum and position in sub-atomic particles are
unknown, and, hence, they are objectively real only during the measurement of either
momentum or position but not both at the same time. The dynamic unity of subject and
object and its existence is apparently discontinuous. Heisenberg’s principle of
indeterminacy or uncertainty and the problems of observation forced him into a
methodological dualism and to an epistemological synthesis by the principle of
complementarity. The doctrines of indeterminacy and uncertainty restore some room for
notions of freedom in the conceptions of reality generated by QM, but at the same time,
they rejected the principles of bivalency and causality. From the creative unity of the
phenomenon between subject and object followed the rejection of Einstein’s critical
realistic position and oscillation between the positions of realism and idealism.47
The position of Roger Penrose is a quantum version of physicalism. However, he
is also an idealist. In his metaphysical world-view, there are three layers of reality. He
believes that we live in the physical, mental, and mathematical worlds. The physical
world attaches to the mental world, which in turn attaches to the mathematical world, and
the mathematical world is the base of the physical world and so on around the  circle. The
most fundamental reality is mathematical. Penrose believes that the physical world in a
sense emerges from the Platonic world of mathematics and from the mental world. In
principle, the entire physical world can be described in terms of mathematics. Therefore,
mathematical physics is the correct starting point for understanding the nature of
consciousness.48
47 Henry J. Folse, Philosophy of Niels Bohr: The Framework of Complementarity (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1985), p. 7, argues that Bohr was more realist than idealist. Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New
Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics (New York: Penguin, 1991), p. 226, argues
that Bohr’s interpretation of QM provides merely a calculational procedure, and does not attempt to
describe the world as it actually is. According to Jaki, Limits, pp. 40-41, the fallacy of Copenhagen
interpretation of QM was the jumping from the operational to the ontological level, the denial of causality
as a consequence.
48 Penrose, The Large, pp. 93-139. See also Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, pp. 87-88, Malcom
Longair, “Foreword,” in R. Penrose, The Large, pp. xi-xviii, and Abner Shimony, “On Mentality, Quantum
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Penrose’s ideal physicalism seems to resolve some problems of QM. His theory
is a framework deploying such concepts as “state,” “observable,” “superposition,”
“transition probability,” and “entanglement.” It is applied successfully to two different
ontologies: the ontology of particles in the standard non-relativistic QM of electrons,
atoms, molecules and crystals, and the ontology of fields in QED, quantum
chromodynamics, and general quantum field theory. Penrose also tried to explain mental
phenomena in physicalistic ontology through a delicate employment of quantum
concepts. However, the problems of the actualization of potentialities and that of
measurement are X-mysteries for him. The linear dynamics of QM precludes
actualization by means of measurement. Penrose is skeptical about all attempts to
explain these mysteries. The theory of many-world, decoherence, hidden variables, and
so on, could not explain at what stage in a process of measurement the unitary evolution
of the quantum state breaks down, and at what stage its actualization occurs. Is the stage
physical in which a macroscopic system is entangled with a microscopic object, or a
stage in which the metric of space-time is entangled with a material system, or is the
stage mental occurring in the mind of the observer? Penrose hypothesizes that
actualization must be a physical process, due to the instability of a superposition of two
or more states of the metric of space-time. The greater the difference in energy among
the superposed states, the shorter the lifetime of the superposition. But he also needs the
superposition of the brain. Altogether, Penrose believed that the problems of QM are
solvable, if we could discover a new theory. 49
Heim was familiar with the beginning and earliest development of QM until 1958.
He prudently realized the possibilities for a new worldpicture that was provided by QM.
He described the discoveries of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac, de
Broglie, and Pauli, among others.
Heim did not explicitly argue that his dimensional doctrine had any solution for
QM and the epistemolog ical problems found in its Copenhagen interpretation. He stated
that his new ontology had some epistemological contributions, but he did not name his
Mechanics, and the Actualization of Potentialities,” in Penrose, The Large, pp. 144-160. Shimony argues
that Penrose is “an alpinist who has tried to climb the wrong mountain.”
49 Serge Haroche in “Entanglement, Decoherence and the Quantum/Classical Boundary” Physics Today
(July 1998), pp. 36-42, proposes that it might be a “mesoscopic theory” between the macrocosmos and the
microcosmos, in which decoherence occurs but slowly enough to be observed.
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targets. The contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for QM not only applies to the
epistemological problems of Bohr but also to the ontological problems of Penrose.
Like Bohr, Heim argued that reality has not only physical but also mental
properties that lead to epistemological problems. Whereas Bohr tried to resolve such
problems by a methodological dualism, that is, by his principle of complementarity,
Heim argued it is not necessary to presuppose that reality is epistemologically dualistic.
The point of departure for Heim was ontological monism, a “real-idealism” in which
“physical” and “mental,” “physicalistic” and “phenomenalistic” properties form one polar
reality. Bohr’s complementarity principle seems to be insufficient, because he could not
avoid oscillation between realism and operationalistic idealism. Heim had a similar
problem in that he oscillated between idealism and realism, as was discussed in Chapter
III, but his concept of polarity is better than Bohr’s quite similar concept of
complementary, because it does not presuppose that reality is dualistic.
The quantum boundary between the quantum level and the classical level of
reality is not only epistemological, as Bohr believed. According to Heim’s dimensional
doctrine, it is also an ontological and dimensional boundary between two infinite and
limitless spaces: the non-objectifiable and objectifiable spaces of reality. The problems
of QM are consequences of the dimensional boundary. In an experimental situation the
problem is not the “entering” from the classical level to the quantum level or vice versa,
which occurs within a space, but the “confrontation” or “meeting” between two polar
spaces: the objectifiable w-reality and the non-objectifiable W-reality, within our five-
dimensional world, where time is two-dimensional. The objectifiable, temporal, and
physical w-reality is the object of measurements and observations of physicists (“I” or
“T”). Physicists, thus, exist in the non-objectifiable and eternal W-reality, but are at the
same time, the perspectival centers of w-reality. The “I”-space and “T”-space of
physicists are space-type (3), but there are also “T”-spaces of type (4), namely,
panpsychic spaces. Therefore, physicists do not confront or meet only sub-atomic objects
but also non-objectifiable “T”-spaces, which at the same time are non-objectifiable
centers of w-reality. Matter is not only made up of infinitely divisible particles but also
of energetic events or processes, whose effects are objectifiable, but the energy itself is
non-objectifiable. In this quantum mechanical confrontation of measurement and
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observation, between “I”-space and “T”-spaces of the sub-atomic events, prevails the
dimensional boundary, which can be crossed only passively, if the new and unknown
“T”-spaces open upon us in a synthetical a priori event.
The “passive opening” of spaces in Heim’s dimensional doctrine differs from
Bohr’s ideas of a constituting role of physicist in the situation of measurement. Instead,
it is quite similar with Einstein’s phenomenon of “mirroring”. Einstein contented that
under ideal conditions, observations and measurements function like “mirrors” or
“camera obscura” reflecting an independent reality. When a direct measurement of
physical reality occurs it merely passively reflects rather than actively constitutes that
which is observed.50
According to Heim, reality is not discontinuous, as Bohr believed, but continuous
and holistic: natura non facit saltus , not quantum jumping, either. Thus, Heim’s solution
was ontological holism. According to ontological holism, there are physical objects that
are not wholly composed of basic physical parts. Views of Bohr, Bohm and others may
be interpreted as endorsing some version of this thesis. In no case is it claimed that any
physical object has non-physical parts. The idea is rather that some physical entities that
we take to be wholly composed of a particular set of basic physical parts are in fact not so
composed. Instead, Heim argued that physical objects really have non-physical parts.
The core of every physical particle is the non-objectifiable T-space, pure energy. 51
There are many similarities between the world-views of Penrose and Heim. For
example, the fundamental reality of Penrose is mathematical. Mathematical reality is
“supra-polar” because there is no polarity within mathematics. The fundamental reality
of Heim was also supra-polar, namely, the supra-polar space of God. However,
according to Heim, it is not necessary to postulate any supra-polar reality for solutions to
quantum mechanical puzzles and paradoxes. Those problems are solvable only within
polar reality. Penrose awaits the emergence of a new theory from the Platonic sphere, or
he hopes that someone will discover it in the near future. Heim also believed that
physical reality could be described in terms of mathematics. For Heim it was possible
50 See Krips, “Measurement in Quantum Theory,” in Stanford Encyclopedia, p.3.
51 GD, pp. 98-139, GN, p. 91, and WnW, pp. 198-247. See Richard Healey, “Holism and Nonseparability in
Physics,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu, 1999), pp. 1-19.
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from the five-dimensional perspective, where time has two dimensions, the eternal and
the physical.
The problem is, however, what kind of mathematics is valid for describing
consciousness and free will. Penrose argues that because consciousness, and in the same
sense also the quantum level of reality, is non-computational or non-algorithmic, it is
impossible to apply any kind of mathematics for describing mental phenomena.
According to Heim’s dimensional doctrine, it is not necessary to explain the unity of
consciousness via quantum mechanical coherence. Instead, ontological categories of the
objectifiable and non-objectifiable spaces, the dimensional boundary, and the polarity
between spaces could describe both physical and mental reality as an interaction within
two-dimensional time.
Like Kant, Bohr described “non-objectifiable” reality and capacities of the mind
in the microphysical quantum level. Einstein described “objectifiable” reality of the
physical, classical level. Both descriptions are incomplete alone. Penrose tried to
combine both, but he could not resolve the problem without a proper concept of time.
B. Two-dimensional Time
Heim’s dimensional thinking and his conception of time are ontological.
Therefore, we must at first analyze some metaphysical problems of time. Heim’s
conception of time is also physical in the same sense as it was for Einstein. Therefore,
we must next analyze Einstein’s time and its consequences in physics. In addition, the
only two-dimensional theory of time currently discussed in physics is a superstring
theory: the so-called F-theory. Therefore, I shall describe its conception of time. Then
we can review the revolutionary treatment of Heim’s two-dimensional time to the
discussion about time among philosophers and scientist.
There have been three paradigmatic topics about time in philosophical enquiry:
change, causation, and possibility.52 It is commonly accepted that only time, not space, is
52 See The Philosophy of Time, ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993). (Next abbreviated: PT).
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the dimension of change. On the one hand, genuine change involves temporal variation
in the properties of things. On the other hand, it seems that time itself also changes,
“passes,” or “flows.” It is the “always changing” event: the future is becoming the
present, and the present is changing into the past. Change is an event that happens only
in the present time, and this process is just the change of the motion and acceleration of
time. It is the change that goes on in the event while it is occurring. A presentness of an
event is its happening, as opposed to its having happened or being about to happen.
Therefore, the things that change are existing things. Time also exists because it can be
infinitely long or short as future-present and past-present. The present itself is only a
point of the flux of time, not in a metaphorical but in a factual sense.53
Another issue follows from the ontological difference between the past and the
future. Past individuals are as real as presently existing ones, but individuals of the future
cannot be thought of as real. The ontological difference between the past and the future
suggests that reality expands in the flux of time. More facts are added to the totality of
facts. J.M.E. McTaggart believed unusually, that, time is unreal, and therefore, he
rejected facts. He argued that the concept of time is so riddled with contradiction that it
makes more sense to suppose that time does not exist at all. Impressions of temporality
are mere human inventions. How can time move in time?54
Time is also understood without change. Temporal relationists believe that time
is only the measure of change, as Aristotle thought. It itself does not change. Leibniz,
for instance, thought that simultaneous temporal relations can be logically analyzed as the
timeless properties of individual monads, and time itself is unreal, although it cannot be
empty. Leibniz’s position is a form of reductionism. A solution for the possibility of
empty time is that time is regarded as a possibility of temporal location. Therefore, the
relationist project is an attempt to reduce instants to some other category.55
Temporal relations are not only definable in terms of change but also in terms of
causal relations. The main point in causal theories of time is that time as a temporal
becoming is asymmetric, deterministic, and continuous: if A causes or is among the
53 Arthur N. Prior, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things,” in PT, pp. 35-46.
54 See R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, “Introduction,” in PT, pp. 2-4, J.M.E. McTaggart, “The Unreality
of Time,” in PT, pp. 23-34, and Paul Davies, About time, p. 254.
55 Graeme Forbes, “Time, Events, and Modality,” in PT, pp. 80-95.
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causes of B, then B does not cause or is not among the causes of A, and A is sufficient
cause for effect B. The asymmetry of time also entails that time has a direction because
causation has a direction. Time is the dimension of causality, and therefore, time cannot
be empty. The direction of asymmetric time means also that time travel is impossible, as
already Hume argued. Michael Dummett argues it is possible to imagine that there are
causes that are simultaneous with their effects, and it may even be possible for the effects
to precede their causes.56 Yet within one-dimensional time we cannot affect the past,
because it is determined: any statement about the past has a determined truth-value. The
future, instead, being unreal, is not yet determined. There is no fact about whether A will
exist tomorrow, so anything I do now could make a difference for the future. If there are
no ontological differences between the present and the future, then future-tense
statements have a determined truth-value. Rejection of temporal becoming is therefore a
rejection of free will.
The question, “Is it possible to escape the constraints the unchangeable direction
of time places us?” has been the subject of many speculations during the histories of
philosophy and of physics. Because it is possible to move freely in space, is it ridiculous
to hope that we will some day move as freely backwards and forwards also in one -
dimensional time? Time travel is possible if some kind of causal loops occur, or if time
is a two-dimensional temporality. If time were a two-dimensional physical space of
plane, then it would be possible also to move side ways on time. However, if the present
is ontologically privileged or time is unreal, then there is nothing for the time-traveler to
visit.57
Time might be topologically closed, which means that every event is both before
and after every other event. It is possible only if time is a two-dimensional plane. On the
two-dimensional spherical surface of the earth every place is, analogously, both to the
west and to the east of every other place. In a closed-time world, there could also be
causal loops, and time would have no direction. In fact, this kind of world could be a
fourth spatial dimension rather than a second dimension of time.
56 Michael Dummett, “Bringing about the Past,” in PT, pp. 117-133. For the same reason, Heim argued
that time must be two-dimensional.
57 PT, pp. 6-10, and David Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” in PT, pp. 134-146.
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Murray MacBeath believes that certain “gedanken experiments” would support
the hypothesis that time really can be at least topologically two-dimensional. He asks
why we assume that time has only a one-dimensional topology. Are there any a priori
reasons in favor of the view? He defines dimensionality as follows: “a space has n
dimensions if there are n respects in which its occupants can, qua occupants of that space,
vary continuously but independently.” He also referred to Cantor, who proved that there
are as many points on a line as in a plane, so that the two sets of points can be paired off
one-to-one. Thus, our three-dimensional space could be only two- or one-dimensional
without losing any point! However, if causal relations define the temporal relationship of
time-space, it is impossible that the occupants of that space could vary in more than one
causal respect. Every causal space is, thus only uni-dimensional, and therefore, physical
time is also uni-dimensional.58
Finally, time could be described as modal terms. Modal statements about time
could take the forms: “necessarily p” or “possibly p.” Those statements represent
“alethic” modality, as opposed “deontic” modality (what ought to be the case) or
“epistemic” modality (what might for all we know be the case). “Necessarily p” means
that p is true in all possible worlds, and “possibly p” means that p is true at least in some
world. The future is just a set of possible worlds, so the flux of time is the passage from
the possible to the necessary. The link between the logic of possibility and the logic of
time has been very close. However, there are some epistemological and ontological
difficulties when modality is introduced to a causal theory of time. If causality is the
mechanism by which we have knowledge of temporal relations, then there is some
epistemological motivation for a non-modal causal theory of time. One might ask, why it
is necessary to base causal relations on the possibility between events and not the actual
temporal relations between them. It is only because time exists between two events that
there is the possibility of change between those events. Modality, like time, is an obscure
notion. It is not at all apparent that, by defining the second in terms of the first, we have
clarified our ideas of either modality or time.59
58 Murray MacBeath, “Time’s Square,” in PT, pp. 183-202.
59 PT, pp. 11-16.
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There are many topological difficulties between time and modality. Is the
structure of time necessary or contingent? Aristotle argued in favor of necessity, but
Hume in favor of contingency. Hume also argued that time is not continuous but
composed of discrete instants. Kant placed time into the mind as a form of pure reason
without any physical dimension. Heidegger believed that ontic time runs forward, but
ontological time goes backwards. W.H. Newton-Smith emphasized that because of
philosophical difficulties, the topology of bounded or unbounded time is a matter to be
settled empirically, and so belongs to physicists rather than to, for example, philosophers
whose arguments are only “gedanken experimental fantasies.”60
For Aristotle time was motion and, as such, only a measure of change. Galileo
discovered that time is a measurable quantity. Newton’s time was absolute, true, and
mathematical, which of itself and from its own nature, flows without relation to anything
external. Material bodies move through space along predictable paths, subject to forces
that accelerate them in accordance with strict mathematical laws. The universe was a
gigantic mechanism of clock, predictable in every detail by the universal and absolute
time. Time was simply there, and nothing could affect it. Newtonian time is calculus:
the precise and continuous flux of the succession of universally present moments.
Leibniz opposed this conception and argued that time is relative and as such an illusion.
Newton’s conception was finally rejected by Einstein’s flexible and relative time 150
years later. Time became space. No longer is it possible to talk of time, but only the time
of the individual observer depending on how s/he is moving. Einstein’s GR describes
gravity not as a  mysterious  mechanical force operating at a distance but as a warping of
space-time by the mass and energy in it, as acceleration that depends on the curvature of
space-time. Mass tells space-time how to curve, and space-time tells mass how to move,
but not at the same time.61
60 W.H. Newton-Smith, “The Beginning of Time,” in PT, pp. 168-182. “Gedanken experiments” are,
however, as usual in physics as in philosophy. For example, Einstein created his theories of relativity only
gedanken experimentally. GR was proved years later by physical experiments.
61 See Davies, About Time,pp. 16-17, 29-33, 40-44, 51-55, 279-283, Richard P. Feynman, Six not-so-easy
Pieces, pp. 93-109, Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, The Nature of Space and Time (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996), and Wolfgang Gebhardt, “Physikalische und astronomische Aspekte der
Zeit,” in GDJ, 1999, pp. 89-98.
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Physicists have tried to explain the mysteries of time in the theories of GR and
QM by describing the same physical time at two different levels. The most peculiar
problem of both descriptions had been “simultaneity.”62 Prior to Einstein’s SR, it was
generally believed that simultaneity was absolute: there was a unique event at location A
that was simultaneous with a given event at location B. Einstein argued that it is
necessary to make the following assumption in order to be able to compare the times of
occurrence of events at spatially separated locations: the definition of so-called “standard
synchrony.” Standard synchrony can be described in terms of a “gedanken experiment”
in which the spatial locations A and B are fixed locations in a particular and arbitrary
inertial frame of reference. For example, let a light ray, traveling in vacuum, leave A at
time t1 (as measured by a clock at rest there), and arrive at B coincident with the event E
at B. Let the ray be instantaneously reflected back to A, arriving at time t2. Standard
synchrony is then defined by saying that E is simultaneous with the event at A that
occurred at time (t1 + t2)/2. This definition is dependent on the requirement that the one-
way speeds of the ray be the same on the two segments of its round-trip journey between
A and B.
Hans Reichenbach, for instance, has argued in favor of Einstein’s thesis that the
choice of standard synchrony is a convention rather than necessity of facts about physical
reality. According to Reichenbach, the only non-conventional basis for claiming that two
distinct events are not simultaneous would be the possibility of a causal influence
connecting the events. However, no causal influence can travel faster than the velocity of
light in a vacuum. Therefore, any event at A whose time of occurrence is in the open
interval between t1 and t2 could be defined to be simultaneous with E: t1 + ε (t2 – t1),
where 0 < ε < 1. The thesis of conventionality asserts that any particular choice of ε
within its stated range is a matter of convention.63
62 Allen I. Janis, “Conventionality of Simultaneity,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(http://plato.stanford.edu, 1998), pp. 1-12, and Davies, About Time,pp.65-67, 70-77.
63 Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space & Time,pp. 165-177, argued that there are no common
“nows,” only inconsistent and conventional simultaneity between A and B. According to R. Lehti, “The
Concept of Space in Relativity and Cosmology,” pp. 12-15, Einstein explained the Lorentz-contraction
epistemologically, when he argued that a universal simultaneity is not possible. However, Lorentz-
contraction is not epistemological but physical and ontological question. Heim argued ontologically that
there is the common and absolute “now,” which is the second dimension of time.
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Since the conventionality thesis rests upon the existence of the fastest causal
signal, the existence of arbitrarily fast causal signals would refute the thesis. Those
possible particles are called “tachyons,” 64 if they could move with arbitrarily high
velocities in consistence with the mathematical formalism of SR. The velocity of light in
a vacuum is an upper limit to the possible speeds of ordinary particles, so-called
“bradyons,” but it is a lower limit to the speeds of tachyons. When a transformation is
made to a different inertial frame of reference, the velocities of both bradyons and
tachyons change. At any instant, the speed of a bradyon can be transformed to zero and
the speed of a tachyon can be transformed to an infinite value. Bradyons move forward
in time, whereas tachyons may be or may not be. The possibility that tachyons in one-
dimensional time could also move backwards leads to causal anomalies: a tachyon signal
could be emitted by an observer and returned to that observer at an earlier time. SR does
not imply that I can jump into my own future, only into some one else’s. Moreover, I
cannot, by changing my state of motion, alter my here-and-now, only my there-and-now.
The simultaneity, like motion, is relative, depending on the reference. If “there” is far
enough away, it is possible that my here-and-now jumps either into the future or the past
of an event E that takes place “there,” depending on whether I am moving towards or
away from “there” at the time.65
Einstein’s GR implies that the universe and time must have a beginning, and
possibly an end. Causality determines that time must have a direction and that it is
irreversible. The laws of thermodynamics verify the law of causality at least in the
macrocosmos. The second law of thermodynamics determines that every closed system
tends toward a state of total disorder. Entropy measures the degree of disorder in a
system. Total entropy can never decrease; at best, it could remain the same. Time is an
asymmetric quantity.
GR also implies that time is warping. Because a gravitational field is associated
with warping time, it tells us how much time is dilated at each point in space. An infinite
64 About “tachyons,” see, for example, Paul Davies, About Time, pp. 79-80, 178, 234-235, 280. Einstein’s
SR does not say that nothing can go faster than light but that nothing can cross the light barrier. The
velocity of tachyons can be superluminal but not slower than light.
65 Janis, “Conventionality of Simultaneity,” in Stanford Encyclopedia, pp. 8-9, and Davies, About Time, pp.
70-71.
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time warp could occur in a “black hole,” from which light would not be able to escape
because of the infinite density of that space-time singularity. The event horizon of the
space-time singularity is the boundary to time itself. It is possible that a singularity, the
“Big Bang,” was once the spontaneous origin of time, and in black hole singularities
and/or “Big Crunch” might be the end of time.66
At the quantum level of reality there is another basic limit that introduces an
irreducible fuzziness to the notions of speed, rate, and time: Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. Uncertainty in energy can be traded for uncertainty in time, but it is impossible
to eliminate both indeterminacies simultaneously. To explain the so-called “tunneling
effect” using uncertainty of energy-time, it is supposed that a particle is permitted to
“borrow” energy for overcoming the energy barrier. Although it is not possible in
general to say when tunneling actually happens in QM, it may be possible to measure
how long it took. However, there is no absolute clock in QM, because all physical clocks
are subject to quantum uncertainty, Einstein’s time is not Newton’s time but flexi-time,
and time itself will be subject to quantum effects.67
When physicists have nothing more to say about physical time, and when they
come closer to a “now” point, they shift from physics to metaphysics, and start
speculating about the mystery of time. I have noted above that Einstein was seriously
worried about the “now.” He thought that it was a question that lies beyond science.68
Eddington, instead, thought that our impression of becoming, of a flowing time, is so
powerful and central to our experience that it must correspond to something in the
objective world. He argued, “If I grasp the notion of existence because I myself exist, I
grasp the notion of becoming because I myself become. It is the innermost Ego of all
which is and becomes.” Eddington thought that we experience time in two distinct ways:
externally through the senses and internally within the soul.69 Penrose has thought
similarly that there is a discrepancy between our minds and the theories about the reality
of the physical world. This fact is telling us something about physics that presumably
66 Davies, About Time, pp. 33-35, 106-125, 131-132. I will later analyze the beginning and the end of time
from the viewpoint of creation and eschatology.
67 Ibid., pp. 163-182.
68 See page 155, note 24.
69 A.S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), p.
97.
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must underlie our conscious perceptions. Paul Davies agrees with Eddington and
Penrose that something important is missing from the physics of time. There must be “an
inner sense of time buried deep within human consciousness, intimately associated with
our sense of personal identity and our unshakable conviction that the future is still ‘open,’
capable of being molded by our chosen actions.”70
Einstein proved that time is part of the physical word and presented his theories
that interweave time with space and matter, but his revolution was unfinished. There is
also a promising theory for a solution of the puzzles of space-time in physical reality,
namely, the theory of superstrings.71 Edward Witten has claimed that the superstring
theory will dominate the world of physics for the next fifty years, because superstring
theory will lead to a new understanding of what space and time really are, the most
dramatic understanding since GR. Ironically, although string theory has the potential to
be the most predictive theory that physicists have ever constructed, they have yet to be
able to make predictions with the precision necessary to confront experimental data. In
fact, no one has even seen these strings, because they are much too small to be observed,
about ten billion billion times smaller than a proton.72
Since the1980s, superstring theory has split into five theories: Type I theory, Type
IIA theory, Type IIB theory, Heterotic type 0(32) theory (pronounced “oh-thirty-two”),
and Heterotic type E8 xE8 theory (pronounced “e-eight times-e-eight”). It is clear that not
all different types of the superstring theory could be the true T.O.E. Therefore, physicists
and mathematicians have been developing such new theories as M-theory (eleven-
dimensional) and F-theory (twelve-dimensional), in which so-called “supergravity”
(SUGRA), a field theory and the low-energy approximation of string theories, is the basic
part. Supergravity seems to work in the eleven- or twelve-dimensional space, but nothing
is really known of the structures of these theories. It seems that M-theory, those five
theories of superstrings, and a sixth theory, eleven-dimensional supergravity, might be
unified in a larger framework, in which between M and other theories prevails some kind
70 Davies, About time,p. 276.
71 See Kaku and Thompson, Beyond Einstein. The Cosmic Quest for Theory of the Universe(New York:
Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1995), and Kaku, Hyperspace. A Scientific Odyssey Through Parallel
Universes, Time Warps, and the 10th Dimension (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1995), and Brian
Greene, The Elegant Universe. Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999).
72 Kaku, Beyond Einstein, pp. 3-4. Green, The Elegant Universe, p. 211.
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of duality or polarity. However, much of the true nature of M-theory and F-theory
remains mysterious. M-theory may be the theory of ten spatial dimensions and one-
dimensional time or something else.73 According to Christopher M. Hull, M-theory
might be the theory of ten spatial dimensions and two time-dimensions. Cumrun Vafa,
among others, is developing F -theory, where there are just ten spatial dimensions and two
time dimensions. If time is two-dimensional, it is like the waves of the ocean on which
we can swim forwards, backwards, and sidewards. The old one-dimensional and linear
flow of time may be only an illusion in our minds. However, superstring theory in its
different modes has not been able to resolve what kind the second or other possible
dimensions of time really are. Therefore, some theorists suggest that space and time are
superfluous or illusions. A new kind of physics looms on the horizon, where space and
time will merge completely.74
There is neither a philosophical nor a scientific theory that could yet explain what
is time itself. Something vital remains missing. Some quality of time has been left out of
the equations, or there may be more than one sort of time. Throughout the history of
philosophy and physics, the main source of the confusion and contradictions about time
has been the presupposition that time is either only a finite or infinite one-dimensional
temporality, or that it is unreal and thus does not exist at all. Einstein plucked time from
philosophy and placed it at the heart of physics, but he left things in a curiously
unfinished state. In fact, he looked at time from the perspective of his theories of
relativity, not from the perspective of time itself, that is, from the perspective of ontology
73 Green, The Elegant Universe, pp. 182-183, 283-319, and Kaku, Introduction to Superstrings and M-
Theory (Second Edition. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1999), p. 542-544. For criticism about M-theory,
see, for example, Stanley L. Jaki, God and Cosmologists, pp. 258-259, according to which, the logic of M-
theory is esoteric: “M” means “membrane,” but may also mean “magic” or “mystery.”
74 A theoretical physicist Julian Barbour argues in his heavily speculative The End of Time. The Next
Revolution in Physics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) that while the laws of physics create the
powerful illusion that the flow of time is real, there is increasing evidence that the universe is in fact
timeless and motionless. He believes that the structures of the universe are static, while giving rise to the
appearance of the flow of time. However, Barbour’s theory cannot prove why we experience temporality
or why nature creates the impression of linear time, which is reversible, and historical time, which is
irreversible. His theory is based on a metaphysical presupposition that reality must be timeless. His
immeasurable “time capsules” or “nows” are quite similar to Heim’s second, eternal dimension of time.
The difference is that Barbour talks about many “nows” and Heim only about one now: the absolute
simultaneity. The flaw of Barbour’s theory is that, because it has no physical, measurable time-space (it is
only illusion), it cannot explain reality. In fact, the term “nows” presupposes that time exists. It is a
temporal distance between now-points.
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and reality of time. After Einstein, physicists have answered many puzzles of time but
are still a long way from solving the problem of time. In fact, no one has said anything
new about the physical dimension of time since Einstein. Physicists have only explored
consequences of Einstein’s theory of time and made some marginal notes to SR and GR.
There are some philosophical and scientific speculations about two-dimensional time, but
they are only “gedanken experiments” without an ontological foundation.
Heim’s time is ontologically justified two-dimensional space. Its first dimension
is objectifiable, physical and temporal space, and its second dimension is non-
objectifiable and eternal space, nunc aeternum. A dimensional boundary and polarity
prevail between them, as I have shown.
According to Heim’s dimensional doctrine, there are, at first, objectifiable spaces
in our “I-Thou-it” world. The objectifiable spaces of “i,” “t,” and their combination, “w,”
are w-reality, “become.” w-reality is the relative physical and temporal dimension of
time. Like Einstein’s time, Heim’s physical time is a relative space. 75 It is impossible to
talk about the time, but only time of individual observers, my time or your time,
depending on how they are moving.76 In macrophysical w-reality, Einstein’s SR and GR
prevail, whereas QM prevails in microphysical w-reality. Einstein’s famous equation E =
mc² could be in Heim’s dimensional thinking the energetic w = mc².
Heim’s physical dimension of time as temporality is the dimension of change. It
involves temporal variations in the properties of things, and it is an ever-changing event.
The future of possibility is becoming the present, and the present is changing into the past
of necessity. The physical present is only a dimensionless point of the flux of time.
According to Heim, this flow of time is a secondary “become” or a process. It is an
infinite or limitless, continuous, and irreversible sequence of successive present moments
(t 1, t 2… t n ). Thus, Heim’s temporal time does not begin at to, but at t1. 77 In other words,
like Einstein, Heim argued that time has a beginning t1 but maybe no end. It is not
75 Heim argued that time is relative space already in 1902, in PA.
76 WnW, pp. 75-117.
77 GD, p. 61, 109. Heim’s temporal time does not begin at to, but at t1.
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absolute but a relative and contingent continuum.78 As a temporal “to be come”, it is
asymmetric and its direction is from the past to the future. Because the future of
possibility is changing into the past of necessity, time is the dimension of causality, and
as such, it cannot be empty. It is impossible to affect the past, because it is determined.
Because causal loops are impossible in Heim’s physical dimension of time, and because
its presence is privileged, time travel is not possible.79
Einstein’s time and Heim’s physical time are similar, but they differ from each
other at a crucial point. The “now” point was, for Einstein, the mysterious question that
lies beyond science. He was right, but because he did not try to answer this crucial
question, his concept of time was insufficient. Like Eddington, Heim thought that the
“now” point of flowing physical time “is the innermost Ego, which is and becomes.”
Penrose, for instance, has emphasized that something important is missing from the
physics of time, because between the mind and physical reality is a discrepancy.
According to Heim, this missing something is W-reality, which, as a non-objectifiable
and eternal time-dimension, is beyond science, as Einstein clearly understood.
In our “I-Thou-it” world, there are also non-objectifiable spaces. Those non-
objectifiable spaces of “I,” “T,” and their combination, “W,” are W-reality, “becoming.”
It is the absolute “now,” the nunc aeternum. W-reality is a pure non-objectifiable
energetic state, which could be explained in Heim’s dimensional thinking as the equation:
W = - ( mc²).
According to Heim, the eternal time dimension is a primary “becoming” or a
“transition.” It is a dimension in which the secondary “become” appears into existence.
In other words, “not yet become” reality becomes “already become” reality. Thus,
eternal time is bound with a certain location in the experienced world. Any certain point
among other similar points in the continuum of physical time suddenly receives from the
non-objectifiable space an accent that distinguishes it from the other points. However,
the eternal “now” is at the same time beyond the continuum of physical time. It is
everywhere in the universe. Therefore, simultaneity is relative and conventional only in
78 Heim’s position was vague. In GD, p. 179 and GN, p. 138, Heim argued that time is open and limitless,
but in WW, p.36, he claimed that physical time is closed. It has beginning and the end. “Die Welt nicht
unendlich ist, sondern ein in sich abgeschlossenes Ganzes darstellet…”
79 GD, p. 116.
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the dimension of physical time but absolute in the dimension of eternal time. In the other
words, Heim rejected absolute physical time, but he thought that eternal time was
absolute. Newton’s flaw had been that he thought that time is only one-dimensional and
physically absolute. In fact, Heim’s two-dimensional concept of time unifies Newtonian
and Einsteinian physics. Newtonian physics is not only a limited case of Einsteinian
physics but is also in an inverse order in two-dimensional time. 80
According to Heim’s dimensional doctrine, the universe is not an empty container
but a five-dimensional time-space in which the dimensional boundary prevail between
spaces. This dimensional boundary also exists between physical and eternal continuums
of time. It is physically the absolute velocity of light. Thus, B d = c1. In addition, there
is also the polarity between spaces. It is physically the absolute simultaneity within the
continuum of physical time and the continuum of eternal time. Heim’s time could be
illustrated as the following (Figure 4):
W + w w + W
The “here-and-now” point of
“I”-space and “i”-space
The arrow of relative and physical time starts from the Big Bang singularity
(W+w), and it ends in the Big Crunch singularity (w+W). The dimension of
absolute and eternal time is everywhere, and so the “now” fills the whole
universe. Polar w-reality and W-reality are constructed by the “now,” in other
80 GN, p. 143. “Dann ist der gegenwärtige Augenblick nicht ein Zeitpunkt, der vom Zeitstrom fortgerissen
wird. Auf das Jezt fällt ein Akzent, der aus einer anderen Dimension kommt. Es ist, vom Ich aus gesehen,
das nunc aeternum, das immer stillstehende Jetzt, durch das der Zeitstrom fortwährend hindurchfließt. Wie
das “Hier” gleichzeitig innerhalb und außerhalb des Körperraums liegt, so liegt also auch das “Jetzt” immer
gleichzeitig innerhalb und außerhalb der Zeitstrecke.”
Big Bang Big Crunch
w- reality W-reality
Now Now
Ps
Pp Pp
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words from energy (electron(s)).81 Our constant “I” and its variable “i” are bound
in the dimensionless point of the “here-and-now” of the dimension of relative and
physical time. The supra-polar space Ps is present in every point of the polar
spaces Pp. (Gray represents the past time in the dimension of physical time, and
means the polarity).82
3. Contributions to Theology
Heim did not write a summa theologiae. However, his whole oeuvre is
theological.83 Heim emphasized that the fundamental aim of his lifework was to provide
a new dimensional language for the means to message of the power of our Redeemer
Lord Christ. He wanted to provide direction for how to understand and speak about God
and His action in the world. From the ontological foundation of Heim’s dimensional
doctrine, the christological and eschatological world-view of theology, philosophical
world-view, and scientific worldpicture evolve into a coherent “worldpicture of the
future,” a theology of nature.84
Heim’s distinctive method was one of his remarkable contributions for theology.
His point of departure was not a theological exegesis of the Bible, but a scientific
interpretation of nature. First, he analyzed objectively the then-current scientific
worldpicture. In his analysis, Heim wanted to speak as a physicist to physicists and as a
biologist to biologists. He demythologized the scientific worldpicture from its
dogmatism and its unnecessary and false ontological assumptions. He proved that
science could never answer qualitative, immeasurable questions. Science has been able
to answer only quantitative, measurable questions. Thus, he made room for the
epistemological factor of non-objectifiable consciousness, and for supra-polar will and
81John Wheeler proposed that the entire universe is made of just one electron. See Kaku, Beyond Einstein,
pp. 181-182.
82 Compare illustration of dimensional doctrine in chapter III.3.
83 WW, pp. 185-199.
84 Heim argued: “Alle Aufschlüsse, die wir über den Sinn der Welt und das Lebens gewinnen können, sind
für uns also nicht dadurch erreichbar, dass wir uns eigene Gedanken über das Wesen Gottes und seine
Schöpfungsordnungen machen, sondern dadurch, dass wir vom Tatbestand der Herrschaft Jesu ausgehen
und dann darüber nachdenken, was sich aus diesem Tatbestand für das Verständnis der Welt und des
menschlichen Dasein ergibt. Unser Denken kann also immer nur nachzeichnen, was uns durch die
Wirklichkeit vorgegeben ist.” JH, p. 69.
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belief. Only after the supra-polar space of God opens upon us, is it possible to
understand God’s revelation and action in the world from this “central vision”
(Zentralschau ). Any scientific worldpicture must be seen in the christologic-
eschatological horizon of revelation, and vice versa. He emphasized that neither
scientific belief nor theological belief is privileged to be sacrifice of intellect. The world
created by science or theology is not simply “out there,” objective to human perceiving,
knowing, and evaluating. Reality and our “scientific” or “theological” reality are not
identical. No kind of science is a mirror of nature but only an intelligent interpretation.85
A. Heim’s Dimensional Cosmology
It seems that metaphysicians and theologians had given up the research of
cosmology to physicists in the first half of the past century. 86 Among theologians, Heim
was like a “space probe” in this quest.87 The point of departure of his dimensional
cosmology was a scientific analysis of the beginning of the universe.88 He explored
questions about the genesis of the universe, its size and volume, the origin of our solar
system, the origin of human life and its place within the organic world, based on what
was known in the first half of the twentieth century. Although Heim’s knowledge of
cosmology, astronomy, and biology was insufficient compared to our current knowledge,
he provided an analysis of their essential questions in a modern manner.
85 Timm, Glaube und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 30-35, and Langdon Gilkey, Nature, Reality, and the Sacred.
The Nexus of Science and Religion(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 9-16, 59-76.
86 See essays in PPT.
87 See Horst W. Beck, “Ein prophetischer Außenseiter” in WW,pp.7-28. Karl Barth stated that as a
principle the theological doctrine of creation should not concern itself with scientific descriptions and
results. Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Nature, p. 32, 48, noticed that in positive contrast to Barth,
Heim was aware that theological talk about God as creator remains empty if it is not relatable to a scientific
description of nature. Pannenberg, however, did not understand Heim’s theology of nature. He stated that
Heim was uncritical concerning the conceptual foundation of natural science. Pannenberg himself gave
priority to theology: “We must go beyond what the sciences provide and include our understanding of God
if we are properly to understand nature.”
88 Heim used, for example, the following books: C.F. von Weizsäcker, Geschichte der Natur (1948) and
Pascual Jordan, Die Entstehung der Sterne (1947). He was familiar also with the theories of Sir James
Jeans, Arthur Eddington, Fred Hoyle, Edwin Hubble, and George Gamow, to which he referred, for
example, WW, pp. 30-54.
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Heim’s analysis started from Kant’s hypothesis concerning meteorites,89
Laplace’s nebular hypothesis,90 and their variations until the 1950s. In the beginning,
something existed because of the dictum ex nihilo nil fit. The universe and our solar
system within it were born from this material stuff in the singularity of the Big Bang
(Anfangspunkt, Nullpunkt) 91 at least ten billion years ago. Because the Doppler effect
has proved that the universe is now expanding, the universe must have had an explosive
beginning from where space and time began. But what was in the beginning of the
universe, and how did it become this explosion of singularity? The last theory known to
Heim was the neutron theory of George Gamow, according to which, the universe began
as pure neutrons in high density in which the neutrons began to convert to protons
through the radioactive process of decay. Gamow, and before him Pascual Jordan,
presented an idea of creating something from pure space-time. Jordan argued that a star
by virtue of its mass obviously has energy. However, if the energy locked within its
gravitational field was calculated, it was negative. The total energy of the system may, in
fact, actually be zero. Therefore, it is possible that the entire universe was created as a
quantum transition from pure space-time, without matter or energy. Since the given star
had zero energy, there would be no violation of the conservation of energy if it were
created out of nothing. Ed Tyron subsequently proposed a similar theory of creation as a
fluctuation in a vacuum from pure space-time, where energy is zero.92
89 Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). Kant had realized that the
physical universe must have a center, which he identified with the point of largest density where the
formation of word started following the creation of matter. See Stanley L. Jaki, Science & Creation. From
Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe , (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986), p.289. Stephen
Hawking’s quantum cosmology starts with a similar presupposition as Kant’s theory, but without the
thought of creation. See his “Quantum Cosmology,” in Hawking and Penrose, The Nature of Space and
Time, pp. 75-103.
90 Pierre Simon Laplace, Exposition du système du monde(Explanation of the World System, 1796) and
Traité de Mécanique céleste (Treatise on Celestial Mechanics , five volumes, 1799-1825).
91 About the newest definitions of singularity, see Hawking, “Classical Theory” in Hawking and Penrose,
The Nature of Space and Time, pp. 3-26. “A space-time is singular if it is timelikebut cannot be embedded
in a larger space-time.”
92 WW, pp. 50-54. About current theories of the origin (and end) of the universe, see, for example, Steven
Weinberg, The First Three Minutes. A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe,(Updated Edition, New
York: Basic Books, 1993) and Paul Davies, The Last Three Minutes. Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate
of the Universe, (New York: Basic Books, 1994). According to Weinberg, The First Three Minutes, pp.
124-128, Gamow’s theory is not adequate because the universe probably started with equal numbers of
neutrons and protons, not with pure neutrons. About theory of Jordan, Gamow, and Tyron, see Kaku,
Beyond Einstein, pp. 189-190, and Pannenberg, Toward a Theology of Nature, pp.93-96. Pannenberg does
not understand what Jordan had argued, that in the progress of time, constantly new matter comes into
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Heim argued based on Einstein’s SR and GR that the universe could not be
infinite, but it is a finite and limitless entity. As such, it must have a weight and a
volume. Within a relative universe there are, however, no absolute yardsticks of space
and time. Measurements are always made from a perspectival center of the knowing
subject in the world, and therefore, they are always relative.93 Because the universe is a
bounded entirety, it must have a beginning and possibly an end. Heim asked three
questions: When were our solar system and the entire universe born? Where are they
born? If it is possible to answer those two questions, then it is possible to answer the
third question: How were they born? In other words, if we could find answers to the
questions about time-space, it is possible to describe adequately the process of
cosmological evolution.94
In order to answer the questions concerning time-space, it is necessary to
understand the meaning of the “human factor.” The universe and the mind are
inextricably correlated and mutually dependent on the relationship of polarity. Homo
sapiens was determined at the beginning of the universe. We are constructed from the
same stuff as the universe is. In the evolutionary process, we could see three tendencies
toward Homo sapiens: an organic, teleological, and holistic tendency, the appearance of
non-directional mutations toward alterations, and a natural selection that automatically
annihilated useless genes and made room for conscious Homo sapiens, his genes, and
culture, which is the end of biocultural evolution within the cosmological evolution of the
universe. The question of why there are just these tendencies and nothing else is
unanswerable. The entire universe is given and as such, it became “I-Thou-It”-reality,
existence. Dirac proved it already in 1930 that energy could be directly used to create matter in the form of
an electron-antielectron pair. See Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (London: Penguin Books, 1983),
pp. 25-43.
93According to Raimo Lehti, “The Concept of Space in Relativity Theory and Cosmology,” in ICD, pp. 12-
15, the discovery of microwave background radiation by Arno A. Penzias and Robert W. Wilson in 1965
has changed the interpretation of Einstein’s relativity principle. The special position of observers as
“stationary” has become a real possibility. It has weakened Einstein’s dogma of the equality of observers.
“The effect can be mathematically based on SR, but the result may be interpreted as a discovery of a
factual preferential role of one special system of reference, although such preference was not obvious in
terms of the theory alone.” In addition, Earth has an absolute motion (350 km s-1) that can be measured
through a universal homogeneous field of the background radiation. Of course, Heim was not aware about
the microwave background radiation.
94 WW, pp.30-37. Physicists have tried to describe how and how long ago the universe was born. They
have not asked where it was born at all.
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which is a five-dimensional entirety with two time dimensions and three spatial
dimensions.95
“In the beginning,” about which the Bible mythologically narrates, means
according to Heim’s dimensional doctrine, all kinds of beginnings within the polar world
that are at the same time the ends of an earlier interval of time. Therefore, the beginning
of time itself cannot belong to the polar world. Heim’s two-dimensional, physical and
eternal, time started from the singularity of W+w in the Big Bang, which was
spontaneously created by the eternal Word of the supra-polar God.96
According to Heim’s dimensional equation, because W = -(mc²) (negative energy)
and w = mc² (positive energy), then their sum is (W + w = 0). In other words, the
singularity of W+w was a point that has no energy. However, it was not absolute
nothingness, because ex nihilo nil fit. Heim’s dimensional cosmology in GD was based
on this conception. In the last volume, WW, however, Heim argued that creation
occurred ex nihilo, which is in consonance with the main line of theology but not with the
revelation and with science. According to the Bible, in the beginning was Logos, and the
creation occurred from and through this eternal Logos. Heim tried to interpret this
vagueness by arguing that the existence of all things in the world is always in a double
relation: they exist in a polar and causal relation, and they exist dependent on God’s
Word. Thus, all events in the world occur, on the one hand, within the polar spaces, and
on the other hand, within the supra-polar world of God. In addition, God’s supra-polar
95 WW, pp. 54-86. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor. Evolution, Culture, and Religion, (Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 1993), pp.277-279 argued in favor of “human factor” quite similarly with Heim who was
quite close to the so-called “weak anthropic principle.” The weak anthropic principle (W.A.P.) states that
we can observe the universe only from places and times where intelligent life can exist and can have
evolved. The strong anthropic principle (S.A.P.) states that intelligent life must necessarily exist in the
universe. See, for example, Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe.
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 51-53 and Robert J.
Russell, “Does the “God Who Acts” Really Act in Nature?” in ST, pp. 77-102. For Heim, however, human
existence or the holism of nature were not proof of God’s existence, because from polarity is no way into
supra-polarity.
96 WW, pp. 87-114. Heim did not claim that God’s Word was “ultimate causation” or a scientific fact. It is
only a biblical explanation about the fact, which remains always unanswerable for science. Paul Davies,
“Is the Universe Absurd?” in ST, p. 69, claims “there is no need for a divine act, or suspension of the laws,
to explain the Big Bang. It would be wrong to say that the laws of physics to which one appeals to explain
the Big Bang came into existence with the universe (or for that matter after it), for one could not then
appeal to those laws to explain the origin of the universe… The laws transcend space and time; they have
an abstract timeless existence, and are in some sense more fundamental than the universe they seek to
describe…”
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space is present in every point of the polar spaces. The Big Bang in the beginning must
have occurred in such a way that the singularity of W+w received a powerful energetic
accent from the supra-polar space of God. The entire universe was created from pure
time-space.97
The double relation just outlined is visible in the evolutionary process. Evolution
occurs in polar w-reality, that is, in physical time. In a certain “singularity” within the
evolution, one of the animals received unexpectedly from the supra-polar omnipotence of
God an accent, call, or divine selection that selected it to evolve to become conscious
Homo sapiens. The next step within human evolution was divine selection of Jesus of
Nazareth. It is impossible to explain those special “singularities” or “mutations” in the
evolutionary process causally, that is, within the dimension of relative and physical time.
On the other hand, it also seems that the double origin of the universe, of Homo sapiens,
and of Jesus Christ is contradictory if we think that time is only one-dimensional. From
the viewpoint of two-dimensional time, there is no contradiction. W-w-reality exists in
two spaces at the same time: both in temporal and in eternal space. In the absolute “now”
point everywhere in the polar W-w-reality, there always is the supra-polar omnipresence
of God’s space. The resurrection of Christ was not an historical event in physical time
but the “singularity” of the new eschatological creation, whose purpose is the return of
the polar creation, W+w, into the supra-polar world of God.98
According to Heim’s dimensional doctrine the origin of the universe occurred in
the ( t1 ) of physical time, from which started the whole cosmological and biological
evolutionary process. Moreover, all creation occurs in the eternal “now” point. Human
beings are a part of this determined and causal process of evolution or becoming in the
97 WW, p. 89. John 1: 1. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God.” Compare Genesis 1:1. Hartle and Hawking have developed a theory of creation out of nothing in
which the concept of time is defined only internally and becomes progressively less defined as we approach
the singularity “at the beginning.” There are no boundary conditions, because there is no point of time at
which the universe begins. See Christopher J. Isham, “Creation of the Universe as a Quantum Process” in
PPT, pp. 375-408. According to Heim’s dimensional doctrine, there was a time-like point of singularity,
W+w = 0, which is outside the dimension of physical time.
98 WW, pp. 90-104, JH, pp. 141-194, and Romans 1:3. Heim’s Christology was throughout his oeuvre
consequently in line with St. Mark, St. John, and St Paul. Therefore, “incarnation” is seldom mentioned in
his main work, “virginal birth” never. See Verena Grüter, Begegnung mit dem göttlichen Du, pp. 300-316.
Christ was incarnate Logos but for Heim “spiritual” Christ (Christos kata pneuma ) was more important
than “physical” Christ (Christos kata sarka ).
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dimension of physical time without any special status. On the other hand, God has
created or selected us to be His co-creators (Gottebenbildlichkeit) in the undetermined
and eternal dimension of time. There is no duality in the universe, because both
dimensions of time belong inseparably together.99
The contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking for theological (as also for
scientific and metaphysical) cosmology is the concept of two-dimensional time. In other
words, it is impossible to explain creation or the quantum singularity within one-
dimensional and physical time, because it does not lead out of the polarity. The
explanation of quantum fluctuation in science needs a two-dimensional time concept,
where w = mc², W = -(mc²), and w + W = 0. The theological doctrine of creation could
be understood only from the viewpoint of two-dimensional time. In creation, the
dimensions of temporal and eternal time cross each other at the eternal “now” point,
where the supra-polar space of God is present as a creative activity. It is not necessary to
presuppose that creation must be ex nihilo. It does not add any extra glory to God at all.
Besides, the origin of the universe without the presupposition of creatio ex nihilo is the
only scientific and biblical explanation, because of the law ex nihilo nil fit. All is from
God, through God, and to God. For Heim, it was not necessary to prove God’s existence
ontologically or teleologically, not even by argument from the evidence of design in
nature or any kind of atrophic principles, because of his panentheism.100 Besides, it is
impossible to prove God’s existence, because we have no way to move from our polarity
into supra-polarity. Nevertheless, God is at the same time both transcendent and
immanent, and Homo sapiens is His co-creator who participates in God’s continuing
creation (creatio continua ) of the world.101
99 WW, p. 105-114.
100 According to Jens Dietmar Colditz, “Schöpfung aus dem Nichts. Die Schöpfungsaussage im
naturwissenschaftlich-theologischen Dialog,” in GDJ, 1995, pp. 29-49, the Old Testament creation
statements can be read as if a creatio ex nihilo is claimed. The New Testament witness to creation assumes
the Old Testament understanding and validates it with a christological perspective. The molding of the
concept of creatio ex nihilo first occurred within the early church. Theology employed this expression in
order to express the absolute freedom and sovereignty of the Creator God.”
101 Ernan McMullin argues quite similarly with Heim that the doctrine of creation is not an explanation of a
beginning at all, but an assertion of the world’s absolute dependence on God in every moment. Arthur
Peacocke, although he argues in favor of panentheism, is closer to pantheism than panentheism. See Ian G.
Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology” in PPT, pp. 35-36, and 42.
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B. Dimensional Eschatology
Modern theologians have been mainly oriented toward the past or the present.
Their eschatological perspectives have tended to be fixed on Bultmann’s and his
follower’s existentialistic proclamation: “Every wave of time crashes on the shore of
eternity.” Theology has not been interested in future apocalypses. Instead, cosmologists
have made scientific assumptions about the future. Heim was on the side of the scientists
in this instance.102 He analyzed all kinds of scientific prognoses of the future from the
viewpoint of Einstein’s GR and the laws of thermodynamics. According to GR, space-
time began at the singularity of the Big Bang and would end at the singularity of the Big
Crunch. According to the laws of thermodynamics, the universe will run out of energy.
The first of these laws, that of conservation of energy, was first formulated by J. R.
Mayer in 1842. It says that in a closed system no more energy can come out than was put
in. All one can do is move energy around or change its form. What energy might be lost
appears in the form of heat. When all energy is turned into heat, the machine stops.
Anyone trying to generate energy without fuel will run foul of the first law. In other
words, perpetual motion is impossible. The second law of thermodynamics was
formulated by Rudolf J. E. Claudius in 1850. It states that heat cannot of itself pass from
a colder body to a hotter body. When energy has dissipated as heat, one cannot get it
back again without using up at least as much energy in the process. In any closed system,
disorder or entropy always increases with time.103
There are three arrows of time. Entropy is the thermodynamic arrow of time,
which distinguishes the past from the future, giving the irreversible and asymmetric
direction to time. The irreversible and asymmetric psychological arrow of time, the
102 Mark William Worthing, God, Greation, and Contemporary Physics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1996), pp. 161-162, hopes that “one can only hope that the dialogue between theology and science in the
field of eschatology will begin with more mutual understanding and less suspicion than that which
characterized much of the early dialogue over creation.”
103 WW, pp.116-131. See also Davies, About Time,pp. 84-87, and Hawking, A Brief History of Time,pp.
144-181. However, Ilya Prigogine argues that the behavior of dissipative systems is far from equilibrium.
Living systems maintain their highly complex order by being dissipative systems. We breathe out entropy
and create order out of chaos. See Polkinghorne, Science & Theology,pp. 43-44, and Hartmut Wehrt,
“Symmetrie und Geschichte. Symmetrieprinzipien und gerichtete Zeit: Geschichtliches und
ungeschichtliches Denken in der modernen Physik,” in GDJ, 1994, pp. 82-107.
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direction in which we remember the past but not the future, is the second. The
cosmological arrow of time, the direction in which the universe is expanding rather than
contracting, is the third arrow. The first and second arrows cannot reverse; they always
point in the same direction. However, the third will reverse, if the universe stops to
expanding and begins to contract.104
From the second law of thermodynamics, Hermann von Helmholtz made a
“scientific eschatological” prognosis in 1856, that the universe is dying, because entropy
never falls and it cannot go on rising forever. The end of the universe is necessarily a
thermodynamic equilibrium. It could be avoided, if there were an infinite energy source
outside the universe. Before the death of the universe, stars will die, and among them,
our sun will burn out and collapse under its own gravity into a white dwarf. The universe
will continue to expand forever, but if the expansion decelerates fast enough, it may one
day stop expanding and start to contract toward a Big Crunch.105
For Heim, the destiny of the human race was more important than the fate of the
universe. It is the key issue for understanding the true meaning of the ultimate fate of the
universe. The prospect of a dying universe convinced Steven Weinberg to conclude his
book about the first three minutes of the universe that all seems to be “pointless” and
“meaningless.”106 Although the future of the universe and humankind as a part of this
“ship” seems to be pessimistic, Heim did not speculate how we could avoid the ultimate
death of the universe (by creating “super beings” or escaping from the “mother universe”
104 See Hawking, A Brief History of Time, pp. 182-195. Hawking believes that a strong thermodynamic
arrow is necessary for intelligent life to operate. In order to survive, human beings have to consume food,
which is an ordered form of energy, and convert it into heat, which is a disordered form of energy. Thus,
intelligent life would not exist in the contracting phase of the universe. See also Davies, About Time,220-
221, and Polkinghorne, Science & Theology,pp. 45-46.
105 WW, pp. 128-131, and Davies, The Last Three Minutes, pp.37-48, 118-126. If the density of the mass
energy of the universe would be bigger than the so-called critical density, then the universe must be finite
but without boundary. The other possibility, that the geometry of the university is not bounded but open or
flat is gaining support from observation. It means, for example, that light is not bend by gravity but travels
in straight lines, the volume of the universe may be infinite, and the universe will continue its steady
expansion forever. A perfectly flat universe will keep on expanding forever, because there is not enough
matter to make it recollapse in a Big Crunch. However, if the so-called “cosmological constant exists,” we
cannot see beyond the event horizon. See Davies, About Time,pp. 157-162, and BBC News Online.
106 Weinberg, The First Three Minutes, pp. 154, 191.
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into “baby metaverses” through “worm holes”), but he drew attention to the
eschatological hope of humankind.107
According to Heim’s dimensional thinking, the destiny of our universe is the polarity of
time and spaces. In our “I-Thou-It” reality, there is dissonance between subject and
object, and between the past and the present, that is, between w- and W-reality. What we
can see belongs to the past, to w-reality. The deepest dissonance and disharmony prevail
between “I” and “Thou,” which belong to W-reality. Everyone is nearest to him or
herself, and the consequence is egoism. One is to another always a stranger. W -reality is
the battleground of opposite wills. It follows that w-reality will become inhabitable
sooner or later. This dissonance does not prevail only in the human world but also
everywhere in the macrocosmos and microcosmos. The microcosmic “T”-spaces
annihilate each other according to the law of polarity. The universe is under distress and
chaos. There are two alternatives: either a hopeless or a hopeful future. Mankind has
always hoped that from the content of the past and of the present could evolve a better
future. According to Heim, the only hope is that the polarity between w- and W-reality
will be abolished. In the other words, temporality must become annihilated.108
According to Heim’s dimensional thinking, the polarity will be abolished at the
Big Crunch or telos, where w + W will recollapse to zero, and physical time ceases.
However, the singularity of the beginning was not an absolute nothingness, so in the
same way, the singularity of the end is not ceasing into emptiness but it is a “return” of
temporality into eternity, polarity into supra-polarity in which God is all in all. Heim
argued that when polarity is abolished, our Kantian a priori intuition forms of space and
time will be altered to the a posteriori intuitive form of eternity, and we might not only
“know the mind of God,” as Hawking hopes, but also see the divine Thou face to face.
This eschatological hope is based on the resurrection of Christ, which was the first stage
or “singularity” of the new creation. The risen Christ ascended to the supra-polar space,
107 WW, pp. 131-141, Worthing, God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics, p. 179, 198, Polkinghorne,
Science & Theology,pp.114-117, Robert J. Russell, “The Theological Consequences of the
Thermodynamics of a Moral Universe: An Appreciative Critique and Extension of the Murphy/Ellis
Project” CTNS Bulletin4 (1998), pp. 19-24, and Davies, The Last Three Minutes, pp.141-155.
108 WW, pp. 141-144.
193
which is not a “metaverse” of many-worlds physicists but the “universe” of eternal
freedom.109
The contribution of Heim’s dimensional doctrine for the theological eschatology
is its strong theology of nature. Heim’s dimensional eschatology was based on scientific
discoveries of nature, but primarily it was also based on sources outside of science,
namely, on dimensionally interpreted biblical truths. These two sources of knowledge
and belief are unified systematically on the ontological foundation of his dimensional
doctrine and its concepts of two-dimensional time and polarity.
109 WW, pp. 145-184.
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CONCLUSION
Karl Heim was one of the first theologians in the twentieth century who saw that
it was necessary to start a dialogue with scientists, philosophers, and theologians. To
assist such a task, he constructed a “theology of nature”: an ontological theory of reality,
where our existence, believing, and thinking are consonant. Heim’s dimensional doctrine
was based on the concepts of space, boundary, and polarity within two-dimensional time.
Heim’s dimensional thinking evolved, on the one hand, from the basis of Kant’s
critical idealism and its continuation in the German absolute idealism of Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel. Heim also built his ideas on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, the neo-
Kantian critical idealism of Natorp and Rickert, and the existentialism of Heidegger.
This mainly idealistic stream of thought was, however, one-sided and insufficient for
describing all of reality. It needed the critical physical realism of Einstein for its polar
basis. In addition, the quantum idealism of Heisenberg, although it oscillated between
idealism and realism, made room for Heim’s two-dimensional time. Heim, however,
constructed his own world-view beyond any mere combination of the above philosophies.
The purpose of Heim’s ontological dimensional doctrine was the correction and
expansion of Kant’s epistemological forms of intuition, space and time, and to bring
together two opposite stances to reality, idealism and realism. This was possible on the
basis of his concept of two-dimensional time.
According to Heim’s dimensional thinking, the basic concepts of reality are space
(Raum), boundary (Grenze), and polarity (Polarität). The concept of space explains that
reality is constructed by limitless and infinite n-dimensional spaces whose types are
physical, mathematical, psychic or conscious, and panpsychic. We are able to know the
existence of a new space, when it will be opened to us in a synthetic event or process a
priori. We can realize synthetically a priori that we have existed in that for us unknown
space.
The concept of boundary explains that there are two types of boundaries. The
boundary of content prevails in one and same space. The boundary of dimension prevails
between two or more spaces. In fact, the dimensional boundary is the velocity of light.
From this conceptual double meaning of the concept of boundary, follow five necessary
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distinctions. First, the contents and spaces must be separated. Next, both unity and
difference prevail in the contents and in the spaces. Then, t here is a relation of parts, that
is, inclusion and subordination between contents and between spaces, and a contact
between contents, and a confrontation or meeting between spaces. Finally, there are two
different kinds of epistemological ways to know: the knowledge of content and the
knowledge of dimension.
The concept of polarity argues that a double polarity prevails between spaces and
their contents, that is, between opposite poles and their indifference condition. Polarity is
neither a causal nor a logical relation but the “given” and original relation sui generis. In
fact, it is absolute simultaneity.
Our world is the polar space of “I-thou-it”, and God’s world is the supra-polar
space, which is, nevertheless, present at every point of our polar reality. We can know it,
when or if it will be opened to us in a synthetic event a priori. Heim’s dimensional
thinking clarified semantically the usage of philosophical and theological language. The
old terms, such as “beyond,” “above,” “over,” or even “t ranscendent,” were no longer
meaningful in expressions about the relationship between God, man, and the world.
Heim’s dimensional thinking is, even after fifty years, still one of the most
remarkable endeavors to find an intelligent answer to the ultimate metaphysical questions.
However, some logical, semantical, and ontological problems are unanswered in Heim’s
dimensional thinking, as this critical analysis has shown. I shall conclude them as the
following:
The basic concept of space in Heim’s dimensional thinking (Philosophie der
Räume) was certainly a notable contribution to the discussion between science,
philosophy, and theology. However, there are some semantical and ontological
controversies or at least controversial points in Heim’s definitions. Heim defined the
concept of space by using the concepts of mathematical sets, which means that the whole
conceptualization of the mathematical sets keeps up with Heim’s definition, for example,
the so-called continuum-problem. On the other hand, there may be no continuum on the
fundamental level of the string or loop theories of Quantum gravity. However, Heim
emphasized that his concept of space is only analogous with the mathematical concept of
space. Thus, the question is what is the exact meaning of “analogous” in this case. Is
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“space” ontologically real, or only metaphorical, as, for example, Pannenberg has
argued? Heim himself argued that his operative spaces “I,” “T,” “i” and “t,” and their
combinations “W” and “w” are ontologically real.
The opening of spaces, which according to Heim, occurs as a gift, as a paradox,
and by a synthetic event a priori, is, according to logical empirism, semantically
confusing. According to Kant and most of his followers, it is, however, adequate.
Popper, among others, accepted synthetic judgments a priori, but he stated that they are
usually false a posteriori. Heim himself did not argue in favor of synthetic judgments a
priori but synthetic events a priori.
The conceptual distinction between the boundary of content and of dimension is
semantically the crucial point in Heim’s dimensional doctrine. On the one hand, it means
a clear and correct usage of language in our scientific era. It is necessary to use this
distinction, if we are to avoid epistemological co ntradictions. On the other hand,
however, Bd is problematic, because its meaning is partly dependent on the concept of
“opening.” If Bd is interpreted as a limit of the velocity of light, Bd = c-1, as I have argued,
it has a serious contribution to physics, especially to the interpretation of QM.
. Heim did not clearly distinguish m-, f-, and φ-languages from each other. This is
a reason for semantical confusions in his dimensional thinking. In addition, Heim wanted
to avoid all kinds of metalanguages. Therefore, he used only ordinary language but at the
cost of semantically inadequate communication.
According to Heim, polarity is the most fundamental law in reality (Weltformel).
However, there are some modal logical problems in its use within Heim’s dimensional
doctrine. We must ask, because we do not know, what is Heim’s idea concerning
polarity (Pp)? Is Pp necessary, possible, or contingent in all cases? Heim argued that it
prevails necessarily in intra-mundane reality, but not in supra-mundane reality. Thus, the
former is necessary, and the latter is contingent, which means that God’s supra-polar
space (Ps) is possible but not necessary. Heim thus reversed the traditional belief that the
world is contingent, whereas God is necessary.
Heim’s “second Copernican revolution,” Ps or “supra-polarity,” is the most
crucial idea (articulus stantis et cadentis) of his dimensional thinking. It is also the most
criticized point of Heim’s thinking. The way from Pp to Ps is by way of negation (via
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negationis): “non”-polarity, “non”-spatial, or “non”-temporal. From the logical negation,
however, nothing follows in the context of existence. Ps is only a necessary postulate. In
addition, the “opening” of Ps is as controversial as the “opening” of the spaces of Pp,
because of problems of synthetic a priori. However, the ontological attitude of logical
empirism to existential entities may be too strict and as a metaphysical assumption, in
fact, against its own premise, because it rejects all metaphysical sentences as meaningless.
Thus, it cannot have any ontological attitude, and it cannot say anything about existence.
According to both critical realism and pragmatic realism, Heim’s concept of supra-
polarity can be tolerable as a theoretical, practical, and operative concept, because, for
example, it is as a necessary concept in Heim’s dimensional thinking as the “electron” is
in physics.
Concerning the intension of Heim’s dimensional thinking, I shall conclude that
Heim did not clearly distinguish between f- and φ-languages. Therefore, for example, i-
space can be either phenomenal or physical. When Heim analyzed objectifiable reality,
he was more physicalist and realist, and when he analyzed the non-objectifiable reality,
he was more phenomenalist and idealist. He tried to unify both physicalism (realism) and
phenomenalism (idealism), but his ordinary language was vague, because he did not want
to use any metalanguage.
The most crucial problems in Heim’s work after supra-polarity (Ps), are I/i, I=i,
(I&i) ⊂ i, I│i, and I╪i. Heim tried to construct a synthesis between idealism and realism,
but he could not completely avoid the antinomy between subject and object. Heim’s
claims oscillated between idealism and realism. He was an idealist on non-objectifiable
reality, and a realist on objectifiable reality. However, the concept of two-dimensional
time of his dimensional thinking provides a useful ontological tool for resolving this
epistemological problem, as I have argued in my analysis.
Ps │ Pp, as dialogue between God and “I,” means some kind of polar relation,
which is against the definition of the supra-polarity. Namely, “I am because God exists,”
but the second condition of polarity, “God is, because I am,” is obviously impossible. In
addition, Pp prevails in Ps between S God and S Satan, which is not possible, because of the
definition of supra-polarity. Heim’s thought that the polar will and belief have some kind
of supra-polar properties is also a controversial idea, which is against the definition of
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space-type (3). On the other hand, if we accept that will and belief have powerful supra-
polar properties, the history of the world and religions would be more understandable.
According to Heim’ dimensional doctrine, reality is monistic and there are three
levels of relations: transcendent, non-objectifiable, and objectifiable. Dimensional
boundaries and polarity prevail between the intra-mundane spaces within the supra-polar
hyperspace that is God’s space. Heim’s world-view is not pantheistic but panentheistic,
because God’s supra-polar space is present (not identical) in every point of polar reality.
Heim’s world-view is also dynamic, because polarity prevails between non-objectifiable
and objectifiable spaces. Thus, reality is not experienced as a static state but also as
dynamic action.
Despite the fact, that in the basic concepts and the intension of Heim’s
dimensional thinking, there are some controversial points, it provides serious solutions to
the important ontological and epistemological problems. Heim claimed that, at first, it is
necessary to construct a common and intelligible theory, on which a fruitful discussion
among philosophers, scientists, and theologians is possible without a sacrificium
intellectus. Heim’s ontological dimensional doctrine could be a basis for all further
endeavors in this field of discussion about ultimate metaphysical questions. Heim’s
primary purpose was only to make room for believing in and thinking of divine revelation
and action in the world. He never tried to prove God’s existence, because such proofs are
epistemologically and ontologically impossible in the polar world. However, his
dimensional doctrine provides serious epistemological and ontological solutions for other
kinds of ultimate problems found in philosophy, physics, and theology. Regrettably,
Heim himself did not enter the soil, which he had liberated with his revolutionary
thinking. Therefore, I have used Heim’s dimensional doctrine and its formalized
language as a yardstick to show what kind of contributions it would have to philosophy,
physics, and theology.
From the viewpoint of philosophy, the purpose of Heim’s dimensional doctrine
was an expansion of Kant’s epistemological forms of intuition, that is, space and time.
Heim proved that Kant’s epistemological scheme of a priori forms of intuition and
categories of sense can map sensations, but are not able to map the ontological side of
objective reality, which is independent from our sensations and the ability of the mind to
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construct it. Kant’s space was the formal a priori condition of outer experiences, and
time was the formal a priori condition of appearances. Neither had any physical status.
Heim rejected this idea and argued that it is necessary that time and space are a unity,
time-space, and that it has both physical and phenomenal status. Time must be the
physical and experienced two-dimensional space.
Heim changed Kant’s epistemological question “How are synthetic a priori
judgments possible?” to an ontological question “What kinds of ontological relations and
events prevail between minds and objects?” For Heim, the opening of “i”-space upon
“I”-space is synthetic a priori and non-propositional event, which occurs in two-
dimensional time-space. The limit between subject and object is the ontological,
“dimensional” boundary between two spaces, not only an epistemological horizon of
contents within a space. Thus, the crucial difference between Kant and Heim was that
Kant made epistemological and propositional claims about objects within a space and
time of pure reason, whereas Heim made non-propositional and ontological conclusions
about events between “I” and “i,” that is, between the epistemological subject and its
object.
Kant’s epistemological separation of reality into the realms of phenomena and
noumena was, in fact, Platonic and dualistic. It was based on his incorrect concepts of
space and time. Kant’s space and time are only a priori forms inside the mind and as
such do not inhere in things-in-themselves. Heim’s reality was a monistic unity, where
there are only dimensional and polar relations between non-objectifiable subjects and
their objects within two-dimensional time-space. Heim rejected Kant’s thought that it is
impossible to overcome the transcendental horizon that separates phenomena and
noumena from each other, and to know anything about noumena. He argued that we
could know dimensionally, intersubjectively, and continuously more and more, not only
about things-it-themselves but also about the universe as a finite and causal entirety.
Heim agreed with Kant that there is no way to prove God’s existence, that is, there is no
way from the polarity into the supra-polarity. However, the most crucial difference
between Kant and Heim was a fundamentally different concept of time. Kant thought
that it was only a form of the mind, whereas Heim argued that it must be two-
dimensional space: physical and eternal.
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Heim’s dimensional doctrine provides also a solution for the controversy between
realism and idealism. Heim claimed that on the basis of the traditional concept of one-
dimensional, temporal, and physical time, it is possible to take either the position of
idealism or realism. The synthesis of realism and idealism is possible only on the basis
of his concept of two-dimensional time. Heim proved that the German idealism of Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel, the existentialism of Heidegger, the critical physical realism of
Einstein, and the quantum idealism of Heisenberg were ultimately based on either
idealism or realism, or they oscillated between idealism and realism, and therefore, they
were insufficient descriptions of reality. Only Schelling’s “ideal-realism” was a similar
endeavor to unify idealism and realism, but it failed, because Schelling ignored his own
basic concept of “polarity.” Because Heim combined ontologically both objectifiable
and non-objectifiable reality, that is, the physical and eternal dimensions of time, it was
possible to avoid the epistemological controversy between idealism and realism, and thus,
unify idealism and realism.
Heim’s dimensional doctrine provides also a solution for the mind-body problem.
It is not possible to resolve the problem on the basis of either materialism or dualism but
only on the basis of his concept of two-dimensional time-space. Heim proved that
consciousness is both a qualitative, subjective, and mental phenomenon, and a natural
part of the physical world. The mental and subjective phenomena of “I” and “T,” and
their combination “W,” are the qualitatively and eternally present “to be becoming” pole
of reality. The quantitative, physical, biological, and objective phenomena of “i” and “t,”
and their combination “w,” are the natural and always past “to be become” pole of reality.
Because the mind belongs to W-reality, and the body belongs to w-reality, it is not
possible know anything about the mind itself. In other words, the non-objectifiable
knower and the objectifiable known belong to two different dimensions of time, and the
dimensional boundary (Bd = c-1) prevails between them. There is no signal faster than the
velocity of light. However, the mind and the body belong inseparably together. The “I”-
space is the epistemological, volitional, and energetic center of the conscious brain, the
“i”-space.
Heim’s dimensional doctrine provides a serious ontological solution to the
peculiarities of QM and an epistemological solution to its interpretations. Heim proved
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that it is not necessary to presuppose that reality is epistemologically dualistic. Bohr’s
complementarity principle was inadequate. The quantum boundary between the quantum
level and the classical level of reality is not only epistemological but also ontological.
The dimensional boundary prevails between two infinite and limitless spaces, that is, the
velocity of light (Bd ) separates the non-objectifiable and objectifiable realms of reality.
Reality is “physical” and “mental,” but it is not discontinuous, as Bohr believed, but
continuous and holistic.
The problem of measurement occurs because it is impossible to measure the non-
objectifiable energy, that is, the “T”-space, which belongs to W-reality. Physicists can
measure only the objectifiable “t”-space, that is, the effects of energy, which belong to w-
reality. Heim’s solution for the problem of measurement was that it must describe both
physical and mental reality as an interaction within two-dimensional time. Both the
dimensional boundary (the velocity of light) and the polarity (the absolute simultaneity)
prevail between W-reality and w-reality. It might be possible to construct a theory in
which this ontological state could be also mathematically resolved.
Heim’s dimensional doctrine proves that the reason of both philosophical and
scientific confusions is an insufficient concept of time. Einstein proved that the physical
dimension of time is not absolute but flexible and relative. Time became space, which is
dependent on the movement of the individual observer. However, Einstein’s revolution
was unfinished. He could not resolve the problems of simultaneity and “now,” because
he ignored the “internal” time of the observer. All endeavors of physicists to resolve
those problems have failed, because of their inadequate concept of time. For example,
the F-theory of superstrings, in which time is two-dimensional but physical, could not be
any adequate T.O.E. because it ignores the non-objectifiable and eternal dimension of
time.
Heim’s time is an ontologically justified two-dimensional space. Its first
dimension is objectifiable, physical, temporal, and relative, and the second dimension is
non-objectifiable, mental, eternal, and absolute. The dimensional boundary, that is, the
velocity of light (Bd = c-1 ) prevails between them in the physical time-dimension, and the
polarity, that is the absolute simultaneity, prevails between them in the eternal dimension
of time. Einstein’s famous equation E = mc² is the energetic w = mc² in Heim’s
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dimensional thinking. It is the secondary “to be become” or “process” in the asymmetric
and causal flux of time within w-reality. The primary “to be becoming” or “transition” is
the eternal and absolute “now” point everywhere within the universe. It could be
explained as the equation W = -(mc²). Thus, the two-dimensional time of Heim’s
dimensional thinking combined the Einsteinian and Newtonian physics.
Heim’s dimensional thinking as such is a remarkable contribution for theology.
When he analyzed theological questions, his language was not only theological but also
philosophical and scientific. He emphasized that neither theological nor scientific
thought is privileged to be absurd, a sacrifice of intellect.
Heim proved that it is impossible to describe creation within one -dimensional
physical time, because it does not lead out of polarity. Instead, from the viewpoint of
two-dimensional time, both scientific and theological cosmology becomes meaningful.
Creatio ex nihilo as a polar description is a false idea both in scientific and in the biblical
context. Theologians have overestimated the support of the quantum physical theories of
creation out of “nothing,” that is, creation as a vacuum fluctuation from pure space-time,
to their own theory of creatio ex nihilo, which was constructed for the glory of God.
Those theories cannot answer the questions when and where was the universe created,
and so the question of how remains unanswered.
In the dimensional cosmology of Heim, the key question is the “human factor” in
the universe. The universe became a polar “I-Thou-It” reality, which is a five-
dimensional entirety with two dimensions of time and three spatial dimensions. The
missing part of all cosmological the ories is, in fact, time itself, which was “in the
beginning” a supra-polar singularity, W+w. This singularity received a powerful
energetic accent from the supra-polar space of God. Thus, the universe was created from
the pure time-space, but not ex nihilo. Conscious human beings were created similarly:
in a certain singularity of the evolutionary process, one of the animals received
unexpectedly an accent or divine selection from the supra-polar omnipotence of God.
The Resurrection of Jesus Christ was the next step within the evolution toward
consummatio mundi, which means according to Heim, the return of polar creation into
the supra-polar world of God.
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Heim argued that the destiny of the universe is the polarity. The hope in the
Heim’s dimensional eschatology is that the polarity between and within W-reality and W-
reality will be abolished. It means that all temporality must become annihilated.
Eschatological consummatio mundi will be, not the “Big Crunch” but the “Big Chance,”
which means that the polar temporality returns into the eternal supra-polarity, where God
is all in all.
The main contribution of Heim’s dimensional thinking is its concept of two-
dimensional time. It provides serious solutions to the ultimate epistemological and
ontological questions of philosophy, science, and theology. It is impossible to answer
those questions only on the basis of the concept of one-dimensional and physical time.
The above-analyzed philosophies and scientific theories have failed because they have
ignored the “eternal factor,” that is, the second dimension of time-space. Heim’s
dimensional thinking provides a remarkable ontological theory and language for the basis
to continue the discussion among philosophers, scientists, and theologians. It makes the
universe, which is our destiny, more understandable. The “worldpicture of the future”
was Heim’s dream in his long journey. However, it is possible to reach the whole picture
only at the end of time, where T.O.E. is neither theories nor dreams but a visio Dei
beatifica.
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